1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
4	HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., :
5	Petitioners : No. 11-398
6	v. :
7	FLORIDA, ET AL. :
8	x
9	Washington, D.C.
10	Tuesday, March 27, 2012
11	
12	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
13	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
14	at 10:00 a.m.
15	APPEARANCES:
16	DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., ESQ., Solicitor General,
17	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
18	Petitioners.
19	PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
20	Respondents Florida, et al.
21	MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
22	Respondents NFIB, et al.
23	
24	
25	
	_

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	DONALD B. <mark>VERRILLI,</mark> JR., ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioners	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondents Florida, et al.	54
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	MICHAEL A. <mark>CARVIN, ESQ.</mark>	
10	On behalf of the Respondents NFIB, et al.	81
11	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
12	DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., ESQ.	
13	On behalf of the Petitioners	108
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:00 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will continue
4	argument this morning in Case 11-398, the Department of
5	Health and Human Services v. Florida.
6	General Verrilli.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.,
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
9	GENERAL VERRILLI: Mr. Chief Justice, and
10	may it please the Court:
11	The Affordable Care Act addresses a
12	fundamental and enduring problem in our health care
13	system and our economy. Insurance has become the
14	predominant means of paying for health care in this
15	country. Insurance has become the predominant means of
16	paying for health care in this country. For most
17	Americans, for more than 80 percent of Americans, the
18	insurance system does provide effective access. Excuse
19	me.
20	But for more than 40 million Americans who
21	do not have access to health insurance either through
22	their employer or through government programs such as
23	Medicare or Medicaid, the system does not work. Those
24	individuals must resort to the individual market, and
25	that market does not provide affordable health

1	insurance. It does not do so because it because the
2	multibillion dollar subsidies that are available for
3	the the employer market are not available in the
4	individual market. It does not do so because ERISA and
5	HIPAA regulations that preclude that preclude
б	discrimination against people based on their medical
7	history do not apply in the individual market. That is
8	an economic problem. And it begets another economic
9	problem.
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why aren't those problems
11	that the Federal Government can address directly?
12	GENERAL VERRILLI: They can address it
13	directly, Justice Scalia, and they are addressing it
14	directly through this through this Act by regulating
15	the means by which health care by which health care
16	is purchased. That is the way this Act works.
17	Under the Commerce Clause, what Congress has
18	done is to enact reforms of the insurance market,
19	directed at the individual insurance market, that
20	preclude that preclude discrimination based on
21	pre-existing conditions, that require guaranteed issue
22	and community rating. And it uses and the minimum
23	coverage provision is necessary to carry into execution
24	those insurance reforms
25	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you create commerce in

4

1 order to regulate it? 2 GENERAL VERRILLI: That's not what's going 3 on here, Justice Kennedy, and we're not seeking to defend the law on that basis. 4 5 In this case, the -- what is being regulated б is the method of financing health -- the purchase of 7 health care. That itself is economic activity with substantial effects on interstate commerce. And --8 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: So, any self-purchasing? Anything I -- you know, if I'm in any market at all, my 10 failure to purchase something in that market subjects me 11 12 to regulation. GENERAL VERRILLI: No. That's not our 13 position at all, Justice Scalia. In the health care 14 15 market -- the health care market is characterized by the 16 fact that aside from the few groups that Congress chose to exempt from the minimum coverage requirement -- those 17 who for religious reasons don't participate, those who 18 19 are incarcerated, Indian tribes -- virtually everybody 20 else is either in that market or will be in that market, and the distinguishing feature of that is that they 21 cannot -- people cannot generally control when they 22 23 enter that market or what they need when they enter that 24 market. 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, the same, it

seems to me, would be true, say, for the market in
 emergency services: police, fire, ambulance, roadside
 assistance, whatever.

You don't know when you're going to need it; 4 you're not sure that you will. But the same is true for 5 б health care. You don't know if you're going to need a 7 heart transplant or if you ever will. So, there's a 8 market there. In some extent, we all participate in it. 9 So, can the government require you to buy a cell phone because that would facilitate responding when 10 you need emergency services? You can just dial 911 no 11 12 matter where you are?

GENERAL VERRILLI: No, Mr. Chief Justice. I 13 think that's different. It's -- we -- I don't think we 14 15 think of that as a market. This is a market. This is 16 market regulation. And, in addition, you have a situation in this market not only where people enter 17 involuntarily as to when they enter and won't be able to 18 19 control what they need when they enter, but when they --20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It seems to me 21 that's the same as in my hypothetical. You don't know when you're going to need police assistance. You can't 22 23 predict the extent to emergency response that you'll 24 need, but when you do -- and the government provides it. 25 I thought that was an important part of your argument,

6

1 that when you need health care, the government will make 2 sure you get it. Well, when you need police assistance or 3 fire assistance or ambulance assistance, the government 4 is going to make sure to the best extent it can that you 5 б get it. 7 GENERAL VERRILLI: I think the fundamental 8 difference, Mr. Chief Justice, is that that's not an issue of market regulation. This is an issue of market 9 regulation, and that's how Congress -- that's how 10 Congress looked at this problem. There is a market. 11 12 Insurance is provided through a market system --13 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think there is a 14 market for burial services? 15 GENERAL VERRILLI: For burial services? 16 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes. GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes, Justice Alito, I 17 think there is. 18 19 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Suppose that you 20 and I walked around downtown Washington at lunch hour 21 and we found a couple of healthy young people and we 22 stopped them and we said: You know what you're doing? 23 You are financing your burial services right now because 24 eventually you're going to die, and somebody is going to 25 have to pay for it, and if you don't have burial

7

1 insurance and you haven't saved money for it, you're 2 going to shift the cost to somebody else. Isn't that a very artificial way of talking 3 about what somebody is doing? 4 5 GENERAL VERRILLI: No -б JUSTICE ALITO: And if that's true, why 7 isn't it equally artificial to say that somebody who is 8 doing absolutely nothing about health care is financing health care services. 9 GENERAL VERRILLI: It's -- I think it's 10 completely different. The -- and the reason is that the 11 12 burial example is not -- the difference is here you are 13 regulating the method by which you are paying for something else -- health care -- and the insurance 14 15 requirement I think -- I mean, the key thing here is my 16 friends on the other side acknowledge that it is within 17 the authority of Congress under Article I under the commerce power to impose guaranteed-issue and 18 19 community-rating reforms, to end -- to impose a minimum 20 coverage provision. Their argument is just that it has 21 to occur at the point of sale, and --2.2 JUSTICE ALITO: I don't see the difference. 23 You can get burial insurance. You can get health 24 insurance. Most people are going to need health care, 25 almost everybody. Everybody is going to be buried or

8

1 cremated at some point. 2 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, one big 3 difference --JUSTICE ALITO: What's the difference? 4 5 GENERAL VERRILLI: One big difference, Justice Alito, is the -- you don't have the cost б 7 shifting to other market participants. Here --8 JUSTICE ALITO: Sure you do, because if you 9 don't have money, then the State is going to pay for it 10 or some --GENERAL VERRILLI: But that's different. 11 12 JUSTICE ALITO: A family member is going to 13 pay for it. 14 GENERAL VERRILLI: That's a difference, and it's a significant difference. That in this situation, 15 16 one of the economic effects Congress is addressing is that the -- there -- the many billions of dollars of 17 uncompensated costs are transferred directly to other 18 19 market participants. It's transferred directly to other 20 market participants because health care providers charge higher rates in order to cover the cost of uncompensated 21 care, and insurance companies reflect those higher rates 22 23 in higher premiums, which Congress found translates to a thousand dollars per family in additional health 24 25 insurance costs.

JUSTICE ALITO: But isn't that really a small part of what the mandate is doing? You can correct me if these figures are wrong, but it appears to me that the CBO has estimated that the average premium for a single insurance policy in the non-group market would be roughly \$5,800 in -- in 2016. Respondents -- the economists who have

8 supported the Respondents estimate that a young, healthy individual targeted by the mandate on average consumes 9 about \$854 in health services each year. So the mandate 10 11 is forcing these people to provide a huge subsidy to the 12 insurance companies for other purposes that the Act wishes to serve, but isn't -- if those figures are 13 14 right, isn't it the case that what this mandate is 15 really doing is not requiring the people who are subject 16 to it to pay for the services that they are going to consume? It is requiring them to subsidize services 17 18 that will be received by somebody else.

19 GENERAL VERRILLI: No, I think that -- I do 20 think that's what the Respondents argue. It's just not 21 right. I think it -- it really gets to a fundamental 22 problem with their argument.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: If you're going to haveinsurance, that's how insurance works.

25 GENERAL VERRILLI: A, it is how insurance

10

1	works, but, B, the problem that they that they are
2	identifying is not that problem. The guaranteed issue
3	and community rating reforms do not have the effect of
4	forcing insurance companies to take on lots of
5	additional people who they then can't afford to cover
б	because they're they tend to be the sick, and that
7	is in fact, the exact opposite is what happens here.
8	The when you enact guaranteed issue and
9	community rating reforms, and you do so in the absence
10	of a minimum coverage provision, it's not that insurance
11	companies take on more and more people and then need a
12	subsidy to cover it, it's that fewer and fewer people
13	end up with insurance because their rates are not
14	regulated. Insurance companies, when when they have
15	to offer guaranteed issue and community rating, they are
16	entitled to make a profit. They charge rates sufficient
17	to cover only the sick population because health
18	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Could you help help me
19	with this. Assume for the moment you may disagree.
20	Assume for the moment that this is unprecedented, this
21	is a step beyond what our cases have allowed, the
22	affirmative duty to act to go into commerce. If that is
23	so, do you not have a heavy burden of justification?
24	I understand that we must presume laws are
25	constitutional, but, even so, when you are changing the

1	relation of the individual to the government in this,
2	what we can stipulate is, I think, a unique way, do you
3	not have a heavy burden of justification to show
4	authorization under the Constitution?
5	GENERAL VERRILLI: So two things about that,
б	Justice Kennedy. <mark>First, we think this is regulation of</mark>
7	people's participation in the health care market, and
8	all all this minimum coverage provision does is say
9	that, instead of requiring insurance at the point of
10	sale, that Congress has the authority under the commerce
11	power and the necessary and proper power to ensure that
12	people have insurance in advance of the point of sale
13	because of the unique nature of this market, because
14	this is a market in which in which you although
15	most of the population is in the market most of the
16	time 83 percent visit a physician every year; 96
17	percent over a five-year period so virtually
18	everybody in society is in this market.
19	And you've got to pay for the health care
20	you get, the predominant way in which it's in which
21	it's paid for is insurance, and and the Respondents
22	agree that Congress could require that you have
23	insurance in order to get health care or forbid health
24	care from being provided
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why do you why do you

12

1	define the market that broadly? Health care. It may
2	well be that everybody needs health care sooner or
3	later, but not everybody needs a heart transplant, not
4	everybody needs a liver transplant. Why
5	GENERAL VERRILLI: That's correct, Justice
б	Scalia, but you never know whether you're going to be
7	that person.
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: Could you define the
9	market everybody has to buy food sooner or later, so
10	you define the market as food, therefore, everybody is
11	in the market; therefore, you can make people buy
12	broccoli.
13	GENERAL VERRILLI: No, that's quite
14	different. That's quite different. The food market,
15	while it shares that trait that everybody's in it, it is
16	not a market in which your participation is often
17	unpredictable and often involuntary. It is not a market
18	in which you often don't know before you go in what you
19	need, and it is not a market in which, if you go in
20	and and seek to obtain a product or service, you will
21	get it even if you can't pay for it. It doesn't have
22	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that a principled basis
23	for distinguishing this from other situations? I mean,
24	you know, you can also say, well, the person subject to
25	this has blue eyes. That would indeed <mark>distinguish</mark> it

13

1 from other situations. Is it a principled basis? I
2 mean, it's -- it's a basis that explains why the
3 government is doing this, but is it -- is it a basis
4 which shows that this is not going beyond what -- what
5 the -- the system of enumerated powers allows the
6 government to do.
7 GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes, for two reasons.

8 First, this -- the test, as this Court has articulated 9 it, is: Is Congress regulating economic activity with a 10 substantial effect on interstate commerce?

11 The way in which this statute satisfies the 12 test is on the basis of the factors that I have 13 identified. If --

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Verrilli, I thought 15 that your main point is that, unlike food or any other 16 market, when you made the choice not to buy insurance, 17 even though you have every intent in the world to 18 self-insure, to save for it, when disaster strikes, you 19 may not have the money. And the tangible result of it 20 is -- we were told there was one brief that Maryland Hospital Care bills 7 percent more because of these 21 22 uncompensated costs, that families pay a thousand 23 dollars more than they would if there were no

24 uncompensated costs.

25

I thought what was unique about this is it's

1 not my choice whether I want to buy a product to keep me 2 healthy, but the cost that I am forcing on other people if I don't buy the product sooner rather than later. 3 4 GENERAL VERRILLI: That is -- and that is 5 definitely a difference that distinguishes this market б and justifies this as a regulation. 7 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. So if that is your difference -- if that is your difference, I'm 8 somewhat uncertain about your answers to -- for example, 9 Justice Kennedy asked, can you, under the Commerce 10 Clause, Congress create commerce where previously none 11 12 existed. Well, yes, I thought the answer to that was, 13 14 since McCulloch versus Maryland, when the Court said Congress could create the Bank of the United States 15 which did not previously exist, which job was to create 16 commerce that did not previously exist, since that time 17 18 the answer has been, yes. I would have thought that 19 your answer -- can the government, in fact, require you 20 to buy cell phones or buy burials that, if we propose comparable situations, if we have, for example, a 21 22 uniform United States system of paying for every burial 23 such as Medicare Burial, Medicaid Burial, Ship Burial, ERISA Burial and Emergency Burial beside the side of the 24 road, and Congress wanted to rationalize that system, 25

15

1	wouldn't the answer be, yes, of course, they could.
2	GENERAL VERRILLI: So
3	JUSTICE BREYER: And the same with the
4	computers, or the same with the the cell phones, if
5	you're driving by the side of the highway and there is a
б	federal emergency service just as you say you have to
7	buy certain mufflers for your car that don't hurt the
8	environment, you could I mean, see, doesn't it depend
9	on the situation?
10	GENERAL VERRILLI: It does, Justice Breyer,
11	and if Congress were to enact laws like that, we
12	JUSTICE BREYER: Would be up here defending
13	it
14	GENERAL VERRILLI: It would be my
15	responsibility to then defend them, and I would defend
16	them on a rationale like that, but I do think that we
17	are advancing a narrower rationale.
18	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, then your question
19	is whether or not there are any limits on the Commerce
20	Clause. Can you identify for us some limits on the
21	Commerce Clause?
22	GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes. The the
23	rationale purely under the Commerce Clause that we're
24	advocating here would not justify forced purchases of
25	commodities for the purpose of stimulating demand.

1 We -- the -- it would not justify purchases of insurance 2 for the purposes -- in situations in which insurance doesn't serve as the method of payment for service --3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But why not? If 4 5 Congress -- if Congress says that the interstate б commerce is affected, isn't, according to your view, 7 that the end of the analysis. 8 GENERAL VERRILLI: No. The -- we think that in a -- when -- the difference between those situations 9 and this situation is that in those situations, Your 10 Honor, Congress would be moving to create commerce. 11 12 Here Congress is regulating existing commerce, economic activity that is already going on, people's 13 14 participation in the health care market, and is 15 regulating to deal with existing effects of existing 16 commerce. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That, it seems to 17 me, is -- and it's a passage in your reply brief that I 18 19 didn't quite grasp. It's the same point. You say 20 health insurance is not purchased for its own sake, like a car or broccoli; it is a means of financing health 21 care consumption and covering universal risks. 22 Well, a 23 car or broccoli aren't purchased for their own sake, 24 either. 25 They're purchased for the sake of

1 transportation or, in broccoli, covering the need for 2 food. 3 GENERAL VERRILLI: No --4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't understand that distinction. 5 GENERAL VERRILLI: The difference, Mr. Chief б 7 Justice, is that health insurance is the means of payment for health care, and broccoli is --8 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, now that's a significant -- I'm sorry. 10 GENERAL VERRILLI: And broccoli is not the 11 12 means of payment for anything else. And an automobile is not --13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's the means of 14 satisfying a basic human need --15 16 GENERAL VERRILLI: But --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- just as insurance 17 is the means of satisfying --18 19 GENERAL VERRILLI: But I do think that's the 20 difference between existing commerce, activity in the 21 market already occurring -- the people in the health 22 care market purchasing, obtaining health care 23 services -- and the creation of commerce. And the 24 principle that we're advocating here under the Commerce 25 Clause does not take the step of justifying the creation

18

1 of commerce.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: General Verrilli, can 3 we --

4 GENERAL VERRILLI: This is a regulation of 5 existing commerce.

б JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can we go back to --7 Justice Breyer asked a question, and it kind of 8 interrupted your answer to my question. And tell me if I'm wrong about this, but I thought a major, major point 9 10 of your argument was that the people who don't participate in this market are making it much more 11 12 expensive for the people who do; that is, they will get -- a goodly number of them will get services that 13 they can't afford at the point when they need them, and 14 15 the result is that everybody else's premiums get raised. 16 So, you're not -- it's not your free choice just to do something for yourself. What you do is going 17 to affect others, affect them in a major way. 18

19 GENERAL VERRILLI: That -- that absolutely 20 is a justification for Congress's action here. That is 21 existing economic activity that Congress is regulating 22 by means of this rule.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Verrilli, you could say that about buying a car. If people don't buy cars, the price that those who do buy cars pay will have to be

19

1 higher. So, you could say in order to bring the price 2 down, you're hurting these other people by not buying a 3 car. 4 GENERAL VERRILLI: That is not what we're saying, Justice Scalia. 5 б JUSTICE SCALIA: That's not -- that's not 7 what you're saying. 8 GENERAL VERRILLI: That's not -- not --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought it was. Т 10 thought you're saying other people are going to have to pay more for insurance because you're not buying it. 11 12 GENERAL VERRILLI: No. It's because you're going -- in the health care market, you're going into 13 the market without the ability to pay for what you get, 14 15 getting the health care service anyway as a result of the social norms that allow -- that -- to which we've 16 17 obligated ourselves so that people get health care. 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, don't obligate 19 yourself to that. Why -- you know? 20 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I can't imagine that that -- that the Commerce Clause would -- would 21 2.2 forbid Congress from taking into account this deeply 23 embedded social norm. 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: You could do it. But does 25 that expand your ability to issue mandates to -- to the

20

1	people?
2	GENERAL VERRILLI: I this is not a
3	purchase mandate. This is a this is a law that
4	regulates the method of paying for a service that the
5	class of people to whom it applies are either
6	consuming
7	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General
8	GENERAL VERRILLI: or inevitably will
9	consume.
10	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General, I see or have
11	seen three strands of arguments in your briefs, and one
12	of them is echoed today. The first strand that I've
13	seen is that Congress can pass any necessary laws to
14	effect those powers within its rights, i.e., because it
15	made a decision that to effect to effect mandatory
16	issuance of insurance, that it could also obligate the
17	mandatory purchase of it.
18	The second strand I see is self-insurance
19	affects the market; and so, the government can regulate
20	those who self-insure.
21	And the third argument and I see all of
22	them as different is that what the government is
23	doing and I think it's the argument you're making
24	today that what the what the government is saying
25	is if you pay for if you use health services, you

1	have to pay with insurance, because only insurance will
2	guarantee that whatever need for health care that you
3	have will be covered, because virtually no one, perhaps
4	with the exception of 1 percent of the population, can
5	afford the massive cost if the unexpected happens.
б	This third argument seems to be saying what
7	we're regulating is health care, and when you go for
8	health services, you have to pay for insurance, and
9	since insurance won't issue at the moment that you
10	consume the product, we can reasonably, necessarily tell
11	you to buy it ahead of time, because you can't buy it at
12	the moment that you need it.
13	Is that which of these three is your
14	argument? Are all of them your argument? I'm just not
15	sure what the
16	GENERAL VERRILLI: So, let me try to state
17	it this way: The Congress enacted reforms of the
18	insurance market, the guaranteed-issue and
19	community-rating reforms. It did so to deal with a very
20	serious problem that results in 40 million people not
21	being able to get insurance and therefore not access to
22	the health care environment. Everybody agrees in this
23	case that those are within Congress's Article I powers.
24	The minimum coverage provision is necessary
25	to carry those provisions into execution, because

1	without them, without those provisions, without minimum
2	coverage, guaranteed issue and community rating will, as
3	the experience in the States showed, make matters worse,
4	not better. There will be fewer people covered; it will
5	cost more. Now, the
б	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, on that ground
7	GENERAL VERRILLI: So
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: you're answering
9	affirmatively to my colleagues that have asked you the
10	question, can the government force you into commerce?
11	GENERAL VERRILLI: So no. No.
12	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And there's no limit to
13	that power.
14	GENERAL VERRILLI: No, because that's
15	that's the first part of our argument.
16	The second part of our argument is that the
17	means here that Congress has chosen, the minimum
18	coverage provision, is a means that regulates the
19	that regulates economic activity, namely your
20	transaction in the health care market, with substantial
21	effects on interstate commerce; and it is the
22	conjunction of those two that we think provides the
23	particularly secure foundation for this statute under
24	the commerce power.
25	JUSTICE KAGAN: General, you've talked on

23

1 a couple of times about other alternatives that Congress 2 might have had, other alternatives that the Respondents 3 suggest to deal with this problem, in particular, the 4 alternative of mandating insurance at the point at which 5 somebody goes to a hospital or an emergency room and 6 asks for care.

7 Did Congress consider those alternatives?
8 Why did it reject them? How should we think about the
9 question of alternative ways of dealing with these
10 problems?

11 GENERAL VERRILLI: I do think, Justice 12 Kagan, that the point of difference between my friends on the other side and the United States is about one of 13 They've agreed that Congress has Article I 14 timing. authority to impose an insurance requirement or other --15 16 or other penalty at the point of sale, and they have 17 agreed that Congress has the authority to do that to achieve the same objectives that the minimum coverage 18 19 provision in the Affordable Care Act is designed to 20 achieve.

This is a situation in which we are talking about means. Congress gets a substantial deference in the choice of means, and if one thinks about the difference between the means they say Congress should have chosen and the means Congress did choose, I think

2.4

1	you can see why it was eminently more sensible for
2	Congress to choose the means that it chose.
3	JUSTICE KENNEDY: <mark>I'm not sure which way it</mark>
4	cuts, if the Congress has alternate means. Let's assume
5	that it could use the tax power to raise revenue and to
б	just have a national health service, single payer. How
7	does that factor into our analysis? In one sense, it
8	can be argued that this is what the government is doing;
9	it ought to be honest about the power that it's using
10	and use the correct power.
11	On the other hand, it means that since the
12	Court can do it anyway Congress can do it anyway, we
13	give a certain amount of latitude. I'm not sure which
14	the way the argument goes.
15	GENERAL VERRILLI: Let me try to answer that
15 16	GENERAL VERRILLI: Let me try to answer that question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question
16	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question
16 17	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question you asked me earlier. The the I do think one
16 17 18	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question you asked me earlier. The the I do think one striking feature of the argument here that this is a
16 17 18 19	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question you asked me earlier. The the I do think one striking feature of the argument here that this is a novel exercise of power is that what Congress chose to
16 17 18 19 20	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question you asked me earlier. The the I do think one striking feature of the argument here that this is a novel exercise of power is that what Congress chose to do was to rely on market mechanisms and efficiency and a
16 17 18 19 20 21	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question you asked me earlier. The the I do think one striking feature of the argument here that this is a novel exercise of power is that what Congress chose to do was to rely on market mechanisms and efficiency and a method that has more choice than would the traditional
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	question, Justice Kennedy, and get back to the question you asked me earlier. The the I do think one striking feature of the argument here that this is a novel exercise of power is that what Congress chose to do was to rely on market mechanisms and efficiency and a method that has more choice than would the traditional Medicare/Medicaid type model. And so, it seems a little

1 unprecedented in the same way, that the Sherman Act was 2 unprecedented when the Court upheld it in the Northern Securities case; or the Packers and Stockyards Act was 3 unprecedented when the Court upheld it, or the National 4 5 Labor Relations Act was unprecedented when the Court б upheld it in Jones & Laughlin; or the dairy price 7 supports in Wrightwood Dairy and Rock Royal. And --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, no, it's not. They all involved commerce. There was no doubt that what was 9 being regulated was commerce. And here you're 10 regulating somebody who isn't covered. 11 12 By the way, I don't agree with you that the relevant market here is health care. You're not 13 regulating health care. You're regulating insurance. 14 15 It's the insurance market that you're addressing and 16 you're saying that some people who are not in it must be in it, and that's -- that's different from regulating in 17 18 any manner commerce that already exists out there. 19 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, to the extent that 20 we are looking at the comprehensive scheme, Justice Scalia, it is regulating commerce that already exists 21 22 out there. And the means in which that regulation is 23 made effective here, the minimum coverage provision, is 24 a regulation of the way in which people participate, the 25 method of their payment in the health care market. That

26

1 is what it is. And I do think, Justice Kennedy, getting 2 back to the question you asked before, what -- what 3 matters here is whether Congress is choosing a tool 4 5 that's reasonably adapted to the problem that Congress б is confronting. And that may mean that the tool is 7 different from a tool that Congress has chosen to use in the past. That's not something that counts against the 8 provision in a Commerce Clause analysis. 9 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Wait. That's -- it's both 11 "Necessary and Proper." What you just said addresses what's necessary. Yes, has to be reasonably adapted. 12 Necessary does not mean essential, just reasonably 13 14 adapted. But in addition to being necessary, it has to be proper. And we've held in two cases that something 15 that was reasonably adapted was not proper, because it 16 violated the sovereignty of the States, which was 17 18 implicit in the constitutional structure. 19 The argument here is that this also is -- may be 20 necessary, but it's not proper, because it violates an equally evident principle in the Constitution, which is 21 22 that the Federal Government is not supposed to be a 23 government that has all powers; that it's supposed to be a government of limited powers. And that's what all 24 this questioning has been about. What -- what is left? 25

1 If the government can do this, what -- what else can it 2 not do? GENERAL VERRILLI: This does not violate the 3 norm of proper as this Court articulated it in Printz or 4 in New York because it does not interfere with the 5 б States as sovereigns. This is a regulation that -- this 7 is a regulation --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: No, that wasn't my point. 9 That is not the only constitutional principle that 10 exists. GENERAL VERRILLI: But it --11 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: An equally evident constitutional principle is the principle that the 13 14 Federal Government is a government of enumerated powers and that the vast majority of powers remain in the 15 16 States and do not belong to the Federal Government. Do 17 you acknowledge that that's a principle? 18 GENERAL VERRILLI: Of course we do, Your 19 Honor. 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. That's what we are talking about here. 21 22 GENERAL VERRILLI: And the way in which this 23 Court in its cases has policed the boundary that -- of 24 what's in the national sphere and what's in the local sphere is to ask whether Congress is regulating economic 25

28

1 activity with a substantial effect on interstate

2 commerce.

And here I think it's really impossible, in 3 view of our history, to say that Congress is invading 4 5 the State sphere. This is a -- this is a market in б which 50 percent of the people in this country get their 7 health care through their employer. There is a massive 8 Federal tax subsidy of \$250 billion a year that makes that much more affordable. ERISA and HIPAA regulate 9 that to ensure that the kinds of bans on pre-existing 10 condition discrimination and pricing practices that 11 occur in the individual market don't occur. 12 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand your point --14 GENERAL VERRILLI: This is in --15 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Whatever the States have chosen not to do, the Federal Government can do? 17 18 GENERAL VERRILLI: No, not at all. 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, the Tenth Amendment 20 says the powers not given to the Federal Government are reserved, not just to the States, but to the States and 21 the people. And the argument here is that the people 22 23 were left to decide whether they want to buy insurance 24 or not. 25 GENERAL VERRILLI: But this -- but, Your

1 Honor, this is -- what the Court has said, and I think 2 it would be a very substantial departure from what the 3 Court has said, is that when Congress is regulating economic activity with a substantial effect on 4 5 interstate commerce, that will be upheld. And that is б what is going on here. And to embark on -- I would 7 submit with all due respect, to embark on the kind of 8 analysis that my friends on the other side suggest the Court ought to embark on is to import Lochner-style 9 substantive due process --10

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The key in Lochner 12 is that we were talking about regulation of the States, 13 right, and the States are not limited to enumerated The Federal Government is. And it seems to me 14 powers. 15 it's an entirely different question when you ask 16 yourself whether or not there are going to be limits on the Federal power, as opposed to limits on the States, 17 18 which was the issue in Lochner.

19 GENERAL VERRILLI: I agree, except, 20 Mr. Chief Justice, that what the Court has said, as I 21 read the Court's cases, is that the way in which you 22 ensure that the Federal Government stays in its sphere 23 and the sphere reserved for the States is protected is 24 by policing the boundary. Is the national government 25 regulating economic activity with a substantial effect

30

1 on interstate commerce?

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the reason, the reason 2 this is concerning is because it requires the individual 3 to do an affirmative act. In the law of torts, our 4 tradition, our law has been that you don't have the duty 5 б to rescue someone if that person is in danger. The blind man is walking in front of a car and you do not 7 8 have a duty to stop him, absent some relation between you. And there is some severe moral criticisms of that 9 10 rule, but that's generally the rule.

And here the government is saying that the Federal Government has a duty to tell the individual citizen that it must act, and that is different from what we have in previous cases, and that changes the relationship of the Federal Government to the individual in a very fundamental way.

GENERAL VERRILLI: I don't think so, Justice 17 Kennedy, because it is predicated on the participation 18 19 of these individuals in the market for health care 20 services. Now, it happens to be that this is a market 21 in which, aside from the groups that the statute 22 excludes, virtually everybody participates. But it is a 23 regulation of their participation in that market. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but it's 25 critical how you define the market. If I understand the

31

1	law, the policies that you're requiring people to
2	purchase involve must contain provision for maternity
3	and newborn care, pediatric services, and substance use
4	treatment. It seems to me that you cannot say that
5	everybody is going to need substance use treatment
6	substance use treatment or pediatric services, and yet
7	that is part of what you require them to purchase.
8	GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, it's part of what
9	the statute requires the insurers to offer. And I think
10	the reason is because it's trying to define minimum
11	essential coverage because the problem
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But your theory is
13	that there is a market in which everyone participates
14	because everybody might need a certain range of health
15	care services, and yet you're requiring people who are
16	not never going to need pediatric or maternity
17	services to participate in that market.
18	GENERAL VERRILLI: The with respect to
19	what insurance has to cover, Your Honor, I think
20	Congress is entitled the latitude of making the
21	judgments of what the appropriate scope of coverage is.
22	And the problem here in this market is that for you
23	may think you're perfectly healthy and you may think
24	that you're not that you're being forced to subsidize
25	somebody else, but this is not a market in which you can

32

1 say that there is a immutable class of healthy people 2 who are being forced to subsidize the unhealthy. This 3 is a market in which you may be healthy one day and you 4 may be a very unhealthy participant in that market the 5 next day, and that is a fundamental difference, and 6 you're not going to know in which --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think you're 8 posing the question I was posing, which is that doesn't 9 apply to a lot of what you're requiring people to 10 purchase. Pediatric services, maternity services. You 11 cannot say that everybody is going to participate in the 12 substance use treatment market and yet you require 13 people to purchase insurance coverage for that.

14 GENERAL VERRILLI: Congress has got --15 Congress is enacting economic regulation here. It has latitude to define essential -- the attributes of 16 essential coverage. That doesn't -- that doesn't seem 17 18 to me to implicate the question of whether Congress is 19 engaging in economic regulation and solving an economic 20 problem here, and that is what Congress is doing. 21 JUSTICE ALITO: Are you denying this? Ιf you took the group of people who are subject to the 22 23 mandate and you calculated the amount of health care 24 services this whole group would consume and figured out

25 the cost of an insurance policy to cover the services

33

that group would consume, the cost of that policy would be much, much less than the kind of policy that these people are now going to be required to purchase under the Affordable Care Act?

5 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, while they are 6 young and healthy, that would be true. But they are not 7 going to be young and healthy forever. They are going 8 to be on the other side of that actuarial equation at 9 some point. And of course, you don't know which among 10 that group is the person who's going to be hit by the 11 bus or get the definitive diagnosis. And that --

12 JUSTICE ALITO: The point is -- no, you take 13 into account that some people in that group are going to be hit by a bus, some people in that group are going to 14 15 unexpectedly contract or be diagnosed with a disease 16 that -- that is very expensive to treat. But if you take their costs and you calculate that, that's a lot 17 18 less than the amount that they are going to be required 19 to pay.

20 So that you can't just justify this on the 21 basis of their trying to shift their costs off to other 22 people, can you?

GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, no, the people in that class get benefits, too, Justice Alito. They get the guaranteed-issue benefit that they would not

34

1 otherwise have, which is an enormously valuable benefit. 2 And in terms of the -- the subsidy rationale, I don't think -- I think it's -- it would be 3 unusual to say that it's an illegitimate exercise of the 4 5 commerce power for some people to subsidize others. б Telephone rates in this country for a century were set 7 via the exercise of the commerce power in a way in which 8 some people paid rates that were much higher than their costs in order to subsidize --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Only if you make phone 10 11 calls. 12 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, right. But -- but everybody -- to live in the modern world, everybody 13 14 needs a telephone. And the same thing with respect to 15 the -- you know, the dairy price supports that -- that the Court upheld in Wrightwood Dairy and Rock Royal. 16 17 You can look at those as disadvantageous contracts, as 18 forced transfers, that -- you know, I suppose it's 19 theoretically true that you could raise your kids 20 without milk, but the reality is you've got to go to the 21 store and buy milk. And the commerce power -- as a result of the exercise of the commerce power, you're 2.2 23 subsidizing somebody else --24 JUSTICE KAGAN: And this is especially true, isn't it, General --25

35

1	GENERAL VERRILLI: because that's a
2	judgment Congress has made.
3	JUSTICE KAGAN: Verrilli, because in this
4	context, the subsidizers eventually become the
5	subsidized?
6	GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, that was the point
7	I was trying to make, Justice Kagan, that you're young
8	and healthy one day, but you don't stay that way, and
9	the system works over time. And so, I just don't think
10	it's a fair characterization of it. And it does get
11	back to, I think, a problem I think is important to
12	understand
13	JUSTICE SCALIA: These people not stupid.
14	They're going to buy insurance later. They're young and
15	need the money now.
16	GENERAL VERRILLI: But that's
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: When they think they have a
18	substantial risk of incurring high medical bills,
19	they'll buy insurance, like the rest of us.
20	GENERAL VERRILLI: But that's that's
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't know why you think
22	that they're never going to buy it.
23	GENERAL VERRILLI: That's the problem,
24	Justice Scalia. That's and that's exactly the
25	experience that the States had that made the imposition

of guaranteed issue and community rating not only be ineffectual but be highly counterproductive. Rates, for example, in New Jersey doubled or tripled, went from 180,000 people covered in this market down to 80,000 people covered in this market. In Kentucky, virtually every insurer left the market.

7 And the reason for that is because when 8 people have that guarantee of -- that they can get 9 insurance, they're going to make that calculation that 10 they won't get it until they're sick and they need it. 11 And so, the pool of people in the insurance market gets 12 smaller and smaller. The rates you have to charge to cover them get higher and higher. It helps fewer and 13 14 fewer -- insurance covers fewer and fewer people until 15 the system ends.

16 This is not a situation in which you're 17 conscripting -- you're forcing insurance companies to 18 cover very large numbers of unhealthy people --19 JUSTICE SCALIA: You could solve that 20 problem by simply not requiring the insurance company to sell it to somebody who has a condition that is going to 21 require medical treatment, or at least not -- not 22 23 require them to sell it to him at a rate that he sells 24 it to healthy people.

But you don't want to do that.

25

37

1	GENERAL VERRILLI: But that seems to me to
2	say, Justice Scalia, that Congress that's the problem
3	here. And that seems to me
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: It's a self-created
5	problem.
6	GENERAL VERRILLI: to say that Congress
7	cannot solve the problem through standard economic
8	regulation, and that and I do not think that can be
9	the premise of our understanding of the Commerce Clause.
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: Whatever
11	GENERAL VERRILLI: This is an economic
12	problem.
13	JUSTICE SCALIA: problems Congress's
14	economic regulation produces, whatever they are, I think
15	Congress can do something to counteract them. Here,
16	requiring somebody to enter to enter the insurance
17	market.
18	GENERAL VERRILLI: This is not a it's not
19	a problem of Congress's creation. The problem is that
20	you have 40 million people who cannot get affordable
21	insurance through the means that the rest of us get
22	affordable insurance. Congress, after long study and
23	careful deliberation, and viewing the experiences of the
24	States and the way they tried to handle this problem,
25	adopted a package of reforms. Guaranteed issue and

community rating and subsidies and the minimum coverage
 provision are a package of reforms that solve that
 problem.

I don't -- I think it's highly artificial to
view this as a problem of Congress's own creation.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is your argument
limited to insurance or means of paying for health care?
GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes. It's limited to
insurance.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, now, why is 10 that? Congress could -- once you -- once you establish 11 12 that you have a market for health care, I would suppose 13 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause meant they 14 had a broad scope in terms of how they regulate that 15 market. And it would be -- it would be going back to 16 Lochner if we were put in the position of saying, no, 17 you can use your commerce power to regulate insurance, 18 but you can't use your commerce power to regulate this 19 market in other ways. I think that would be a very 20 significant intrusion by the Court into Congress's 21 power.

So, I don't see how we can accept your -it's good for you in this case to say, oh, it's just insurance. But once we say that there is a market and Congress can require people to participate in it, as

39

1	some would say, or as you would say, that people are
2	already participating in it, it seems to me that we
3	can't say there are limitations on what Congress can do
4	under its commerce power, just like in any other area
5	given significant deference that we accord to Congress
6	in this area, all bets are off, and you could regulate
7	that market in any rational way.
8	GENERAL VERRILLI: But this is insurance as
9	a method of payment for health care services. And that
10	
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Exactly. You're
12	worried
13	GENERAL VERRILLI: And that's
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That's the area that
15	Congress has chosen to regulate. There's this health
16	care market. Everybody's in it. So, we can regulate
17	it, and we're going to look at a particular serious
18	problem, which is how people pay for it. But next year,
19	they can decide everybody's in this market; we're going
20	to look at a different problem now, and this is how
21	we're going to regulate it. And we can compel people to
22	do things purchase insurance, in this case; something
23	else in the next case because you've we've
24	accepted the argument that this is a market in which
25	everybody participates.

1	GENERAL VERRILLI: Mr. Chief Justice, let me
2	answer that, and then if I may, I'd like to move to the
3	tax power argument.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Can I tell you what the
5	something else is so while you're answering it?
б	(Laughter.)
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: The something else is
8	everybody has to exercise, because there's no doubt that
9	lack of exercise cause causes illness, and that
10	causes health care costs to go up. So, the Federal
11	government says everybody has to join a an exercise
12	club. That's the something else.
13	GENERAL VERRILLI: No. The position we're
14	taking here would not justify that rule, Justice Scalia,
15	because health club membership is not a means of payment
16	for for consumption of anything in a market. And
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. Right.
18	That's exactly right, but it doesn't seem responsive to
19	my concern that there's no reason once we say this is
20	within Congress's commerce power, there's no reason
21	other than our own arbitrary judgment to say all they
22	can regulate is the method of payment. They can
23	regulate other things that affect this now-conceded
24	interstate market in health care in which everybody
25	participates.

1	GENERAL VERRILLI: But I think it's common
2	ground between us and the Respondents that this is an
3	interstate market in which everybody participates.
4	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right.
5	GENERAL VERRILLI: And they agree that
6	Congress could impose the insurance requirement at the
7	point of sale. And this is just a question of timing
8	and whether Congress's whether the necessary and
9	proper authority gives Congress, because of the
10	particular features of this market, the ability to
11	impose the the insurance, the need for insurance, the
12	maintenance of insurance before you show up to get
13	health care, rather than at the moment you get up to
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. No, I think
15	you're just
16	GENERAL VERRILLI: show up to get health
17	care. And that
18	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Unless I'm missing
19	something, I think you're just repeating the idea that
20	this is the regulation of the method of payment. And I
21	understand that argument. And it may be
22	GENERAL VERRILLI: And it is
23	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It may be a good
24	one. But what I'm concerned about is, once we accept
25	the principle that everybody is in this market, <mark>I don't</mark>

see why Congress's power is limited to regulating the
 method of payment and doesn't include as it does in any
 other area.

What other area have we said Congress can regulate this market but only with respect to prices, but only with respect to means of travel? No. Once you're -- once you're in the interstate commerce and can regulate it, pretty much all bets are off.

9 GENERAL VERRILLI: But we agree Congress can 10 regulate this market. ERISA regulates this market. HIPAA regulates this market. The market is regulated at 11 12 the Federal level in very significant ways already. So, I don't think that's the question, Mr. Chief Justice. 13 The question is, is there a limit to the authority that 14 15 we're advocating here under the commerce power? And the 16 answer is yes, because we are not advocating for a power that would allow Congress to compel purchases. 17

18 JUSTICE ALITO: Could you just --

19 GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes.

JUSTICE ALITO: Before you move on, could you express your limiting principle as succinctly as you possibly can? Congress can force people to purchase a product where the failure to purchase the product has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, if what? If this is part of a larger regulatory scheme?

43

1	GENERAL VERRILLI: We've got
2	JUSTICE ALITO: Is that it?
3	GENERAL VERRILLI: We've got
4	JUSTICE ALITO: Is there anything more?
5	GENERAL VERRILLI: We got two and they
б	are they are different. Let me state them. <mark>First,</mark>
7	with respect to the comprehensive scheme. When Congress
8	is regulating is enacting a comprehensive scheme that
9	it has the authority to enact that the Necessary and
10	Proper Clause gives it the authority to include
11	regulation, including a regulation of this kind, if it
12	is necessary to counteract risks attributable to the
13	scheme itself that people engage in economic activity
14	that would undercut the scheme. It's like it's very
14 15	that would undercut the scheme. It's like it's very much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich
15	much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich
15 16	much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect.
15 16 17	much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect. With respect to the with respect to
15 16 17 18	<pre>much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect. With respect to the with respect to the considering the Commerce Clause alone and not</pre>
15 16 17 18 19	<pre>much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect. With respect to the with respect to the considering the Commerce Clause alone and not embedded in the comprehensive scheme, our position is</pre>
15 16 17 18 19 20	<pre>much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect. With respect to the with respect to the considering the Commerce Clause alone and not embedded in the comprehensive scheme, our position is that Congress can regulate the method of payment by</pre>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<pre>much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect. With respect to the with respect to the considering the Commerce Clause alone and not embedded in the comprehensive scheme, our position is that Congress can regulate the method of payment by imposing an insurance requirement in advance of the time</pre>
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>much like Wickard in that respect. Very much like Raich in that respect.</pre>

Official - Subject to Final Review

1	you enter that market is uncertain and when when you
2	will get the care in that market, whether you can afford
3	to pay for it or not and shift costs to other market
4	participants.
5	So those those are our views as to
б	those are the principles we are advocating for and it's,
7	in fact, the conjunction of the two of them here that
8	makes this, we think, a strong case under the Commerce
9	Clause.
10	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General, could you turn
11	to the tax clause?
12	GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes.
13	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I have looked for a case
14	that involves the issue of whether something denominated
15	by Congress as a penalty was nevertheless treated as a
16	tax, except in those situations where the code itself or
17	the statute itself said treat the penalty as a tax.
18	Do you know of any case where we've done
19	that?
20	GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I think I would
21	point the Court to the License Tax Case, where it was
22	was denominated a fee and nontax, and the Court upheld
23	it as an exercise of the taxing power, in a situation in
24	which the structure of the law was very much like the
25	structure of this law, in that there was a separate

45

stand-alone provision that set the predicate and then a
separate provision imposing --

JUSTICE SCALIA: But fees, you know, license fees, fees for a hunting license, everybody knows those are taxes. I mean, I don't think there is as much of a difference between a fee and a tax as there is between a penalty and a tax.

8 GENERAL VERRILLI: And that, and -- and I 9 think in terms of the tax power, I think it's useful to 10 separate this into two questions. One is a question of 11 characterization. Can this be characterized as a tax; 12 and second, is it a constitutional exercise of the 13 power?

With respect to the question of characterization, the -- this is -- in the Internal Revenue Code, it is administered by the IRS, it is paid on your Form 1040 on April 15th, I think --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But yesterday you told me -- you listed a number of penalties that are enforced through the tax code that are not taxes and they are not penalties related to taxes.

GENERAL VERRILLI: They may still be exercise of the tax -- exercises of the taxing power, Justice Ginsburg, as this is, and I think there isn't a case in which the Court has, to my mind, suggested

46

1 anything that bears this many indicia of a tax can't be 2 considered as an exercise of the taxing power. 3 In fact, it seems to me the License Tax 4 Cases point you in the opposite direction. And beyond 5 that your -- it seems to me the right way to think about б this question is whether it is capable of being 7 understood as an exercise of the tax --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: The President said it wasn't a tax, didn't he? 9 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, Justice Scalia, 10 what the -- two things about that. First, as it seems 11 12 to me, what matters is what power Congress was 13 exercising. And they were -- and I think it's clear that the -- they were exercising the tax power as well 14 15 as --16 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're making two arguments. Number one, it's a tax; and number two, even 17 if it isn't a tax, it's within the taxing power. I'm 18 19 just addressing the first. 20 GENERAL VERRILLI: What the President 21 said --2.2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it a tax or not a tax? 23 The President didn't think it was. 24 GENERAL VERRILLI: The President said it 25 wasn't a tax increase because it ought to be understood

47

Official - Subject to Final Review

as an incentive to get people to have insurance. I 1 2 don't think it's fair to infer from that anything about whether that is an exercise of the tax power or not. 3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: A tax is to raise 4 revenue, tax is a revenue-raising device, and the 5 б purpose of this exaction is to get people into the 7 health care risk -- risk pool before they need medical 8 care. And so it will be successful, if it doesn't raise 9 any revenue, if it gets people to buy the insurance, that's -- that's what this penalty is -- this penalty is 10 designed to affect conduct. 11

12 The conduct is buy health protection, buy 13 health insurance before you have a need for medical 14 care. That's what the penalty is designed to do, not to 15 raise revenue.

16 GENERAL VERRILLI: That -- that is true, 17 Justice Ginsburg. That is also true of the marijuana 18 tax that was upheld in Sanchez. That's commonly true of 19 penalties under the code. They do -- if they raise 20 revenue, they are exercises of the taxing power, but 21 their purpose is not to raise revenue. Their purpose is 22 to discourage behavior.

I mean, the mortgage deduction works that way. When the mortgage deduction is -- it's clearly an exercise of the taxing power. When it's successful, it

48

raises less revenue for the Federal Government. It's 1 2 still an exercise of the taxing power. So, I don't --3 JUSTICE KAGAN: I suppose, though, General, one question is whether the determined efforts of 4 5 Congress not to refer to this as a tax make a б difference. I mean, you're suggesting we should just 7 look to the practical operation. We shouldn't look at 8 labels. And that seems right, except that here we have 9 a case in which Congress determinedly said, this is not 10 a tax, and the question is why should that be 11 irrelevant?

12 GENERAL VERRILLI: I don't think that that's a fair characterization of the actions of Congress here, 13 Justice Kagan. On the -- December 23rd, a point of 14 constitutional order was called, too, in fact, with 15 respect to this law. The floor sponsor, Senator Baucus, 16 defended it as an exercise of the taxing power. In his 17 response to the point of order, the Senate voted 60 to 18 19 39 on that proposition.

The legislative history is replete with members of Congress explaining that this law is constitutional as an exercise of the taxing power. It was attacked as a tax by its opponents. So I don't think this is a situation where you can say that Congress was avoiding any mention of the tax power.

49

1	It would be one thing if Congress explicitly
2	disavowed an exercise of the tax power. But given that
3	it hasn't done so, it seems to me that it's not only
4	is it fair to read this as an exercise of the tax power,
5	but this Court has got an obligation to construe it as
б	an exercise of the tax power, if it can be upheld on
7	that basis.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why didn't Congress
9	call it a tax, then?
10	GENERAL VERRILLI: Well
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You're telling me
12	they thought of it as a tax, they defended it on the tax
13	power. Why didn't they say it was a tax?
14	GENERAL VERRILLI: They might have thought,
15	Your Honor, that calling it a penalty as they did would
16	make it more effective in accomplishing its objectives.
17	But it is in the Internal Revenue Code, it is collected
18	by the IRS on April 15th. I don't think this is a
19	situation in which you can say
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that's the
21	reason. They thought it might be more effective if they
22	called it a penalty.
23	GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I you know, I
24	don't there is nothing that I know of that
25	illuminates that, but certainly


1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General, the problem
2	goes back to the limiting principle. Is this simply
3	anything that raises revenue, Congress can do?
4	GENERAL VERRILLI: No. There are certain
5	limiting principles under the
б	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So there has to be a
7	limiting principle as to when
8	GENERAL VERRILLI: taxing power, and
9	they and I think, of course, the Constitution imposes
10	some, got to be uniform, can't be taxed on exports, if
11	it's a direct tax, it's got to be apportioned. Beyond
12	that, the limiting principle, as the Court has
13	identified from Drexel Furniture to Kurth Ranch, is that
14	it can't be punishment, punitive in the guise of a tax.
15	And there are three factors the Court has identified to
16	look at that.
17	The first is the sanction and how
18	disproportionate it is to the conduct; the second is
19	whether there is scienter; and the third is whether
20	there is an administrative apparatus out there to
21	enforce the tax.
22	Now, in Bailey against Drexel Furniture, for
23	example, the tax was 10 percent of the company's
24	profits, even if they had only one child laborer for one
25	day. There was a scienter requirement, and it was


1 enforced by the Department of Labor. It wasn't just 2 collected by the Internal Revenue Service. 3 Here you don't have any of those things. 4 This -- the penalty is calculated to be no more than, at most, the equivalent of what one would have paid for 5 б insurance if you forgone. There is no scienter 7 requirement, there is no enforcement apparatus out 8 there. So, certain --9 JUSTICE ALITO: Can the -- can the mandate be viewed as a tax if it does impose a requirement on 10 people who are not subject to the penalty or the tax? 11 12 GENERAL VERRILLI: I think it could, for the 13 reasons I -- I discussed yesterday. I don't think it can or should be read that way. But if there is any 14 doubt about that, Your Honor, if there is -- if it is 15 16 the view of the Court that it can't be, then I think the right way to handle this case is by analogy to New 17 York against United States, in which the -- the Court 18 19 read the shall provision, shall handle low level 20 radioactive waste as setting the predicate, and then the 21 other provisions were merely incentives to get the 22 predicate met, and so --23 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're saying that all the 24 discussion we had earlier about how this is one big

25 uniform scheme and the Commerce Clause, blah, blah,

52

1 blah, it really doesn't matter. This is a tax and the 2 Federal Government could simply have said, without all of the rest of this legislation, could simply have said, 3 everybody who doesn't buy health insurance at a certain 4 age will be taxed so much money, right? 5 б GENERAL VERRILLI: It -- it used its powers 7 together to solve the problem of the market not --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but you didn't need 9 that. GENERAL VERRILLI -- providing affordable 10 11 coverage --12 JUSTICE SCALIA: You didn't need that. If it's a tax, it's only -- raising money is enough. 13 14 GENERAL VERRILLI: It is justifiable under 15 its tax power. JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. Extraordinary. 16 GENERAL VERRILLI: If I may reserve the 17 balance of my time. 18 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, General. 20 We'll take a pause for a minute or so, 21 Mr. Clement. 2.2 (Pause.) 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: All right. Why 24 don't we get started again. 25 Mr. Clement.





1 Congress's commerce power.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So, what do you do with the impossibility of buying insurance at the point of consumption. Virtually, you force insurance companies to sell it to you?

б MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice, I think there's 7 two points to make on that. One is a lot of the 8 discussion this morning so far has proceeded on the 9 assumption that the only thing that's at issue here is emergency room visits, and the only thing that's being 10 11 imposed is catastrophic care coverage. But, as the Chief Justice indicated earlier, a lot of the insurance 12 that's being covered is for ordinary preventive care, 13 ordinary office visits, and those are the kinds of 14 15 things that one can predict.

16 So, there's a big part of the market that's 17 regulated here that wouldn't pose the problem that 18 you're suggesting; but, even as to emergency room 19 visits, it certainly would be possible to regulate at 20 that point. You could simply say, through some sort of 21 mandate on the insurance companies, you have to provide 22 people that come in -- this will be a high-risk pool, and maybe you'll have to share it amongst yourself or 23 24 something, but people simply have to sign up at that 25 point, and that would be regulating at the point of

55

1 sale.

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Mr. Clement, now it seems as though you're just talking about a matter of 3 timing, that Congress can regulate the transaction. And 4 5 the question is when does it make best sense to regulate б that transaction? 7 And Congress surely has it within its 8 authority to decide, rather than at the point of sale, given an insurance-based mechanism, it makes sense to 9 regulate it earlier. It's just a matter of timing. 10 11 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Kagan, we don't think it's a matter of timing alone, and we think it has 12 very significant substantive effects, because if 13 14 Congress tried to regulate at the point of sale, the one group that it wouldn't capture at all are the people who 15 don't want to purchase health insurance and also have no 16 plans of using health care services in the near term. 17 18 And Congress very much wanted to capture those people. 19 I mean, those people are essentially the golden geese 20 that pay for the entire lowering of the premium --21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is the government's 22 argument this -- and maybe I won't state it accurately. 23 It is true that the noninsured young adult is, in fact, 24 an actuarial reality insofar as our allocation of health 25 services, insofar as the way health insurance companies

56

1 figure risks. That person who is sitting at home in his 2 or her living room doing nothing is an actuarial reality that can and must be measured for health service 3 purposes; is that their argument? 4 5 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I don't know, б Justice Kennedy, but, if it is, I think there's at least 7 two problems with it. 8 One is, as Justice Alito's question suggested earlier -- I mean, somebody who is not in the 9 insurance market is sort of irrelevant as an actuarial 10 I mean, we could look at the people not in the 11 risk. 12 insurance market, and what we'd find is that they're relatively young, relatively healthy, and they would 13 14 have a certain pool of actuarial risks that would 15 actually lead to lower premiums. 16 The people that would be captured by quaranteed rating and community issue -- guaranteed 17 18 issue and community rating would presumably have a 19 higher risk profile, and there would be higher premiums. 20 And one of the things, one of the things, Congress sought to accomplish here was to force 21 22 individuals into the insurance market to subsidize those 23 that are already in it to lower the rates. And that's 24 just not my speculation, that's Finding (I) at 43a of the Government's brief that -- it has the statute. And 25

57

1 that's one of the clear findings. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Clement, doesn't that 2 work -- that work the way Social Security does? 3 Let me put it this way: Congress, in the 4 5 '30s, saw a real problem of people needing to have old б age and survivor's insurance. And, yes, they did it 7 through a tax, but they said everybody has got to be in 8 it because if we don't have the healthy in it, there's not going to be the money to pay for the ones who become 9 old or disabled or widowed. So, they required everyone 10 11 to contribute. 12 There was a big fuss about that in the beginning because a lot of people said -- maybe some 13 people still do today -- I could do much better if the 14 15 government left me alone. I'd go into the private market, I'd buy an annuity, I'd make a great investment, 16 and they're forcing me to paying for this Social 17 18 Security that I don't want. 19 But that's constitutional. So, if Congress 20 could see this as a problem when we need to have a group that will subsidize the ones who are going to get the 21 benefits, it seems to me you're saying the only way that 22 23 could be done is if the government does it itself; it 24 can't involve the private market, it can't involve the

25 private insurers. If it wants to do this, Social

58

Official - Subject to Final Review

1	Security is its model. The government has to do
2	there has to be government takeover. We can't have the
3	insurance industry in it. Is that your position?
4	MR. CLEMENT: No. I don't think it is,
5	Justice Ginsburg. I think there are other options that
6	are available.
7	The most straightforward one would be to
8	figure out what amount of subsidy to the insurance
9	industry is necessary to pay for guaranteed issue and
10	community rating. <mark>And once we calculate the amount of</mark>
11	that subsidy, we could have a tax that's spread
12	generally through everybody to raise the revenue to pay
13	for that subsidy. That's the way we pay for most
14	subsidies.
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could we have an
16	exemption? Could the government say everybody pays a
17	shared health care responsibility payment to offset all
18	the money that we're forced to spend on health care, we
19	the government; but anybody who has an insurance policy
20	is exempt from that tax? Could the government do that?
21	MR. CLEMENT: The government might be able
22	to do that. I think it might raise some issues about
23	whether or not that would be a valid exercise of the
24	taxing power.
25	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Under what theory

1 wouldn't it be?

2 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I do think that --3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We get tax credits for 4 having solar-powered homes. We get tax credits for 5 using fuel-efficient cars. Why couldn't we get a tax 6 credit for having health insurance and saving the 7 government from caring for us.

8 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I think it would depend a little bit on how it was formulated, but my concern 9 would be -- the constitutional concern would be that it 10 would just be a disguised impermissible direct tax. 11 And 12 I do think -- you know, I mean, I don't want to suggest we get to the taxing power to soon, but I do think it's 13 worth realizing that the taxing power is limited in the 14 15 ability to impose direct taxes.

16 And the one thing I think the Framers would have clearly identified as a direct tax is a tax on not 17 having something. I mean, the framing generation was 18 19 divided over whether a tax on carriages was a direct tax 20 or not. Hamilton thought that was a indirect tax; 21 Madison thought it was a direct tax. I have little doubt that both of them would have agreed that a tax on 22 23 not having a carriage would have clearly been a direct 24 tax. I also think they would have thought it clearly 25 wasn't a valid regulation of the market in carriages.

60

1	And, you know, I mean, if you look at Hylton
2	v. The United States, that's this Court's first direct
3	tax case.
4	JUSTICE BREYER: Let me ask can I go back
5	for a step? Because I don't want to get into a
6	discussion of whether this is a good bill or not. Some
7	people think it's going to save a lot of money. Some
8	people think it won't.
9	So, I'm focusing just on the Commerce
10	Clause; not on the Due Process Clause, the Commerce
11	Clause. And I look back into history, and I think if we
12	look back into history, we see sometimes Congress can
13	create commerce out of nothing. That's the national
14	bank, which was created out of nothing to create other
15	commerce out of nothing.
16	I look back into history, and I see it seems
17	pretty clear that if there are substantial effects on
18	interstate commerce, Congress can act.
19	And I look at the person who's growing
20	marijuana in her house, or I look at the farmer who is
21	growing wheat for home consumption. This seems to have
22	more substantial effects.
23	Is this commerce? Well, it seems to me more
24	commerce than marijuana. I mean, is it, in fact, a
25	regulation? Well, why not? If creating a bank is, why

1 isn't this? 2 And then you say, ah, but one thing here out of all those things is different, and that is you're 3 making somebody do something. 4 5 I say, hey, can't Congress make people drive б faster than 45 -- 40 miles an hour on a road? Didn't 7 they make that man growing his own wheat go into the market and buy other wheat for his -- for his cows? 8 Didn't they make Mrs. -- if she married somebody who had 9 marijuana in her basement, wouldn't she have to go and 10 11 get rid of it? Affirmative action? 12 I mean, where does this distinction come 13 from? It sounds like sometimes you can, and sometimes 14 vou can't. So what is argued here is there is a large 15 group of -- what about a person that we discover that 16 there are -- a disease is sweeping the United States, 17 18 and 40 million people are susceptible, of whom 10 19 million will die; can't the Federal Government say all 20 40 million get inoculation? So here, we have a group of 40 million, and 21 22 57 percent of those people visit emergency care or other 23 care, which we are paying for. And 22 percent of those 24 pay more than \$100,000 for that. And Congress says they are in the midst of this big thing. We just want to 25

62

rationalize this system they are already in. 1 2 So, there, you got the whole argument, and I 3 would like you to tell me --4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Answer those questions in inverse order. 5 б JUSTICE BREYER: Well, no, it's one 7 question. It's looking back at that -- looking back at 8 that history. 9 The thing I can see that you say to some people, go buy. Why does that make a difference in 10 terms of the Commerce Clause? 11 12 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Breyer, let me start at the beginning of your question with McCulloch. 13 McCulloch was not a commerce power case. 14 15 JUSTICE BREYER: It was both? MR. CLEMENT: No, the bank was not justified 16 17 and the corporation was not justified as an exercise of commerce power. So that is not a case that says that 18 19 it's okay to conjure up the bank as an exercise of the 20 commerce power. 21 And what, of course, the Court didn't say, and I think the Court would have had a very different 2.2 reaction to, is, you know, we are not just going to have 23 24 the bank, because that wouldn't be necessary and proper, 25 we are going to force the citizenry to put all of their

63

money in the bank, because, if we do that, then we know
 the Bank of the United States will be secure.

I think the framers would have identified the difference between those two scenarios, and I don't think that the great Chief Justice would have said that forcing people to put their deposits in the Bank of the United States was necessary and proper.

8 Now, if you look through all the cases you mentioned, I do not think you will find a case like 9 this. And I think it's telling that you won't. I mean, 10 the regulation of the wheat market in Wickard against 11 12 Filburn, all this effort to address the supply side and what producers could do, what Congress was trying to do 13 was support the price of wheat. It would have been much 14 15 more efficient to just make everybody in America buy 10 loaves of bread. That would have had a much more direct 16 effect on the price of wheat in the prevailing market. 17

But we didn't do that. We didn't say when we had problems in the automobile industry that we are not just going to give you incentives, not just cash for clunkers, we are going to actually have everybody over 100,000 dollars has to buy a new car --

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, Mr. Clement, 24 the key to the government's argument to the contrary is 25 that everybody is in this market. It's all right to

64

Official - Subject to Final Review

regulate Wickard -- again, in Wickard against Filburn,
 because that's a particular market in which the farmer
 had been participating.

Everybody is in this market, so that makes it very different than the market for cars or the other hypotheticals that you came up with, and all they're regulating is how you pay for it.

MR. CLEMENT: Well, with respect, Mr. Chief 8 Justice, I suppose the first thing you have to say is 9 what market are we talking about? Because the 10 11 government -- this statute undeniably operates in the health insurance market. And the government can't say 12 that everybody is in that market. The whole problem is 13 14 that everybody is not in that market, and they want to 15 make everybody get into that market.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, doesn't that seem a little bit, Mr. Clement, cutting the baloney thin? I mean, health insurance exists only for the purpose of financing health care. The two are inextricably interlinked. We don't get insurance so that we can stare at our insurance certificate. We get it so that we can go and access health care.

23 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Kagan, I'm not 24 sure that's right. I think what health insurance does 25 and what all insurance does is it allows you to

65

diversify risk. And so it's not just a matter of I'm
 paying now instead of paying later. That's credit.
 Insurance is different than credit. Insurance
 guarantees you an upfront, locked-in payment, and you
 won't have to pay any more than that even if you incur
 much great expenses.

7 And in every other market that I know of for 8 insurance, we let people basically make the decision 9 whether they are relatively risk averse, whether they 10 are relatively non-risk averse, and they can make the 11 judgment based on --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we don't in car 13 insurance, meaning we tell people, buy car -- not we, the States do, although you're going to -- I'll ask you 14 15 the question, do you think that if some States decided 16 not to impose an insurance requirement, that the Federal 17 Government would be without power to legislate and 18 require every individual to buy car insurance? 19 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Sotomayor, let 20 me say this, which is to say -- you're right in the 21 first point to say that it's the States that do it, 22 which makes it different right there. But it's also --23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that goes back to 24 the substantive due process question. Is this a Lochner 25 era argument that only the States can do this, even

66

1 though it affects commerce? Cars indisputably affect 2 commerce. So are you arguing that because the States 3 have done it all along, the Federal Government is no 4 longer permitted to legislate in this area? 5 MR. CLEMENT: No. I think you might make a б different argument about cars than you would make about 7 health insurance, unless you tried to say -- but, you 8 know, we're --9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Health insurance -- I 10 mean, I've never gotten into an accident, thankfully, and I hope never. The vast majority of people have 11 12 never gotten into an accident where they have injured 13 others; yet, we pay for it dutifully every year on the possibility that at some point, we might get into that 14 15 accident. MR. CLEMENT: But, Justice Sotomayor, what I 16 think is different is there is lots of people in 17 Manhattan, for example, that don't have car insurance 18 19 because they don't have cars. And so they have the 20 option of withdrawing from that market. It's not a 21 direct imposition from the government. 2.2 So even the car market is difference from 23 this market, where there is no way to get outside of the

24 regulatory web. And that's, I think, one of the real

25 problems with this because, I mean, we take as a

67

1 given --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you're -- but the 3 given is that virtually everyone, absent some intervention from above, meaning that someone's life 4 will be cut short in a fatal way, virtually everyone 5 б will use health care. 7 MR. CLEMENT: At some point, that's right, 8 but all sorts of people will not, say, use health care 9 in the next year, which is the relevant period for the 10 insurance.

JUSTICE BREYER: But do you think you can, better than the actuaries or better than the members of Congress who worked on it, look at the 40 million people who are not insured and say which ones next year will or will not use, say, emergency care?

Can you do that any better than if we knew that 40 million people were suffering, about to suffer a contagious disease, and only 10 million would get

19 sick --

20 MR. CLEMENT: Of course not --

JUSTICE BREYER: -- and we don't know which? MR. CLEMENT: Of course not, Justice Breyer, but the point is that once Congress decides it's going to regulate extant commerce, it is going to get all sorts of latitude to make the right judgments about

68

actuarial predictions, which actuarial to rely on, which
 one not to rely on.

3 The question that's a proper question for this Court, though, is whether or not, for the first 4 5 time ever in our history, Congress also has the power to б compel people into commerce, because, it turns out, that 7 would be a very efficient things for purposes of 8 Congress's optimal regulation of that market. 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Clement, this goes 10 back to the Chief Justice's question. But, of course, the theory behind, not just the government's case, but 11 12 the theory behind this law is that people are in this 13 market right now, and they are in this market because people do get sick, and because when people get sick, we 14 15 provide them with care without making them pay. 16 And it would be different, you know, if you

17 were up here saying, I represent a class of Christian 18 Scientists. Then you might be able to say, look, you 19 know, why are they bothering me. But absent that, 20 you're in this market. You're an economic actor. MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Kagan, once 21 22 again, it depends on which market we're talking about. 23 If we're talking about the health care insurance 24 market --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, we are talking about

69

25

1 the health insurance market, which is designed to access 2 the health care market.

3 MR. CLEMENT: And with respect to the health 4 insurance market that's designed to have payment in the health care market, everybody is not in the market. And 5 б that's the premise of the statute, and that's the 7 problem Congress is trying to solve.

And if it tried to solve it through incentives, we wouldn't be here; but, it's trying to 9 10 solve it in a way that nobody has ever tried to solve an economic problem before, which is saying, you know, it 11 12 would be so much more efficient if you were just in this 13 market --

8

14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But they are in the market in the sense that they are creating a risk that the 15 16 market must account for.

MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Kennedy, I don't 17 18 think that's right, certainly in any way that 19 distinguishes this from any other context. When I'm 20 sitting in my house deciding I'm not going to buy a car, I am causing the labor market in Detroit to go south. 21 Ι 22 am causing maybe somebody to lose their job, and for everybody to have to pay for it under welfare. So, the 23 24 cost shifting that the government tries to uniquely 25 associate with this market -- it's everywhere.

70

And even more to the point, the rationale that they think ultimately supports this legislation, that, look, it's an economic decision; once you make the economic decision, we aggregate the decision; there's your substantial effect on commerce. That argument works here. It works in every single industry.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Of course, we do know that 8 there are a few people, more in New York City than there 9 are in Wyoming, who never will buy a car. But we also know here, and we don't like to admit it, that because 10 we are human beings, we all suffer from the risk of 11 12 getting sick, and we also all know that we'll get seriously sick. And we also know that we can't predict 13 when. And we also know that when we do, there will be 14 our fellow taxpayers through the Federal Government who 15 16 will pay for this. If we do not buy insurance, we will 17 pay nothing. And that happens with a large number of people in this group of 40 million, none of whom can be 18 19 picked out in advance.

Now, that's quite different from the car situation, and it's different in only this respect: It shows there is a national problem, and it shows there is a national problem that involves money, cost, insurance. So, if Congress could do this, should there be a disease that strikes the United States and they want every one

71

inoculated even though 10 million will be hurt, it's hard for me to decide why that isn't interstate commerce, even more so where we know it affects everybody.

5 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Breyer, there 6 are other markets that affect every one --7 transportation, food, burial services -- though we don't 8 like to talk about that either. There also are 9 situations where there are many economic effects from 10 somebody's failure to purchase a product.

11 And if I could -- if I could talk about the 12 difference between the health insurance market and the health care market, I mean, ultimately I don't want you 13 14 to leave here with the impression that anything turns on 15 that. Because if the government decided tomorrow that 16 they've come up with a great -- somebody -- some private 17 company has come up with a great new wonder drug that 18 would be great for everybody to take, it would have huge 19 health benefits for everybody; and by the way, also, if 20 everybody had to buy it, it would facilitate economies 21 of scale, and the production would be great, and the 22 price would be cheaper -- and force everybody in the 23 health care market, the actual health care market, to 24 buy the wonder drug, I'd be up here making the same 25 argument.

72

1	I'd be saying that's not a power that's
2	within the commerce power of the Federal Government. It
3	is something much greater. And it would have been much
4	more controversial. That's one of the important things.
5	In Federalist 45, Madison says the commerce power
6	that's a new power, but it's not one anyone has any
7	apprehension about.
8	The reason they didn't have any apprehension
9	about it is because it's a power that only operated once
10	people were already in commerce. You see that from the
11	text of the clause. The first kind of commerce Congress
12	gets to regulate is commerce with foreign nations. Did
13	anybody think the fledgling Republic had the power to
14	compel some other nation into commerce with us? Of
15	course not. And in the same way, I think if the Framers
16	had understood the commerce power to include the power
17	to compel people to engage in commerce
18	JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, once again, though,
19	who's in commerce and when are they in commerce?
20	If the effect of all these uninsured people
21	is to raise everybody's premiums, not just when they get
22	sick, if they get sick, but right now in the aggregate,
23	and Wickard and Raich tell us we should look at the
24	aggregate, and the aggregate of all these uninsured
25	people are increasing the normal family premium,

Official - Subject to Final Review

1	Congress says, by a thousand dollars a year those
2	people are in commerce. They are making decisions that
3	are affecting the price that everybody pays for this
4	service.
5	MR. CLEMENT: Justice Kagan, again, with all
6	due respect, <mark>I don't think that's a limiting principle.</mark>
7	My unwillingness to buy an electric car is forcing up
8	the price of an electric car. If only more people
9	demanded an electric car, there would be economies of
10	scale, and the price would go down.
11	JUSTICE KAGAN: No, this is very different,
12	Mr. Clement, and it's different because of the nature of
13	the health care service, that you are entitled to health
14	care when you go to an emergency room, when you go to a
15	doctor, even if you can't pay for it. So, the
16	difference between your hypotheticals and the real case
17	is the problem of uncompensated care, which
18	MR. CLEMENT: Justice Kagan, first of all, I
19	do think there this is not the only place where
20	there's uncompensated care. If some if I don't buy a
21	car and somebody goes on welfare, I'm going to end up
22	paying for that as well.
23	But let me also say that there's a real
24	disconnect then between that focus on what makes this
25	different and the statute that Congresses passed. If

74

1 all we were concerned about is the cost sharing that 2 took place because of uncompensated care in emergency 3 rooms, presumably we'd have before us a statute that 4 only addressed emergency care and catastrophic insurance 5 coverage. But it covers everything, soup to nuts, and 6 all sorts of other things.

7 And that gets at the idea that there's two 8 kinds of cost shifting that are going on here. One is 9 the concern about emergency care and that somehow somebody who gets sick is going to shift costs back to 10 other policy areas -- holders. But there's a much 11 12 bigger cost shifting going on here, and that's the cost shifting that goes on when you force healthy people into 13 an insurance market precisely because they're healthy, 14 15 precisely because they're not likely to go to the 16 emergency room, precisely because they're not likely to use the insurance they're forced to buy in the health 17 18 care insurance. That creates a huge windfall. Ιt 19 lowers the price of premiums.

is lowers one price of premiums.

And, again, this isn't just some lawyer up here telling you that's what it does and trying to second-guess the congressional economic decisions. This is Congress's findings, Findings (I) on page 43a of the appendix to the Government's brief.

25 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. But all that

75

sounds like you're debating the merits of the bill. You
 asked really for limiting principles so we don't get
 into a matter that I think has nothing to do with this
 case: broccoli. Okay?

5 And the limiting principles -- you've heard б three. First, the Solicitor General came up with a 7 couple joined, very narrow ones. You've seen in Lopez 8 this Court say that we cannot -- Congress cannot get into purely local affairs, particularly where they are 9 noncommercial. And, of course, the greatest limiting 10 principle of all, which not too many accept, so I'm not 11 12 going to emphasize that, is the limiting principle derived from the fact that members of Congress are 13 14 elected from States and that 95 percent of the law of 15 the United States is State law. That is a principle, though enforced by the legislature. The other two are 16 principles, one written into Lopez and one you just 17 18 heard.

19 It seems to me all of those eliminate the 20 broccoli possibility, and none of them eliminates the 21 possibility that we're trying to take the 40 million 22 people who do have the medical cost, who do affect 23 interstate commerce, and provide a system that you may 24 like or not like.

MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Breyer, let me

25

76

1 take them turn. 2 JUSTICE BREYER: That's where we are in 3 limiting principles. MR. CLEMENT: Let me take them in turn. I 4 would encourage this Court not to Garcia-ize the 5 б Commerce Clause and just simply say it's up to Congress 7 to police the Commerce Clause. So, I don't think that 8 is a limiting principle. 9 Second of all --10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that's exactly what Justice Marshall said in Gibbons. He said that it is 11 12 the power to regulate; the power like all others vested in Congress is complete in itself, may be exercised to 13 its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other 14 15 than those prescribed in the Constitution. But there is 16 no conscription in the -- set forth in the Constitution 17 _ _ 18 MR. CLEMENT: I agree --19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- with respect to 20 regulating commerce. 21 MR. CLEMENT: I agree 100 percent, and I think that was the Chief Justice's point, which was once 2.2 you open the door to compelling people into commerce 23 24 based on the narrow rationales that exist in this 25 industry, you are not going to be able to stop that

77

1 process.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, see, that's the --JUSTICE SCALIA: I would like hear you address Justice Breyer's other two principles.

5 MR. CLEMENT: Well, the other two principles 6 are Lopez -- and this case really is not -- I mean, you 7 know, Lopez is a limit on the affirmative exercise of 8 people who are already in commerce. The question is, is 9 there any other limit to people who aren't in commerce? 10 And so, I think this is the case that really asks that 11 question.

12 And then the first point which was -- I take it to be the Solicitor General's point, is, with all due 13 respect, simply a description of the insurance market. 14 It's not a limiting principle, because the justification 15 16 for why this is a valid regulation of commerce is in no way limited to this market. It simply says these are 17 18 economic decisions; they have effect on other people; my 19 failure to purchase in this market has a direct effect 20 on others who are already in the market. That's true of virtually every other market under the sun. 21

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And now maybe return23 to Justice Sotomayor's question.

24 MR. CLEMENT: I'd be delighted to, which is 25 -- I mean, I -- you're absolutely right. Once you're in

78

1 the commerce power, there -- this Court is not going to 2 police that subject maybe to the Lopez limit. And that's exactly why I think it's very important for this 3 Court to think seriously about taking an unprecedented 4 step of saying that the commerce power not only includes 5 б the power to regulate, prescribe the rule by which 7 commerce is governed, the rule of Gibbons v. Ogden; but 8 to go further and say it's not just prescribing the rule for commerce that exists but is the power to compel 9 people to enter into commerce in the first place. 10 11 I'd like to say two very brief things about 12 the taxing power, if I could. There are lots of reasons 13 why this isn't a tax. It wasn't denominated a tax. 14 It's not structured as a tax. If it's any tax at all, 15 though, it is a direct tax. Article I, section 9, 16 clause 4 -- the Framers would have had no doubt that a 17 tax on not having something is not an excise tax but a 18 forbidden direct tax. That's one more reason why this 19 is not proper legislation, because it violates that. 20 The second thing is I would urge you to read 21 the license tax case which the Solicitor General says is 22 his best case for why you ignore the fact that a tax is

23 denominated into something other. Because that's a case

24 where the argument was that because the Federal

25 Government had passed a license, not a tax, that somehow

79

1 that allowed people to take actions that would have been 2 unlawful under State law, that this was some special 3 Federal license to do something that was forbidden by 4 State law. This Court looked beyond the label in order to preserve federalism there. 5 б What the Solicitor General and the 7 government ask you to do here is exactly the opposite, 8 which is to look past labels in order to up-end our 9 basic federalist system. In this --10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me, do you think the States could pass this mandate? 11 12 MR. CLEMENT: I represent 26 States. I do 13 think the States could pass this mandate, but I --14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is there any other area of commerce, business, where we have held that there 15 isn't concurrent power between the State and the Federal 16 17 Government to protect the welfare of commerce? 18 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Sotomayor, I 19 have to resist your premise, because I didn't answer 20 yes, the States can do it because it would be a valid 21 regulation of intrastate commerce. I said yes, the 2.2 States can do it because they have a police power, and that is the fundamental difference between the States on 23 24 the one hand and the limited, enumerated Federal 25 Government on the other.

80

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 2 Mr. Clement. Mr. Carvin. 3 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN 4 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS NFIB, ET AL. 5 б MR. CARVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice; 7 may it please the Court: 8 I'd like to begin with the Solicitor General's main premise, which is that they can compel 9 10 the purchase of health insurance in order to promote commerce in the health market because it will reduce 11 12 uncompensated care. If you accept that argument, you have to fundamentally alter the text of the Constitution 13 14 and give Congress plenary power. 15 It simply doesn't matter whether or not this regulation will promote health care commerce by reducing 16 uncompensated care. All that matters is whether the 17 activity actually being regulated by the act negatively 18 19 affects Congress or negatively affects commerce 20 regulation, so that it's within the commerce power. If you agree with us that this is -- exceeds commerce 21 power, the law doesn't somehow become redeemed because 22 23 it has beneficial policy effects in the health care 24 market. 25

In other words, Congress does not have the

81

Official - Subject to Final Review

power to promote commerce. Congress has -- Congress has 1 2 the power to regulate commerce. And if the power 3 exceeds their permissible regulatory authority, then the law is invalid. 4 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, surely --6 MR. CARVIN: I'm sorry. 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, surely 8 regulation includes the power to promote. Since the New 9 Deal we've said that regulation in -- there is a market 10 in agricultural products; Congress has the power to subsidize, to limit production, all sorts of things. 11 12 MR. CARVIN: Absolutely, Chief Justice, and 13 that's the distinction I'm trying to draw. When they are acting within their enumerated power, then obviously 14 15 they are promoting commerce. 16 But the Solicitor General wants to turn it 17 into a different power. He wants to say we have the 18 power to promote commerce, to regulate anything to 19 promote commerce. And if they have the power to promote 20 commerce, then they have the power to regulate 21 everything, right? Because --2.2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't -- I don't 23 think you're addressing their main point, which is that 24 they are not creating commerce in -- in health care. 25 It's already there, and we are all going to need some

82

1 kind of health care; most of us will at some point. MR. CARVIN: I'd -- I'd like to address that 2 3 in two ways, if I could, Mr. Chief Justice. In the first place, they keep playing mix and match with the 4 5 statistics. They say 95 percent of us are in the health б care market, okay? But that's not the relevant 7 statistic, even as the government frames the issue. No 8 one in Congress and the Solicitor General is arguing 9 that going to the doctor and fully paying him creates a 10 problem. The problem is uncompensated care, and they say the uncompensated care arises if you have some kind 11 12 of catastrophe -- hit by a bus, have some prolonged 13 illness. Well, what is the percentage of the uninsured that have those sorts of catastrophes? We know it has 14 got to be a relative small fraction. So in other words, 15 16 the relevant --17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yet we don't know 18 who they are.

MR. CARVIN: We don't, no, and we don't know in advance, and -- and -- but that doesn't change the basic principle, that you are nonetheless forcing people for paternalistic reasons to go into the insurance market to insure against risk that they have made the voluntary decision that they are not -- have decided not to. But even --

83

1 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the problem is -- the 2 problem is that they are making the rest of us pay for 3 it, because as much as they say, well, we are not in the market, we don't know when the -- the timing when they 4 5 will be. б MR. CARVIN: Which is --7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the -- the figures of 8 how much more families are paying for insurance because people get sick, they may have intended to self-insure, 9 they haven't been able to meet the bill for -- for 10 cancer, and the rest of us end up paying because these 11 12 people are getting cost-free health care, and the only 13 way to prevent that is to have them pay sooner rather 14 than later, pay up front. 15 MR. CARVIN: Yes, but my point is this. That, with respect, Justice Ginsburg, conflicts the 16 17 people who do result in uncompensated care, the free 18 riders. Those are people who default on their health 19 care payments. That is an entirely different group of 20 people, an entirely different activity than being 21 uninsured. 22 So the question is whether or not you can regulate activity because it has a statistical 23 24 connection to an activity that harms Congress. And my basic point to you is this: the Constitution only gives 25

84

Official - Subject to Final Review

1 Congress the power to regulate things that negatively 2 affect commerce or commerce regulation. It doesn't give 3 them the power to regulate things that are statistically 4 connected to things that negatively affect the 5 commerce -б JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Mr. Carvin --7 MR. CARVIN: Because -- I'm sorry. 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Please. 9 MR. CARVIN: I was just going to say, 10 because if they have that power, then they obviously 11 have the power to regulate everything, because 12 everything in the aggregate is statistically connected 13 to something that negatively affects commerce, and every compelled purchase promotes commerce. 14 15 JUSTICE BREYER: So in your view, right 16 there -- in your view right there --17 MR. CARVIN: Justice Breyer --18 JUSTICE BREYER: Can I just --19 MR. CARVIN: I'm sorry. 20 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm just picking on 21 something. I'd like to just -- if it turned out there 22 was some terrible epidemic sweeping the United States, 23 and we couldn't say that more than 40 or 50 percent -- I 24 can make the number as high as I want -- but the -- the -- you'd say the Federal Government doesn't have the 25

85

1	power to get people inoculated, to require them to be
2	inoculated, because that's just statistical.
3	MR. CARVIN: Well, in all candor, I think
4	Morrison must have decided that issue, right? Because
5	people who commit violence against
6	JUSTICE BREYER: Is your answer to that yes
7	or no?
8	MR. CARVIN: Oh, I'm sorry. <mark>My answer is</mark>
9	no, they couldn't do it, because Morrison
10	JUSTICE BREYER: No, they could not do it?
11	MR. CARVIN: Yes.
12	JUSTICE BREYER: They cannot require people,
13	even if this disease is sweeping the country, to be
14	inoculated. The Federal Government has no power, and if
15	there's okay, fine. Go ahead.
16	MR. CARVIN: May
17	JUSTICE BREYER: Please turn to Justice
18	Kagan.
19	MR. CARVIN: May I just please explain why?
20	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
21	MR. CARVIN: <mark>Violence against women</mark>
22	obviously creates the same negative impression on fellow
23	citizens as this communicable disease, but the and
24	it has huge effects on the health care of our country.
25	Congress found that it increased health care costs by

1	JUSTICE BREYER: I agree with you that
2	MR. CARVIN: Well, but
3	JUSTICE BREYER: that it had big effects,
4	but the majority thought that was a local matter.
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: I think that's his point.
б	(Laughter.)
7	MR. CARVIN: I I don't know why having a
8	disease is any more local than that beating up a
9	woman. But but my basic point is, is that
10	notwithstanding its very profound effect on the health
11	care market, this Court said the activity being
12	regulated, i.e., violence against women, is outside the
13	Commerce Clause power. So regardless of whether it has
14	beneficial downstream effects, we must say no, Congress
15	doesn't have that power. Why not? Because everything
16	has downstream effects on commerce and every compelled
17	purchase promotes commerce. It by definition helps the
18	sellers of existing
19	JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Carvin, isn't there this
20	difference between Justice Breyer's hypothetical and the
21	law that we have before us here? In his hypothetical
22	the harm to other people from the communicable disease
23	is the result of the disease. It is not the result of
24	something that the government has done, whereas here the
25	reason why there is <mark>cost- shifting is because the</mark>

Official - Subject to Final Review

1	government has mandated that. It has required hospitals
2	to provide emergency treatment and, instead of paying
3	for that through a tax which would be born by everybody,
4	it has required <mark>it has set up a system in which the</mark>
5	cost is surreptitiously shifted to people who have
6	health insurance and who pay their bills when they go to
7	the hospital.
8	MR. CLEMENT: Justice Alito, that is exactly
9	the government's argument. It's an extraordinarily
10	illogical argument.
11	JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. Then if that's so,
12	is let me just change my example under pressure
13	(Laughter.)
14	JUSTICE BREYER: and say that in fact it
15	turns out that 90 percent of all automobiles driving
16	interstate without certain equipment put up pollution,
17	which travels interstate not 100 percent, maybe only
18	60 percent. Does the EPA have the power then to say
19	you've got to have an antipollution device? It's
20	statistical.
21	MR. CARVIN: What they can't do yes, if
22	you have a car, they can require you to have an
23	anti-pollution
24	JUSTICE BREYER: Then you're not going on
25	statistics; you're going on something else, which is

88

1 what I'd like to know what it is.

MR. CARVIN: It's this. They can't require 2 3 you to buy a car with an anti-pollution device. Once you've entered the market and made a decision, they can 4 5 regulate the terms and conditions of the car that you б do, and they can do it for all sorts of reasons. What 7 they can't do it compel you to enter the market. 8 JUSTICE BREYER: Now we -- now you've 9 changed the ground of argument, which I accept as -- as 10 totally legitimate. And then the question is when you are born and you don't have insurance and you will in 11 12 fact get sick and you will in fact impose costs, have you perhaps involuntarily -- perhaps simply because you 13 are a human being -- entered this particular market, 14 15 which is a market for health care? 16 MR. CARVIN: If being born is entering the market, then I can't think of a more plenary power 17 18 Congress can have, because that literally means they can 19 regulate every human activity from cradle to grave. I 20 thought that's what distinguished the plenary police 21 power from the very limited commerce power. 22 I don't disagree that giving the Congress 23 plenary power to mandate property transfers from A to B 24 would be a very efficient way of helping B and of accomplishing Congress's objectives. But the framers --25

89

1	JUSTICE BREYER: I see the point. You can
2	go back to, go back to Justice Kagan. Don't forget her
3	question.
4	JUSTICE KAGAN: I've forgotten my question.
5	(Laughter.)
6	MR. CARVIN: I I was facing the same
7	dilemma, Justice Kagan.
8	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Let me let me ask a
9	question I asked Mr. Clement. It just seems
10	JUSTICE KAGAN: See what it means to be the
11	junior justice?
12	(Laughter.)
13	JUSTICE GINSBURG: It just seems very
14	strange to me that there's no question we can have a
15	Social Security system besides all the people who say:
16	I'm being forced to pay for something I don't want. And
17	this it seems to me, to try to get care for the ones who
18	need it by having everyone in the pool, but is also
19	trying to preserve a role for the private sector, for
20	the private insurers. There's something very odd about
21	that, that the government can take over the whole thing
22	and we all say, oh, yes, that's fine, but if the
23	government wants to get to preserve private insurers,
24	it can't do that.
25	MR. CARVIN: Well I don't think the test of

1 a law's constitutionality is whether it more adheres to 2 the libertarian principles of the Cato Institute or the 3 statist principles of someone else. I think the test of 4 a law's constitutionality is not those policy questions; 5 it's whether or not the law is regulating things that 6 negatively affect commerce or don't.

And since obviously the failure to purchase an item doesn't create the kind of effects on supply and demand that the market participants in Wickard and Raich did and doesn't in any way interfere with regulation of the insurance companies, I don't think it can pass the basic --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought -- I thought that Wickard was you must buy; we are not going to let you use the home-grown wheat. You have got to go out in the market and buy that wheat that you don't want.

MR. CARVIN: Oh, but let's be careful about 17 18 what they were regulating in Wickard, Justice Ginsburg. 19 What they were regulating was the supply of wheat. It 20 didn't in any way imply that they could require every 21 American to go out and buy wheat. And yes, one of the consequences of regulating local market participants is 22 it'll affect the supply and the demand for the product. 23 24 That's why you can regulate them, because those local 25 market participants have the same effect on the

91

interstate market that a black market has on a legal
 market.

But none of that is true -- in other words, you can regulate local bootleggers, but that doesn't suggest you can regulate teetotalers, people who stay out of the liquor market, because they don't have any negative effect on the existing market participants or on regulation of those market participants.

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: That's why I suggested, Mr. Carvin, that it might be different if you were raising 10 an as-applied challenge and presenting a class of people 11 12 whom you could say clearly would not be in the health care market. But you're raising a facial challenge and 13 we can't really know which, which of the many, many, 14 15 people that this law addresses in fact will not 16 participate in the health care market and in fact will not impose costs on all the rest of us. 17

So the question is can Congress respond to those facts, that we have no crystal ball, that we can't tell who is and isn't going to be in the health insurance market, and say most of these people will be and most of these people will thereby impose costs on the rest of us and that's a problem that we can deal with on a class-wide basis?

MR. CARVIN: No again. The people who

25

92

Official - Subject to Final Review

1	impose the costs on the rest of us are people who engage
2	in a different activity at a different time, which is
3	defaulting on their health care payments. It's not the
4	uninsured. Under your theory you could regulate anybody
5	if they have got a statistical connection to a problem.
6	You could say, since we could regulate people who enter
7	into the mortgage market and impose mortgage insurance
8	on them, we can simply impose the requirement to buy
9	private mortgage insurance on everybody before they have
10	entered the market because we are doing it in this
11	prophylactic way before it develops.
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no, that's not

12 -- I don't think that's fair, because not everybody is 14 going to enter the mortgage market. The government's 15 position is that almost everybody is going to enter the 16 health care market.

17 MR. CARVIN: Two points, one of which 18 Mr. Clement's already made, which is the health insurance market is different than the health care 19 20 market. But let me take it on full-stride. I think 21 everybody is in the milk market. I think everybody is 22 in the wheat product market. But that doesn't suggest 23 that the government compel you to buy five gallons of meat or five bushels of wheat because they are not 24 25 regulating commerce.

93

1	Whether you're a market participant or not,
2	they are still requiring you to make a purchase that you
3	don't want to do, and to get back to your facial
4	example
5	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I mean, but that's true
6	of almost every product.
7	MR. CARVIN: I've sorry?
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It's true of almost
9	every product, directly or indirectly by government
10	regulation. The government says, borrowing my
11	colleague's example, you can't buy a car without
12	emission control. I don't want a car with emission
13	control. It's less efficient in terms of the
14	horsepower. But I'm forced to do something I don't want
15	to do by government regulation.
16	MR. CARVIN: You are not forced to buy a
17	product you don't want. And I agree with you that since
18	the government regulates all markets there is no
19	limiting principle on their compelled purchase. When
20	they put these environmental controls on the
21	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They force me to buy
22	MR. CARVIN: I'm sorry.
23	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They forced me to buy if
24	I need unpasteurized foods, goods that don't have
25	certain pesticides but have others. There is government

1 compulsion in almost every economic decision because the 2 government regulates so much. It's a condition of life 3 that some may rail against, but --

MR. CARVIN: Let's think about it this way. Yes, when you've entered the marketplace they can impose all sorts of restrictions on you, and they can impose, for example, all kinds of restrictions on States after they have enacted laws. They can wipe out the laws. They can condition them.

But what can't they do? They can't compel States to enact laws. They can't compel States to carry out Federal law. And I am arguing for precisely the same distinction, because everyone intuitively understands that regulating participants after A and B have entered into a contract is fundamentally less intrusive than requiring the contract.

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We let the government 18 regulate the manufacturing process whether or not the 19 goods will enter into interstate commerce, merely 20 because they might statistically. We -- there is all 21 sorts of government regulation of manufacturing plants, of agricultural farms, of all sorts of activity that 22 23 will be purely intrastate because it might affect 24 interstate activity.

MR. CARVIN: I fully agree with you, Justice

95

25

1 Sotomayor. But I think --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how is that different 2 3 from saying you are self-insuring today, you're foregoing insurance? Why isn't that a predecessor to 4 5 the need that you're eventually going to have? б MR. CARVIN: The cases you referred to I 7 think effectively eliminated the distinction between 8 participants in the intrastate market vis-à-vis participants in the interstate market. None of those 9 cases suggest that you can regulate people who are 10 outside of the market on both an intrastate and 11 12 interstate level by compelling them to enter into the 13 market. And that --14 JUSTICE BREYER: What about -- the simplest

15 counter-example for me to suggest is you've undoubtedly 16 read Judge Sutton's concurring opinion. He has about 17 two pages, it seemed to me, of examples where everyone 18 accepts the facts that under these kinds of regulations 19 the government can compel people to buy things they 20 don't otherwise want to buy.

For example, he gives, even in that farm case, the farmer who was being forced to go out and buy grain to feed to his animals because he couldn't raise it at home. You know and he goes through one example after another. So what -- what is your response to

96

1 that, which you've read?

2 MR. CARVIN: Judge Sutton is wrong in each 3 and every example. There was no -- there was no compulsion in Raich for him to buy wheat. He could have 4 gotten wheat substitutes or he could have not sold 5 б wheat, which is actually what he was doing. There is a 7 huge difference between conditioning regulation, i.e., 8 conditioning access to the health care market and saying you must buy a product, and forcing you to buy a 9 product. And that, that -- I'm sorry. 10 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought it was common 12 ground that the requirement that the insurers -- what was it, the community-based one and they have to insure 13 you despite your health status; they can't refuse 14 15 because of preexisting conditions. The government tells 16 us and the Congress determined that those two won't work 17 unless you have a pool that will include the people who are now healthy. But so -- well, first, do you agree 18 19 with your colleague that the community-based -- and 20 what's the name that they give to the other? 21 MR. CARVIN: The guaranteed-issue. 2.2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. That that is 23 legitimate Commerce Clause legislation? 24 MR. CARVIN: Oh, sure. And that's why --25 but we don't in any way impede that sort of regulation.

97

These nondiscrimination regulations will apply to every
 insurance company just as Congress intended whether or
 not we buy insurance.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well then, what about the 4 determination that they can't possibly work if people 5 б don't have to buy insurance until they are -- their 7 health status is such that the insurance company just 8 dealt with them on its -- as it will? They'd say, I 9 won't insure you because you're -- you're already sick. 10 MR. CARVIN: It depends what you mean by It'll work just fine in ensuring that no sick 11 "work." 12 people are discriminated against. What -- what -- but 13 when you do that -- Congress --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the sick people, why would they insure early if they had to be protected if they get insurance late?

MR. CARVIN: Yes. Well, that's -- see, this 17 18 is the government's very illogical argument. They seem 19 to be saying, look, we couldn't just force people to buy 20 insurance to lower health insurance premiums. That 21 would be no good. But we can do it because we've 22 created the problem. We, Congress, have driven up the 23 health insurance premiums, and since we've created that 24 problem, this somehow gives us authority that we 25 wouldn't otherwise have. That can't possibly be right.

98

1 That would --2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you think that 3 there's -- what percentage of the American people who took their son or daughter to an emergency room and that 4 child was turned away because the parent didn't have 5 б insurance -- do you think there's a large percentage of 7 the American population who would stand for the death of 8 that child --MR. CARVIN: One of the most --9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- if they had an 10 allergic reaction and a simple shot would have saved the 11 12 child? 13 MR. CARVIN: One of the more pernicious, misleading impressions that the government has made is 14 15 that we are somehow advocating that people could get thrown out of emergency rooms, or that this alternative 16 that they've hypothesized is going to be enforced by 17 18 throwing people out of emergency rooms. This 19 alternative, i.e., you condition access to health care 20 on buying health insurance, is enforced in precisely the same way that the Act does. You either buy health 21 insurance or you pay a penalty of \$695. You don't have 22 23 doctors throwing people out on the street. And -- and 24 so the only --25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. Did you say

99

the penalty's okay but not the mandate? I'm sorry.
 Maybe I've misheard you.

MR. CARVIN: No, no, no. I was -- they 3 create this strawman that says: Look, the only 4 5 alternative to doing it the way we've done it, if we б condition access to health care on buying health 7 insurance, the only way you can enforce that is making 8 sick people not get care. I'm saying no, no. There's a perfectly legitimate way they could enforce their 9 alternative, i.e., requiring you to buy health insurance 10 when you access health care, which is the same penalty 11 12 structure that's in the Act.

There is no moral dilemma between having 13 people have insurance and denying them emergency 14 15 service. Congress has made a perfectly legitimate value 16 judgment that they want to make sure that people get emergency care. Since the founding, whenever Congress 17 18 has imposed that public responsibility on private 19 actors, it has subsidized it from the Federal Treasury. 20 It has not conscripted a subset of the citizenry and made them subsidize the actors who are being hurt, which 21 22 is what they're doing here.

They're making young, healthy people subsidize insurance premiums for the cost that the nondiscrimination provisions have put on insurance

100

1 premiums and insurance companies. 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So the --MR. CARVIN: And that is the fundamental 3 4 problem here. 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So the -- I -- I want to б understand the choices you're saying Congress has. 7 Congress can tax everybody and set up a public health 8 care system. 9 MR. CARVIN: Yes. 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That would be okay? MR. CARVIN: Yes. Tax power is --11 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay. 13 MR. CARVIN: I would accept that. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: 14 Congress can -- are you 15 taking the same position as your colleague, Congress 16 can't say we're going to set up a public health system, 17 but you can get a tax credit if you have private health 18 insurance because you won't access the public system. 19 Are you taking the same position as your colleague? 20 MR. CARVIN: There may have been some confusion in your prior colloquy. I fully agree with my 21 2.2 brother Clement that a direct tax would be 23 unconstitutional. I don't think he means to suggest, 24 nor do I, that a tax credit that incentivizes you to buy 25 insurance creates a problem. Congress incentivizes all

101

1	kinds of activities. <mark>If they gave us a tax credit for</mark>
2	buying insurance, then it would be our choice whether or
3	not that makes economic sense, even though
4	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how is this different
5	than this Act, which says if a taxpayer fails to meet
6	the requirement of having minimum coverage, then they
7	are responsible for paying the shared responsibility
8	payment?
9	MR. CARVIN: The difference is that the
10	taxpayer is not given a choice. It's the difference
11	between banning cigarettes and saying I'm going to
12	enforce that legal ban through a \$5 a pack penalty, and
13	saying, look, if you want to sell cigarettes, fine; I'm
14	going to charge you a tax of \$5 a pack. And that's
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I think I think
16	that's what's happening, isn't it?
17	MR. CARVIN: No. Not
18	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We're paying I
19	thought that everybody was paying, what is it, \$10 a
20	pack now? I don't even know the price. It's pretty
21	high.
22	MR. CARVIN: Right. And everyone would
23	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I think everybody
24	recognizes that it's all taxation for the purposes of
25	dissuading you to buy it.

1 MR. CARVIN: That's precisely my point. And 2 everyone intuitively understands that that system is 3 dramatically different than saying cigarettes tomorrow 4 are illegal.

5 JUSTICE BREYER: It is different. It is б different. It is different. I agree with that. But 7 you pointed out, and I agree with you on this, that the 8 government set up these emergency room laws. The 9 government set up Medicaid. The government set up 10 Medicare. The government set up CHIP, and there are 40 million people who don't have the private insurance. 11

In that world, the government has set up It's all over the United States. And in that 13 commerce. world, of course, the decision by the 40 million not to 14 15 buy the insurance affects that commerce and substantially so. 16

So I thought the issue here is not whether 17 it's a violation of some basic right or something to 18 19 make people buy things they don't want, but simply 20 whether those decisions of that group of 40 million people substantially affect the interstate commerce that 21 22 has been set up in part through these other programs. 23 So that's the part of your argument I'm not 24 hearing.

25 MR. CARVIN: Let me --

12

103

1	JUSTICE BREYER: Please.
2	MR. CARVIN: It is clear that the failure to
3	buy health insurance doesn't affect anyone. Defaulting
4	on your payments to your health care provider does.
5	Congress chose, for whatever reason, not to regulate the
б	harmful activity of defaulting on your health care
7	provider. They used the 20 percent or whoever among the
8	uninsured as a leverage to regulate the 100 percent of
9	the uninsured.
10	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I agree I agree that
11	that's what's happening here.
12	MR. CARVIN: Okay.
13	JUSTICE KENNEDY: And the government tells
14	us that's because the insurance market is unique. And
15	in the next case, it'll say the next market is unique.
16	But I think it is true that if most questions in life
17	are matters of degree, in the insurance and health care
18	world, both markets stipulate two markets the
19	young person who is uninsured is uniquely proximately
20	very close to affecting the rates of insurance and the
21	costs of providing medical care in a way that is not
22	true in other industries.
23	That's my concern in the case.
24	MR. CARVIN: And, Your I may be
25	misunderstanding you, Justice Kennedy. I hope I'm not.
	104

1 Sure, it would be perfectly fine if they 2 allowed -- you do actuarial risk for young people on the basis of their risk for disease, just like you judge 3 flood insurance on the homeowner's risk of flood. One 4 5 of the issues here is not only that they're compelling б us to enter into the marketplace, they're not -- they're 7 prohibiting us from buying the only economically sensible product that we would want, catastrophic 8 9 insurance. Everyone agrees the only potential problem 10 that a 30-year-old, as he goes from the healthy 70 11 12 percent of the population to the unhealthy 5 percent -and yet Congress prohibits anyone over 30 from buying 13 any kind of catastrophic health insurance. 14 And the 15 reason they do that is because they needed this massive 16 subsidy. Justice Alito, it's not our numbers. 17 CBO said that injecting my clients into the risk pool lowers 18 19 premiums by 15 to 20 percent. 20 So, Justice Kennedy, even if we were going 21 to create exceptions for people that are outside of 22 commerce and inside of commerce, surely we'd make 23 Congress do a closer nexus and say, look, we're really 24 addressing this problem; We want these 30-year-olds to 25 get catastrophic health insurance.

105

1	And not only did they they deprived them
2	of that option. And I think that illustrates the
3	dangers of giving Congress these plenary powers, because
4	they can always leverage them. They can always come up
5	with some public policy rationale that converts the
6	power to regulate commerce into the power to promote
7	commerce, which, as I was saying before, is the one that
8	I think is plenary.
9	JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Carvin, a large part of
10	this argument has concerned the question of whether
11	certain kinds of people are active participants in a
12	market or not active participants in a market. And your
13	test, which is a test that focuses on this
14	activity/inactivity distinction, would force one to
15	confront that problem all the time.
16	Now, if you look over the history of the
17	Commerce Clause, what you see is that there were sort of
18	unhappy periods when the Court used tests like this,
19	direct versus indirect, commerce versus manufacturing.
20	I think most people would say that those things didn't
21	really work. And the question is, why should this test,
22	inactive versus active, work any better?
23	MR. CARVIN: The problem you identify is
24	exactly the problem you would create if you bought the
25	government's bogus limiting principles. You'd have to

Official - Subject to Final Review

1	draw a distinction between the insurance industry and
2	the car industry and all of that, returning to the
3	Commerce Clause jurisprudence that bedeviled the Court
4	before the 1930s, where they were drawing all these
5	kinds of distinctions among industries, whereas our test
6	is really very simple. Are you buying the product or is
7	Congress compelling you to buy the product? I can't
8	think of a brighter line.
9	And again, if Congress has the power to
10	compel you to buy this product, then obviously they have
11	got the power to provide you to compel you to buy any
12	product, because any purchase is going to benefit
13	commerce, and this Court is never going to second-guess
14	Congress's policy judgments on how important it is this
15	product versus that product.
16	JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think that drawing a
17	line between commerce and everything else that is not
18	commerce is drawing an artificial line, like drawing a
19	line between commerce and manufacturing?
20	MR. CARVIN: The words "inactivity" and
21	"activity" are not in the Constitution. The words
22	"commerce" and "noncommerce" are. And again, it's a
23	distinction that comes, Justice Kagan, directly from the
24	text of the Constitution.
25	The Framers consciously gave Congress the

107

ability to regulate commerce, because that's not a
 particularly threatening activity that deprives you of
 individual freedom.

If you were required, if you were authorized 4 5 to require A to transfer property to B, you have, as the б early cases put it, a monster in legislation which is 7 against all reason and justice, because everyone 8 intuitively understands that regulating people who voluntarily enter into contracts in setting changing 9 conditions does not create the possibility of Congress 10 compelling wealth transfers among the citizenry. And 11 12 that is precisely why the Framers denied them the power 13 to compel commerce and precisely why they didn't give them plenary power. 14 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 16 Mr. Carvin. General Verrilli, you have 4 minutes 17 18 remaining. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., 19 20 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 21 GENERAL VERRILLI: Thank you, Mr. Chief 2.2 Justice: 23 Congress confronted a grave problem when it 24 enacted the Affordable Care Act: The 40 million 25 Americans who can't get health insurance and suffered

108

often very terrible consequences. Now, we agree, I
 think, everyone arguing this case agrees, that Congress
 could remedy that problem by imposing an insurance
 requirement at the point of sale.

5 That won't work. The reason it won't work 6 is because people will still show up at the hospital or 7 at their physician's office seeking care without 8 insurance, causing the cost-shifting problem. And 9 Mr. Clement's suggestion that they can be signed up for 10 a high risk pool at that point is utterly unrealistic.

11 Think about how much it would cost to get 12 the insurance when you are at the hospital or at the 13 doctor. It would be -- it would be unfathomably high. 14 That will never work. Congress understood that. Ιt 15 chose the means that will work, the means that it saw 16 worked in the States and in the State of Massachusetts, and that -- and that it had every reason to think would 17 18 work on a national basis.

19 That is the kind of choice of means that 20 McCulloch says that the Constitution leaves to the 21 democratically accountable branches of government. 22 There is no temporal limitation in the Commerce Clause. 23 Everyone subject to this regulation is in or will be in 24 the health care market. They are just being regulated 25 in advance. That's exactly the kind of thing that ought

109

Alderson Reporting Company

1 to be left to the judgment of Congress and the 2 democratically accountable branches of government. And I think this is actually a paradigm 3 example of the kind of situation that Chief Justice 4 5 Marshall envisioned in McCulloch itself, that the б provisions of the Constitution needed to be interpreted 7 in a manner that would allow them to be effective in 8 addressing the great crises of human affairs that the Framers could not even envision. 9 But if there is any doubt about that under 10 the Commerce Clause, then I urge this Court to uphold 11 12 the minimum coverage provision as an exercise of the 13 taxing power. 14 Under New York v. United States, this is 15 precisely a parallel situation. If the Court thinks there is any doubt about the ability of Congress to 16 impose the requirement in 5000A(a), it can be treated as 17 simply the predicate to which the tax incentive of 18 19 5000A(b) seeks accomplishment. 20 And the Court, as the Court said in New 21 York, has a solemn obligation to respect the judgments of the democratically accountable branches of 2.2 23 government, and because this statute can be construed in 24 a manner that allows it to be upheld in that way, I 25 respectfully submit that it is this Court's duty to do

110

Alderson Reporting Company

1	so.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, General.
3	Counsel, we'll see you tomorrow.
4	(Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the case in the
5	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

<u> </u>	77:14	addresses 3:11	26:12 30:19	29:19
ability 20:14,25	act 3:11 4:14,16	27:11 92:15	42:5 43:9 77:18	America 64:15
42:10 60:15	10:12 11:22	addressing 4:13	77:21 81:21	American 91:21
108:1 110:16	24:19 26:1,3,5	9:16 26:15	87:1 94:17	99:3,7
able 6:18 22:21	31:4,13 34:4	47:19 82:23	95:25 97:18	Americans 3:17
59:21 69:18	61:18 81:18	105:24 110:8	101:21 103:6,7	3:17,20 108:25
77:25 84:10	99:21 100:12	adheres 91:1	104:10,10	amount 25:13
above-entitled	102:5 108:24	administered	109:1	33:23 34:18
1:12 111:5	acting 82:14	46:16	agreed 24:14,17	59:8,10
absence 11:9	action 19:20	administrative	60:22	analogy 52:17
absent 31:8 68:3	62:11	51:20	agrees 22:22	analysis 17:7
69:19	actions 49:13	admit 71:10	105:10 109:2	25:7 27:9 30:8
	80:1	adopted 38:25	agricultural	animals 96:23
absolutely 8:8 19:19 78:25	active 106:11,12	adult 56:23	82:10 95:22	annuity 58:16
82:12	106:22	advance 12:12	ah 62:2	answer 15:13,18
	activities 102:1	44:21 71:19	ahead 22:11	15:19 16:1 19:8
accept 39:22	activity 5:7 14:9	83:20 109:25	86:15	25:15 41:2
42:24 54:18	17:13 18:20	advancing 16:17	al 1:4,7,20,22 2:7	43:16 63:4
76:11 81:12	19:21 23:19	advocating 16:24	2:10 54:2 81:5	80:19 86:6,8
89:9 101:13	29:1 30:4,25	18:24 43:15,16	Alito 7:13,16,17	answering 23:8
accepted 40:24	44:13 81:18	45:6 99:15	7:19 8:6,22 9:4	41:5
accepts 96:18	84:20,23,24	affairs 76:9	9:6,8,12 10:1	answers 15:9
access 3:18,21	87:11 89:19	110:8	33:21 34:12,24	antipollution
22:21 65:22	93:2 95:22,24	affect 19:18,18	43:18,20 44:2,4	88:19
70:1 97:8 99:19	104:6 107:21	41:23 48:11	52:9 87:19 88:8	anti-pollution
100:6,11	104.0 107.21	67:1 72:6 76:22	105:17 107:16	88:23 89:3
101:18	activity/inactiv	85:2,4 91:6,23	Alito's 57:8	anybody 59:19
accident 67:10	106:14	95:23 103:21	allergic 99:11	73:13 93:4
67:12,15	actor 69:20	104:3	allocation 56:24	anyway 20:15
accomplish	actors 100:19,21	affirmative	allow 20:16	25:12,12
57:21	actual 72:23	11:22 31:4	43:17 110:7	apparatus 51:20
accomplishing	actuarial 34:8	62:11 78:7	allowed 11:21	52:7
50:16 89:25	56:24 57:2,10	affirmatively	80:1 105:2	APPEARANC
accomplishment	57:14 69:1,1	23:9	allows 14:5 65:25	1:15
110:19	105:2	afford 11:5 19:14	110:24	appears 10:3
accord 40:5	actuaries 68:12	22:5 45:2	alter 81:13	appendix 75:24
account 20:22	adapted 27:5,12	affordable 3:11	alternate 25:4	applies 21:5
34:13 70:16	27:14,16	3:25 24:19 29:9	alternative 24:4	44:23
accountable	addition 6:16	34:4 38:20,22	24:9 99:16,19	apply 4:7 33:9
109:21 110:2	27:14	53:10 108:24	100:5,10	98:1
110:22	additional 9:24	age 53:5 58:6	alternatives 24:1	apportioned
accurately 56:22	11:5	aggregate 71:4	24:2,7	51:11
achieve 24:18,20	address 4:11,12	73:22,24,24	ambulance 6:2	apprehension
acknowledge	64:12 78:4 83:2	85:12	7:4	73:7,8
8:16 28:17	addressed 75:4	agree 12:22	Amendment	appropriate
acknowledges	uuui coocu /J.+	usice 12.22		"

	1			
32:21	assistance 6:3	ban 102:12	beyond 11:21	brief 14:20 17:18
April 46:17 50:18	6:22 7:3,4,4	bank 15:15 61:14	14:4 25:24 47:4	57:25 75:24
arbitrary 41:21	associate 70:25	61:25 63:16,19	51:11 80:4	79:11
area 40:4,6,14	assume 11:19,20	63:24 64:1,2,6	big 9:2,5 52:24	briefs 21:11
43:3,4 67:4	25:4	banning 102:11	55:16 58:12	brighter 107:8
80:14	assumption 55:9	bans 29:10	62:25 87:3	bring 20:1
areas 75:11	as-applied 92:11	based 4:6,20	bigger 75:12	broad 39:14
argue 10:20	attacked49:23	66:11 77:24	bill 61:6 76:1	broadly 13:1
argued 25:8	attributable	basement 62:10	84:10	broccoli 13:12
62:15	44:12	basic 18:15 80:9	billion 29:8	17:21,23 18:1,8
arguing 67:2	attributes 33:16	83:21 84:25	billions 9:17	18:11 76:4,20
83:8 95:12	authority 8:17	87:9 91:12	bills 14:21 36:18	brother 101:22
109:2	12:10 24:15,17	103:18	88:6	burden 11:23
argument 1:13	42:9 43:14 44:9	basically 66:8	bit 60:9 65:17	12:3
2:2,5,8,11 3:4,7	44:10 56:8 82:3	basis 5:4 13:22	black 92:1	burial 7:14,15,23
6:25 8:20 10:22	98:24	14:1,2,3,12	blah 52:25,25	7:25 8:12,23
19:10 21:21,23	authorization	34:21 50:7	53:1	15:22,23,23,23
22:6,14,14	12:4	92:24 105:3	blind 31:7	15:24,24 72:7
23:15,16 25:14	authorized 108:4	109:18	blue 13:25	burials 15:20
25:18 27:19	automobile	Baucus 49:16	bogus 106:25	buried 8:25
29:22 39:6	18:12 64:19	bears 47:1	bootleggers 92:4	bus 34:11,14
40:24 41:3	automobiles	beating 87:8	born 88:3 89:11	83:12
42:21 54:1	88:15	bedeviled 107:3	89:16	bushels 93:24
56:22 57:4 63:2	available 4:2,3	begets 4:8	borrowing 94:10	business 80:15
64:24 66:25	59:6	beginning 58:13	bothering 69:19	buy 6:9 13:9,11
67:6 71:5 72:25	average 10:4,9	63:13	bought 106:24	14:16 15:1,3,20
79:24 81:4,12	averse 66:9,10	behalf 1:17,19	boundary 28:23	15:20 16:7
88:9,10 89:9	avoiding 49:25	1:21 2:4,7,10	30:24	19:24,25 22:11
98:18 103:23	a.m 1:14 3:2	2:13 3:8 54:2	branches 109:21	22:11 29:23
106:10 108:19		81:5 108:20	110:2,22	35:21 36:14,19
arguments 21:11	<u> </u>	behavior 48:22	bread 64:16	36:22 48:9,12
47:17	B 1:16 2:3,12 3:7	beings 71:11	Breyer 15:7 16:3	48:12 53:4
arises 83:11	11:1 89:23,24	belong 28:16	16:10,12 19:7	58:16 62:8
Article 8:17	95:14 108:5,19	beneficial 81:23	61:4 63:6,12,15	63:10 64:15,22
22:23 24:14	back 19:6 25:16	87:14	68:11,21,22	66:13,18 70:20
79:15	27:3 36:11	benefit 34:25	71:7 72:5 75:25	71:9,16 72:20
articulated 14:8	39:15 51:2 61:4	35:1 107:12	76:25 77:2	72:24 74:7,20
28:4	61:11,12,16	benefits 34:24	85:15,17,18,20	75:17 89:3
artificial 8:3,7	63:7,7 66:23	58:22 72:19	86:6,10,12,17	91:14,16,21
39:4 107:18	69:10 75:10	best 7:5 56:5	86:20 87:1,3	93:8,23 94:11
aside 5:16 31:21	90:2,2 94:3	79:22	88:11,14,24	94:16,21,23
asked 15:10 19:7	Bailey 51:22	bets 40:6 43:8	89:8 90:1 96:14	96:19,20,22
23:9 25:17 27:3	balance 53:18	better 23:4 54:6	103:5 104:1	97:4,9,9 98:3,6
76:2 90:9	ball 92:19	58:14 68:12,12	Breyer's 78:4	98:19 99:21
asks 24:6 78:10	baloney 65:17	68:16 106:22	87:20	100:10 101:24

102:25 103:15	26:14,25 29:7	86:21 87:2,7,19	causing 70:21,22	65:8 69:10
103:19 104:3	31:19 32:3,15	88:21 89:2,16	109:8	77:22 78:22
107:7,10,11	33:23 34:4 39:7	90:6,25 91:17	CBO 10:4	81:1,6 82:5,7
buying 19:24	39:12 40:9,16	92:10,25 93:17	105:17	82:12,22 83:3
20:2,11 55:3	41:10,24 42:13	94:7,16,22 95:4	cell 6:10 15:20	83:17 93:12
99:20 100:6	42:17 45:2 48:7	95:25 96:6 97:2	16:4	108:15,21
102:2 105:7,13	48:8,14 55:11	97:21,24 98:10	century 35:6	110:4 111:2
107:6	55:13 56:17	98:17 99:9,13	certain 16:7	child 51:24 99:5
	59:17,18 62:22	100:3 101:3,9	25:13 32:14	99:8,12
<u> </u>	62:23 65:19,22	101:11,13,20	44:24 51:4 52:8	CHIP 103:10
C 2:1 3:1	68:6,8,15 69:15	102:9,17,22	53:4 57:14	choice 14:16
calculate 34:17	69:23 70:2,5	103:1,25 104:2	88:16 94:25	15:1 19:16
59:10	72:13,23,23	104:12,24	106:11	24:23 25:21
calculated 33:23	74:13,14,17,20	106:9,23	certainly 50:25	102:2,10
52:4	75:2,4,9,18	107:20 108:16	55:19 70:18	109:19
calculation 37:9	81:12,16,17,23	case 3:4 5:5	certificate 65:21	choices 101:6
call 50:9	82:24 83:1,6,10	10:14 22:23	challenge 92:11	choose 24:25
called 49:15	83:11 84:12,17	26:3 39:23	92:13	25:2
50:22	84:19 86:24,25	40:22,23 45:8	change 83:20	choosing 27:4
calling 50:15	87:11 89:15	45:13,18,21	88:12	chose 5:16 25:2
calls 35:11	90:17 92:13,16	46:25 49:9	changed 89:9	25:19 104:5
cancer 84:11	93:3,16,19 97:8	52:17 61:3	changes 31:14	109:15
candor 86:3	99:19 100:6,8	63:14,18 64:9	changing 11:25	chosen 23:17
capable 47:6	100:11,17	69:11 74:16	108:9	24:25 27:7
capture 56:15,18	101:8 104:4,6	76:4 78:6,10	characterization	29:17 40:15
captured 57:16	104:17,21	79:21,22,23	36:10 46:11,15	Christian 69:17
car 16:7 17:21,23	108:24 109:7	96:22 104:15	49:13	cigarettes
19:24 20:3 31:7	109:24	104:23 109:2	characterized	102:11,13
64:22 66:12,13	careful 38:23	111:4	5:15 46:11	103:3
66:18 67:18,22	91:17	cases 11:21	charge 9:20	citizen 31:13
70:20 71:9,20	caring 60:7	27:15 28:23	11:16 37:12	citizenry 63:25
74:7,8,9,21	carriage 60:23	30:21 31:14	102:14	100:20 108:11
88:22 89:3,5	carriages 60:19	47:4 64:8 96:6	cheaper72:22	citizens 86:23
94:11,12 107:2	60:25	96:10 108:6	Chief 3:3,9 5:25	City 71:8
care 3:11,12,14	carry 4:23 22:25	cash 64:20	6:13,20 7:8	class 21:5 33:1
3:16 4:15,15	95:11	catastrophe	17:17 18:4,6,9	34:24 44:22
5:7,14,15 6:6	cars 19:24,25	83:12	18:14,17 30:11	69:17 92:11
7:1 8:8,9,14,24	60:5 65:5 67:1	catastrophes	30:20 31:24	class-wide 92:24
9:20,22 12:7,19	67:6,19	83:14	32:12 33:7 39:6	clause 4:17
12:23,24 13:1,2	Carvin 1:21 2:9	catastrophic	39:10 40:11,14	15:11 16:20,21
14:21 17:14,22	81:3,4,6 82:6	55:11 75:4	41:1,17 42:4,14	16:23 18:25
18:8,22,22	82:12 83:2,19	105:8,14,25	42:18,23 43:13	20:21 27:9 38:9
20:13,15,17	84:6,15 85:6,7	Cato 91:2	50:8,11,20	39:13 44:10,18
22:2,7,22 23:20	85:9,17,19 86:3	cause 41:9	53:19,23 54:3	45:9,11 52:25
24:6,19 26:13	86:8,11,16,19	causes 41:9,10	55:12 64:5,23	54:7 61:10,10
	I	I	I	I

61:11 63:11	come 55:22	105:22,22	completely 8:11	33:14,15,18,20
73:11 77:6,7	62:12 72:16,17	106:6,7,17,19	comprehensive	36:2 38:2,6,15
79:16 87:13	106:4	107:3,13,17,18	26:20 44:7,8,19	38:22 39:11,25
97:23 106:17	comes 107:23	107:19,22	compulsion 95:1	40:3,5,15 42:6
107:3 109:22	commerce 4:17	108:1,13	97:4	42:9 43:4,9,17
110:11	4:25 5:8 8:18	109:22 110:11	computers 16:4	43:22 44:7,20
clear 47:13 58:1	11:22 12:10	commit 86:5	conceded 54:19	45:15 47:12
61:17 104:2	14:10 15:10,11	commodities	concern 41:19	49:5,9,13,21
clearly 48:24	15:17 16:19,21	16:25	60:9,10 75:9	49:25 50:1,8
60:17,23,24	16:23 17:6,11	common 42:1	104:23	51:3 54:5,7,9
92:12	17:12,16 18:20	97:11	concerned 42:24	54:12,19 56:4,7
Clement 1:19 2:6	18:23,24 19:1,5	commonly 48:18	75:1 106:10	56:14,18 57:21
53:21,25 54:1,3	20:21 23:10,21	communicable	concerning 31:3	58:4,19 61:12
54:22 55:6 56:2	23:24 26:9,10	86:23 87:22	concurrent 80:16	61:18 62:5,24
56:11 57:5 58:2	26:18,21 27:9	community 4:22	concurring 96:16	64:13 68:13,23
59:4,21 60:2,8	29:2 30:5 31:1	11:3,9,15 23:2	condition 29:11	69:5 70:7 71:24
63:12,16 64:23	35:5,7,21,22	37:1 39:1 57:17	37:21 95:2,9	73:11 74:1 76:8
65:8,17,23	38:9 39:13,17	57:18 59:10	99:19 100:6	76:13 77:6,13
66:19 67:5,16	39:18 40:4	community-ba	conditioning 97:7	81:14,19,25
68:7,20,22 69:9	41:20 43:7,15	97:13,19	97:8	82:1,1,10 83:8
69:21 70:3,17	43:24 44:18	community-rat	conditions 4:21	84:24 85:1
72:5 74:5,12,18	45:8 52:25 54:6	8:19 22:19	89:5 97:15	86:25 87:14
76:25 77:4,18	54:6,7,8,10,10	companies 9:22	108:10	89:18,22 92:18
77:21 78:5,24	54:14,25 55:1	10:12 11:4,11	conduct 48:11,12	97:16 98:2,13
80:12,18 81:2	61:9,10,13,15	11:14 37:17	51:18	98:22 100:15
88:8 90:9	61:18,23,24	55:5,21 56:25	conflicts 84:16	100:17 101:6,7
101:22	63:11,14,18,20	91:11 101:1	confront 106:15	101:14,15,25
Clement's 93:18	67:1,2 68:24	company 37:20	confronted	104:5 105:13
109:9	69:6 71:5 72:3	72:17 98:2,7	108:23	105:23 106:3
clients 105:18	73:2,5,10,11	company's 51:23	confronting 27:6	107:7,9,25
close 104:20	73:12,14,16,17	comparable	confusion 101:21	108:10,23
closer 105:23	73:19,19 74:2	15:21	Congress 4:17	109:2,14 110:1
club 41:12,15	76:23 77:6,7,20	compel 40:21	5:16 7:10,11	110:16
clunkers 64:21	77:23 78:8,9,16	43:17 54:5,9	8:17 9:16,23	Congresses
code 45:16 46:16	79:1,5,7,9,10	69:6 73:14,17	12:10,22 14:9	74:25
46:20 48:19	80:15,17,21	79:9 81:9 89:7	15:11,15,25	congressional
50:17	81:11,16,19,20	93:23 95:10,11	16:11 17:5,5,11	75:22
colleague 97:19	81:21 82:1,2,15	96:19 107:10	17:12 19:21	Congress's
101:15,19	82:18,19,20,24	107:11 108:13	20:22 21:13	19:20 22:23
colleagues 23:9	85:2,2,5,13,14	compelled 85:14	22:17 23:17	38:13,19 39:5
colleague's	87:13,16,17	87:16 94:19	24:1,7,14,17	39:13,20 41:20
94:11	89:21 91:6	compelling 77:23	24:22,24,25	42:8 43:1 55:1
collected 50:17	93:25 95:19	96:12 105:5	25:2,4,12,19	69:8 75:23
52:2	97:23 103:13	107:7 108:11	27:4,5,7 28:25	89:25 107:14
colloquy 101:21	103:15,21	complete 77:13	29:4 30:3 32:20	conjunction

23:22 45:7	17:22 41:16	37:2	75:5 102:6	danger 31:6
conjure 63:19	55:4 61:21	counter-exam	110:12	dangers 106:3
connected 85:4	contagious 68:18	96:15	covered 22:3	daughter99:4
85:12	contain 32:2	country 3:15,16	23:4 26:11 37:4	day 33:3,5 36:8
connection 84:24	context 36:4	29:6 35:6 86:13	37:5 55:13	51:25
93:5	70:19	86:24	covering 17:22	deal 17:15 22:19
consciously	continue 3:3	counts 25:23	18:1	24:3 82:9 92:23
107:25	contract 34:15	27:8	covers 37:14	dealing 24:9
conscripted	95:15,16	couple 7:21 24:1	75:5	dealt 98:8
100:20	contracts 35:17	76:7	cows 62:8	death 99:7
conscripting	108:9	course 16:1	cradle 89:19	debating 76:1
37:17	contrary 64:24	28:18 34:9 51:9	create 4:25	December 49:14
conscription	contribute 58:11	63:21 68:20,22	15:11,15,16	decide 29:23
77:16	control 5:22 6:19	69:10 71:7	17:11 54:10	40:19 56:8 72:2
consequences	94:12,13	73:15 76:10	61:13,14 91:8	decided 66:15
91:22 109:1	controls 94:20	103:14	100:4 105:21	72:15 83:24
consider 24:7	controversial	Court 1:1,13	106:24 108:10	86:4
considered 47:2	73:4	3:10 14:8 15:14	created 61:14	decides 68:23
considering	converts 106:5	25:12 26:2,4,5	98:22,23	deciding 70:20
44:18	corporation	28:4,23 30:1,3	creates 75:18	decision 21:15
consistent 54:23	63:17	30:9,20 35:16	83:9 86:22	54:15 66:8 71:3
Constitution	correct 10:3 13:5	39:20 45:21,22	101:25	71:4,4 83:24
12:4 27:21 51:9	25:10	46:25 50:5	creating 61:25	89:4 95:1
77:15,16 81:13	cost 8:2 9:6,21	51:12,15 52:16	70:15 82:24	103:14
84:25 107:21	15:2 22:5 23:5	52:18 54:4	creation 18:23	decisions 74:2
107:24 109:20	33:25 34:1	63:21,22 69:4	18:25 38:19	75:22 78:18
110:6	70:24 71:23	76:8 77:5 79:1	39:5	103:20
constitutional	75:1,8,12,12	79:4 80:4 81:7	credit 60:6 66:2	deduction 48:23
11:25 27:18	76:22 87:25	87:11 106:18	66:3 101:17,24	48:24
28:9,13 46:12	88:5 100:24	107:3,13	102:1	deeply 20:22
49:15,22 58:19	109:11	110:11,15,20	credits 60:3,4	default 84:18
60:10	costs 9:18,25	110:20	cremated 9:1	defaulting 93:3
constitutionality	14:22,24 34:17	Court's 30:21	crises 110:8	104:3,6
91:1,4	34:21 35:9	54:24 61:2	critical 31:25	defend 5:4 16:15
construe 50:5	41:10 45:3	110:25	criticisms 31:9	16:15
construed	75:10 86:25	cover9:21 11:5	crystal 92:19	defended 49:17
110:23	89:12 92:17,22	11:12,17 32:19	cut 68:5	50:12
consume 10:17	93:1 104:21	33:25 37:13,18	cuts 25:4	defending 16:12
21:9 22:10	cost-free 84:12	coverage 4:23	cutting 65:17	deference 24:22
33:24 34:1	cost-shifting	5:17 8:20 11:10		40:5
54:20	109:8	12:8 22:24 23:2	D	define 13:1,8,10
consumed 44:22	Counsel 111:3	23:18 24:18	D 1:19 2:6 3:1	31:25 32:10
consumes 10:9	counteract 38:15	26:23 32:11,21	54:1	33:16
consuming 21:6	44:12	33:13,17 39:1	dairy 26:6,7	definitely 15:5
consumption	counterproduc	53:11 55:11	35:15,16	definition 87:17

definitive 34:11	die 7:24 62:19	disavowed 50:2	100:5,22	5:7 9:16 14:9
degree 104:17	difference 7:8	disconnect 74:24	dollar 4:2	17:12 19:21
deliberation	8:12,22 9:3,4,5	discourage 48:22	dollars 9:17,24	23:19 28:25
38:23	9:14,15 15:5,8	discover 62:16	14:23 64:22	30:4,25 33:15
delighted 78:24	15:8 17:9 18:6	discriminated	74:1	33:19,19 38:7
demand 16:25	18:20 24:12,24	98:12	DONALD 1:16	38:11,14 44:13
91:9,23	33:5 46:6 49:6	discrimination	2:3,12 3:7	54:15 69:20
demanded 74:9	63:10 64:4	4:6,20 29:11	108:19	70:11 71:3,4
democratically	67:22 72:12	discussed 52:13	door 77:23	72:9 75:22
109:21 110:2	74:16 80:23	discussion 52:24	doubled 37:3	78:18 95:1
110:22	87:20 97:7	55:8 61:6	doubt 26:9 41:8	102:3
denied 108:12	102:9,10	disease 34:15	52:15 60:22	economically
denominated	different 6:14	62:17 68:18	79:16 110:10	105:7
45:14,22 79:13	8:11 9:11 13:14	71:24 86:13,23	110:16	economies 72:20
79:23	13:14 21:22	87:8,22,23	downstream	74:9
denying 33:21	26:17 27:7	105:3	87:14,16	economists 10:7
100:14	30:15 31:13	disguised 60:11	downtown 7:20	economy 3:13
Department 1:3	40:20 44:6 62:3	disproportionate	dramatically	effect 11:3 14:10
1:17 3:4 52:1	63:22 65:5 66:3	51:18	103:3	21:14,15,15
departure 30:2	66:22 67:6,17	dissuading	draw82:13 107:1	29:1 30:4,25
depend 16:8 60:8	69:16 71:20,21	102:25	drawing 107:4,16	43:24 64:17
depends 69:22	74:11,12,25	distinction 18:5	107:18,18	71:5 73:20
98:10	82:17 84:19,20	62:12 82:13	Drexel 51:13,22	78:18,19 87:10
deposits 64:6	92:10 93:2,2,19	95:13 96:7	drive 62:5	91:25 92:7
deprived 106:1	96:2 102:4	106:14 107:1	driven98:22	effective 3:18
deprives 108:2	103:3,5,6,6	107:23	driving 16:5	26:23 50:16,21
derived 76:13	dilemma 90:7	distinctions	88:15	110:7
description	100:13	107:5	drug 72:17,24	effectively 96:7
78:14	direct 51:11	distinguish13:25	due 30:7,10	effects 5:8 9:16
designed 24:19	60:11,15,17,19	distinguished	61:10 66:24	17:15 23:21
48:11,14 70:1,4	60:21,23 61:2	89:20	74:6 78:13	56:13 61:17,22
despite 97:14	64:16 67:21	distinguishes	dutifully 67:13	72:9 81:23
determination	78:19 79:15,18	15:5 70:19	duty 11:22 31:5,8	86:24 87:3,14
98:5	101:22 106:19	distinguishing	31:12 110:25	87:16 91:8
determined 49:4	directed 4:19	5:21 13:23	D.C 1:9,17,19,21	efficiency 25:20
97:16	direction 47:4	diversify 66:1		efficient 64:15
determinedly	directly 4:11,13	divided 60:19	$\frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{E}^{1} \mathbf{E}^{1} \mathbf{E}^{1} \mathbf{E}^{1}}$	69:7 70:12
49:9	4:14 9:18,19	doctor 74:15	E 2:1 3:1,1	89:24 94:13
Detroit 70:21	94:9 107:23	83:9 109:13	earlier 25:17	effort 54:5 64:12
develops 93:11	disabled 58:10	doctors 99:23	52:24 55:12	efforts 49:4
device 48:5	disadvantageo	doing 7:22 8:4,8	56:10 57:9	either 3:21 5:20
88:19 89:3	35:17	10:2,15 14:3	early 98:15	17:24 21:5
diagnosed 34:15	disagree 11:19	21:23 25:8	108:6	44:23 72:8
diagnosis 34:11	89:22	33:20 57:2	echoed 21:12	99:21
dial 6:11	disaster 14:18	93:10 97:6	economic 4:8,8	elected 76:14
	I	I	I	1

	1	1	1	1
electric 74:7,8,9	29:10 30:22	estimate 10:8	exception 22:4	explicitly 50:1
eliminate 76:19	ensuring 98:11	estimated 10:4	exceptions	exports 51:10
eliminated 96:7	enter 5:23,23	et 1:4,7,20,22 2:7	105:21	express 43:21
eliminates 76:20	6:17,18,19	2:10 54:2 81:5	excise 79:17	extant 68:24
else's 19:15	38:16,16 45:1	eventually 7:24	excludes 31:22	extent 6:8,23 7:5
embark 30:6,7,9	54:6,9 79:10	36:4 96:5	Excuse 3:18	26:19 77:14
embedded 20:23	89:7 93:6,14,15	everybody 5:19	execution 4:23	extraordinarily
44:19	95:19 96:12	8:25,25 12:18	22:25	88:9
emergency 6:2	105:6 108:9	13:2,3,4,9,10	exempt 5:17	Extraordinary
6:11,23 15:24	entered 89:4,14	19:15 22:22	59:20	53:16
16:6 24:5 55:10	93:10 95:5,15	31:22 32:5,14	exemption 59:16	eyes 13:25
55:18 62:22	entering 89:16	33:11 35:13,13	exercise 25:19	
68:15 74:14	entire 56:20	40:25 41:8,11	35:4,7,22 41:8	F
75:2,4,9,16	entirely 30:15	41:24 42:3,25	41:9,11 45:23	facial 92:13 94:3
88:2 99:4,16,18	84:19,20	46:4 53:4 58:7	46:12,23 47:2,7	facilitate 6:10
100:14,17	entitled 11:16	59:12,16 64:15	48:3,25 49:2,17	72:20
103:8	32:20 74:13	64:21,25 65:4	49:22 50:2,4,6	facing 90:6
eminently 25:1	entry 44:25	65:13,14,15	59:23 63:17,19	fact 5:16 11:7
emission 94:12	enumerated 14:5	70:5,23 72:4,18	78:7 110:12	15:19 45:7 47:3
94:12	28:14 30:13	72:19,20,22	exercised 77:13	49:15 56:23
emphasize 76:12	80:24 82:14	74:3 88:3 93:9	exercises 46:23	61:24 76:13
employer 3:22	environment	93:13,15,21,21	48:20	79:22 88:14
4:3 29:7	16:8 22:22	101:7 102:19	exercising 47:13	89:12,12 92:15
enact 4:18 11:8	environmental	102:23	47:14	92:16
16:11 44:9	94:20	everybody's	exist 15:16,17	factor 25:7
95:11	envision 110:9	13:15 40:16,19	77:24	factors 14:12
enacted 22:17	envisioned 110:5	73:21	existed 15:12	51:15
95:8 108:24	EPA 88:18	evident 27:21	existing 17:12,15	facts 92:19 96:18
enacting 33:15	epidemic 85:22	28:12	17:15 18:20	fails 102:5
44:8	equally 8:7 27:21	exact 11:7	19:5,21 54:8	failure 5:11
encourage 77:5	28:12	exaction 48:6	87:18 92:7	43:23 72:10
ends 37:15	equation 34:8	exactly 36:24	exists 26:18,21	78:19 91:7
enduring 3:12	equipment 88:16	40:11 41:18	28:10 65:18	104:2
enforce 51:21	equivalent 52:5	77:10 79:3 80:7	79:9	fair 36:10 48:2
100:7,9 102:12	era 66:25	88:8 106:24	expand 20:25	49:13 50:4
enforced 46:19	ERISA 4:4 15:24	109:25	expenses 66:6	93:13
52:1 76:16	29:9 43:10	example 8:12	expensive 19:12	families 14:22
99:17,20	especially 35:24	15:9,21 37:3	34:16	84:8
enforcement	ESQ 1:16,19,21	51:23 67:18	experience 23:3	family 9:12,24
52:7	2:3,6,9,12	88:12 94:4,11	36:25	73:25
engage 44:13	essential 27:13	95:7 96:21,24	experiences	far 54:9 55:8
73:17 93:1	32:11 33:16,17	97:3 110:4	38:23	farm 96:21
engaging 33:19	essentially 54:10	examples 96:17	explain 86:19	farmer61:20
enormously 35:1	56:19	exceeds 81:21	explaining 49:21	65:2 96:22
ensure 12:11	establish 39:11	82:3	explains 14:2	farms 95:22

	1	1	1	1
faster 62:6	first 12:6 14:8	forget 90:2	General 1:16 3:6	84:12
fatal 68:5	21:12 23:15	forgo 54:15	3:9 4:12 5:2,13	Gibbons 77:11
feature 5:21	44:6 47:11,19	forgone 52:6	6:13 7:7,15,17	79:7
25:18	51:17 54:10	forgotten90:4	8:5,10 9:2,5,11	Ginsburg 10:23
features 42:10	61:2 65:9 66:21	Form 46:17	9:14 10:19,25	14:14 19:2,6
federal 4:11 16:6	69:4 73:11	formulated 60:9	12:5 13:5,13	46:18,24 48:4
27:22 28:14,16	74:18 76:6	forth 77:16	14:7 15:4 16:2	48:17 58:2 59:5
29:8,17,20	78:12 79:10	found 7:21 9:23	16:10,14,22	84:1,7,16 90:8
30:14,17,22	83:4 97:18	86:25	17:8 18:3,6,11	90:13 91:13,18
31:12,15 41:10	five 93:23,24	foundation 23:23	18:16,19 19:2,4	97:11,22 98:4
43:12 49:1 53:2	five-year 12:17	founding 100:17	19:19 20:4,8,12	98:14
62:19 66:16	fledgling 73:13	fraction 83:15	20:20 21:2,7,8	give 25:13 54:8
67:3 71:15 73:2	flood 105:4,4	framers 60:16	21:10 22:16	64:20 81:14
79:24 80:3,16	floor 49:16	64:3 73:15	23:7,11,14,25	85:2 97:20
80:24 85:25	Florida 1:7,20	79:16 89:25	24:11 25:15	108:13
86:14 95:12	2:7 3:5 54:2	107:25 108:12	26:19 28:3,11	given 29:20 40:5
100:19	focus 74:24	110:9	28:18,22 29:15	50:2 56:9 68:1
federalism 80:5	focuses 106:13	frames 83:7	29:18,25 30:19	68:3 102:10
federalist 73:5	focusing 61:9	framing 60:18	31:17 32:8,18	gives 42:9 44:10
80:9	food 13:9,10,14	free 19:16 84:17	33:14 34:5,23	54:7 84:25
fee 45:22 46:6	14:15 18:2 72:7	freedom 108:3	35:12,25 36:1,6	96:21 98:24
feed 96:23	foods 94:24	friends 8:16	36:16,20,23	giving 89:22
fees 46:3,4,4	forbid 12:23	24:12 30:8	38:1,6,11,18	106:3
fellow 71:15	20:22	front 31:7 84:14	39:8 40:8,13	go 11:22 13:18
86:22	forbidden79:18	fuel-efficient	41:1,13 42:1,5	13:19 19:6 22:7
fewer 11:12,12	80:3	60:5	42:16,22 43:9	35:20 41:10
23:4 37:13,14	force 23:10	fully 83:9 95:25	43:19 44:1,3,5	58:15 61:4 62:7
37:14,14	43:22 55:4	101:21	45:10,12,20	62:10 63:10
figure 57:1 59:8	57:21 63:25	full-stride 93:20	46:8,22 47:10	65:22 70:21
figured 33:24	72:22 75:13	fundamental	47:20,24 48:16	74:10,14,14
figures 10:3,13	94:21 98:19	3:12 7:7 10:21	49:3,12 50:10	75:15 79:8
84:7	106:14	31:16 33:5	50:14,23 51:1,4	83:22 86:15
Filburn 64:12	forced 16:24	80:23 101:3	51:8 52:12 53:6	88:6 90:2,2
65:1	32:24 33:2	fundamentally	53:10,14,17,19	91:15,21 96:22
financing 5:6	35:18 59:18	81:13 95:15	76:6 79:21 80:6	goes 24:5 25:14
7:23 8:8 17:21	75:17 90:16	Furniture 51:13	82:16 83:8	51:2 66:23 69:9
65:19	94:14,16,23	51:22	108:17,21	74:21 75:13
find 57:12 64:9	96:22	further 79:8	111:2	96:24 105:11
Finding 57:24	forcing 10:11	fuss 58:12	generally 5:22	going 5:2 6:4,6
findings 54:13	11:4 15:2 37:17	G	31:10 59:12	6:22 7:5,24,24
58:1 75:23,23	58:17 64:6 74:7	$\frac{\mathbf{G}}{\mathbf{G} 3:1}$	General's 54:19	8:2,24,25 9:9
fine 86:15 88:11	83:21 97:9	gallons 93:23	78:13 81:9	9:12 10:16,23
90:22 98:11	foregoing 96:4	Garcia-ize 77:5	generation 60:18	13:6 14:4 17:13
102:13 105:1	foreign 73:12	geese 56:19	getting 20:15	19:17 20:10,13
fire 6:2 7:4	forever 34:7	geese 30.17	27:2 71:12	20:13 30:6,16

	1	1	1	
32:5,16 33:6,11	67:3,21 70:24	37:1 38:25	57:3 59:17,18	9:23 20:1 35:8
34:3,7,7,10,13	71:15 72:15	57:17,17 59:9	60:6 65:12,18	37:13,13 57:19
34:14,18 36:14	73:2 79:25 80:7	guaranteed-iss	65:19,22,24	57:19
36:22 37:9,21	80:17,25 83:7	8:18 22:18	67:7,9 68:6,8	highly 37:2 39:4
39:15 40:17,19	85:25 86:14	34:25 97:21	69:23 70:1,2,3	highway 16:5
40:21 54:20	87:24 88:1	guarantees 66:4	70:5 72:12,13	high-risk 55:22
58:9,21 61:7	90:21,23 93:23	guise 51:14	72:19,23,23	HIPAA 4:5 29:9
63:23,25 64:20	94:9,10,15,18		74:13,13 75:17	43:11
64:21 66:14	94:25 95:2,17	<u> </u>	81:10,11,16,23	history 4:7 29:4
68:23,24 70:20	95:21 96:19	Hamilton 60:20	82:24 83:1,5	49:20 61:11,12
74:21 75:8,10	97:15 99:14	hand 25:11 80:24	84:12,18 86:24	61:16 63:8 69:5
75:12 76:12	103:8,9,9,10	handle 38:24	86:25 87:10	106:16
77:25 79:1	103:12 104:13	52:17,19	88:6 89:15	hit 34:10,14
82:25 83:9 85:9	109:21 110:2	happening	92:12,16,20	83:12
88:24,25 91:14	110:23	102:16 104:11	93:3,16,18,19	holders 75:11
92:20 93:14,15	government's	happens 11:7	97:8,14 98:7,20	home 57:1 61:21
96:5 99:17	56:21 57:25	22:5 31:20	98:23 99:19,20	96:24
101:16 102:11	64:24 69:11	71:17	99:21 100:6,6	homeowner's
102:14 105:20	75:24 88:9	hard 72:2	100:10,11	105:4
107:12,13	93:14 98:18	harm 87:22	101:7,16,17	homes 60:4
golden 56:19	106:25	harmful 104:6	104:3,4,6,17	home-grown
good 39:23 42:23	grain 96:23	harms 84:24	105:14,25	91:15
61:6 98:21	grasp17:19	health 1:3 3:5,12	108:25 109:24	honest 25:9
goodly 19:13	grave 89:19	3:14,16,21,25	healthy 7:21 10:8	Honor 17:11
goods 94:24	108:23	4:15,15 5:6,7	15:2 32:23 33:1	28:19 30:1
95:19	great 58:16 64:5	5:14,15 6:6 7:1	33:3 34:6,7	32:19 50:15
gotten 67:10,12	66:6 72:16,17	8:8,9,14,23,24	36:8 37:24	52:15
97:5	72:18,21 110:8	9:20,24 10:10	57:13 58:8	hope 67:11
governed 79:7	greater 54:9 73:3	11:17 12:7,19	75:13,14 97:18	104:25
government 3:22	greatest 76:10	12:23,23 13:1,2	100:23 105:11	horsepower
4:11 6:9,24 7:1	ground 23:6 42:2	17:14,20,21	hear 78:3	94:14
7:4 12:1 14:3,6	89:9 97:12	18:7,8,21,22	heard 76:5,18	hospital 14:21
15:19 21:19,22	group 33:22,24	20:13,15,17	hearing 103:24	24:5 88:7 109:6
21:24 23:10	34:1,10,13,14	21:25 22:2,7,8	heart 6:7 13:3	109:12
25:8 27:22,23	56:15 58:20	22:22 23:20	heavy 11:23 12:3	hospitals 88:1
27:24 28:1,14	62:16,21 71:18	25:6 26:13,14	held 27:15 80:15	hour 7:20 62:6
28:14,16 29:17	84:19 103:20	26:25 29:7	help 11:18,18	house 61:20
29:20 30:14,22	groups 5:16	31:19 32:14	helping 89:24	70:20
30:24 31:11,12	31:21	33:23 39:7,12	helps 37:13	huge 10:11 72:18
31:15 41:11	growing 61:19,21	40:9,15 41:10	87:17	75:18 86:24
49:1 53:2 58:15	62:7	41:15,24 42:13	hey 62:5	97:7
58:23 59:1,2,16	guarantee 22:2	42:16 48:7,12	high 36:18 85:24	human 1:4 3:5
59:19,20,21	37:8	48:13 53:4	102:21 109:10	18:15 71:11
60:7 62:19	guaranteed 4:21	54:16,20 56:16	109:13	89:14,19 110:8
65:11,12 66:17	11:2,8,15 23:2	56:17,24,25	higher 9:21,22	hunting 46:4

hurt 16:7 72:1	93:8 95:5,6	4:4,7,19 10:9	42:11,12 44:21	Internal 46:15
100:21	110:17	12:1 29:12 31:3	48:1,9,13 52:6	50:17 52:2
hurting 20:2	imposed 55:11	31:12,15 66:18	53:4 54:16,21	interpreted
Hylton 61:1	100:18	108:3	55:3,4,12,21	110:6
hypothesized	imposes 51:9	individuals 3:24	56:16,25 57:10	interrupted 19:8
99:17	imposing 44:21	31:19 54:5	57:12,22 58:6	interstate 5:8
hypothetical	46:2 109:3	57:22	59:3,8,19 60:6	14:10 17:5
6:21 87:20,21	imposition 36:25	industries	65:12,18,20,21	23:21 29:1 30:5
hypotheticals	67:21	104:22 107:5	65:24,25 66:3,3	31:1 41:24 42:3
65:6 74:16	impossibility	industry 59:3,9	66:8,13,16,18	43:7,24 61:18
	55:3	64:19 71:6	67:7,9,18 68:10	72:2 76:23
<u> </u>	impossible 29:3	77:25 107:1,2	69:23 70:1,4	88:16,17 92:1
idea 42:19 75:7	impression 72:14	ineffectual 37:2	71:16,23 72:12	95:19,24 96:9
identified 14:13	86:22	inevitably 21:8	75:4,14,17,18	96:12 103:21
51:13,15 60:17	impressions	inextricably	78:14 81:10	intervention 68:4
64:3	99:14	65:19	83:22 84:8 88:6	intrastate 80:21
identify 16:20	inactive 106:22	infer48:2	89:11 91:11	95:23 96:8,11
106:23	inactivity 107:20	injecting 105:18	92:21 93:7,9,19	intrusion 39:20
identifying 11:2	incarcerated	injured 67:12	96:4 98:2,3,6,7	intrusive 95:16
ignore 79:22	5:19	inoculated 72:1	98:16,20,20,23	intuitively 95:13
illegal 103:4	incentive 48:1	86:1,2,14	99:6,20,22	103:2 108:8
illegitimate 35:4	110:18	inoculation 62:20	100:7,10,14,24	invading 29:4
illness 41:9	incentives 52:21	inside 105:22	100:25 101:1	invalid 82:4
83:13	64:20 70:9	insofar 56:24,25	101:18,25	inverse 63:5
illogical 88:10	incentivizes	Institute 91:2	102:2 103:11	investment
98:18	101:24,25	insurance 3:13	103:15 104:3	58:16
illuminates 50:25	include 43:2	3:15,18,21 4:1	104:14,17,20	involuntarily
illustrates 106:2	44:10 73:16	4:18,19,24 7:12	105:4,9,14,25	6:18 89:13
imagine 20:20	97:17	8:1,14,23,24	107:1 108:25	involuntary
immutable 33:1	includes 79:5	9:22,25 10:5,12	109:3,8,12	13:17
impede 97:25	82:8	10:24,24,25	insurance-based	involve 32:2
impermissible	including 44:11	11:4,10,13,14	56:9	58:24,24
60:11	increase 47:25	12:9,12,21,23	insure 83:23	involved 26:9
implicate 33:18	increased 86:25	14:16 17:1,2,20	97:13 98:9,15	involves 45:14
implicit 27:18	increasing 73:25	18:7,17 20:11	insured 68:14	71:23
imply 91:20	incur 66:5	21:16 22:1,1,8	insurer 37:6	ironic 25:23
import 30:9	incurring 36:18	22:9,18,21 24:4	insurers 32:9	irrelevant 49:11
important 6:25	Indian 5:19	24:15 26:14,15	58:25 90:20,23	57:10
36:11 73:4 79:3	indicated 55:12	29:23 32:19	97:12	IRS 46:16 50:18
107:14	indicia 47:1	33:13,25 36:14	intended 84:9	issuance 21:16
impose 8:18,19	indirect 60:20	36:19 37:9,11	98:2	issue 4:21 7:9,9
24:15 42:6,11	106:19	37:14,17,20	intent 14:17	11:2,8,15 20:25
52:10 60:15	indirectly 94:9	38:16,21,22	interfere 28:5	22:9 23:2 30:18
66:16 89:12 02:17 22 03:1 7	indisputably 67:1	39:7,9,17,24	91:10	37:1 38:25
92:17,22 93:1,7	individual 3:24	40:8,22 42:6,11	interlinked 65:20	45:14 55:9
	1	1	1	l

57:17,18 59:9	20:9,18,24 21:7	82:12,22 83:3	69:25 73:18	92:14 96:24
83:7 86:4	21:10 23:6,8,12	83:17 84:1,7,16	74:5,11,18 85:6	102:20
103:17	23:25 24:11	85:6,8,15,17	85:8 86:18 90:2	knows 46:4
issues 59:22	25:3,16 26:8,20	85:18,20 86:6	90:4,7,10 92:9	Kurth 51:13
105:5	27:2,10 28:8,12	86:10,12,17,17	106:9 107:23	
item 91:8	28:20 29:13,16	86:20 87:1,3,5	keep 15:1 83:4	L
it'll 91:23 98:11	29:19 30:11,20	87:19,20 88:8	Kennedy 4:25	label 80:4
104:15	31:2,17,24	88:11,14,24	5:3 11:18 12:6	labels 49:8 80:8
i.e 21:14 87:12	32:12 33:7,21	89:8 90:1,2,4,7	15:10 16:18	labor 26:5 52:1
97:7 99:19	34:12,24 35:10	90:8,10,11,13	17:4 25:3,16	70:21
100:10	35:24 36:3,7,13	91:13,18 92:9	27:2 31:2,18	laborer 51:24
	36:17,21,24	93:12 94:5,8,21	56:21 57:6	lack 41:9
J	37:19 38:2,4,10	94:23 95:17,25	70:14,17	large 37:18
Jersey 37:3	38:13 39:6,10	96:2,14 97:11	104:10,13,25	62:15 71:17
job 15:16 70:22	40:11,14 41:1,4	97:22 98:4,14	105:20	99:6 106:9
join 41:11	41:7,14,17 42:4	99:2,10,25	Kentucky 37:5	larger43:25
joined 76:7	42:14,18,23	101:2,5,10,12	key 8:15 30:11	late 98:16
Jones 26:6	43:13,18,20	101:14 102:4	64:24	latitude 25:13
JR 1:16 2:3,12	44:2,4 45:10,13	102:15,18,23	kids 35:19	32:20 33:16
3:7 108:19	46:3,18,24 47:8	103:5 104:1,10	kind 19:7 30:7	68:25
judge 96:16 97:2	47:10,16,22	104:13,25	34:2 44:11	Laughlin 26:6
105:3	48:4,17 49:3,14	105:17,20	73:11 83:1,11	Laughter 41:6
judgment 36:2	50:8,11,20 51:1	106:9 107:16	91:8.105:14	87:6 88:13 90:5
41:21 66:11	51:6 52:9,23	107:23 108:7	109:19,25	90:12
100:16 110:1	53:8,12,16,19	108:15,22	110:4	law 5:4 21:3 31:4
judgments 32:21	53:23 54:3,18	110:4 111:2	kinds 29:10	31:5 32:1 45:24
68:25 107:14	54:23 55:2,6,12	Justice's 69:10	55:14 75:8 95:7	45:25 49:16,21
110:21	56:2,11,21 57:6	77:22	96:18 102:1	69:12 76:14,15
junior 90:11	57:8 58:2 59:5	justifiable 53:14	106:11 107:5	80:2,4 81:22
jurisprudence	59:15,25 60:3	justification	knew 68:16	82:4 87:21 91:5
54:24 107:3	61:4 63:4,6,12	11:23 12:3	know 5:10 6:4,6	92:15 95:12
justice 1:17 3:3,9	63:15 64:5,23	19:20 78:15	6:21 7:22 13:6	laws 11:24 16:11
4:10,13,25 5:3	65:9,16,23	justified 54:14	13:18,24 20:19	21:13 95:8,8,11
5:9,14,25 6:13	66:12,19,23	63:16,17	33:6 34:9 35:15	103:8
6:20 7:8,13,16	67:9,16 68:2,11	justifies 15:6	35:18 36:21	lawyer 75:20
7:17,19 8:6,22	68:21,22 69:9	justify 16:24 17:1	45:18 46:3	law's 91:1,4
9:4,6,8,12 10:1	69:21,25 70:14	34:20 41:14	50:23,24 57:5	lead 57:15
10:23 11:18	70:17 71:7 72:5	justifying 18:25	60:12 61:1	leave 72:14
12:6,25 13:5,8	73:18 74:5,11		63:23 64:1 66:7	leaves 109:20
13:22 14:14	74:18 75:25	K W	67:8 68:21	left 27:25 29:23
15:7,10 16:3,10	76:25 77:2,10	Kagan 23:25	69:16,19 70:11	37:6 58:15
16:12,18 17:4	77:11,19 78:2,3	24:12 35:24	71:7,10,12,13	110:1
17:17 18:4,7,9	78:4,22,23	36:3,7 49:3,14	71:14 72:3 78:7	legal 92:1 102:12
18:14,17 19:2,6	80:10,14,18	56:2,11 65:16	83:14,17,19	legislate 66:17
19:7,23 20:5,6	81:1,6 82:5,7	65:23 69:9,21	84:4 87:7 89:1	67:4
		l	l	I

legislation 53:3	live 35:13	M	9:20 10:5 12:7	94:1 96:8,9,11
71:2 79:19	liver 13:4	Madison 60:21	12:13,14,15,18	96:13 97:8
97:23 108:6	living 57:2	73:5	13:1,9,10,11	104:14,15
legislative 49:20	loaves 64:16	main 14:15 81:9	13:14,16,17,19	106:12,12
legislature 76:16	local 28:24 76:9	82:23	14:16 15:5	109:24
legitimate 89:10	87:4,8 91:22,24	maintenance	17:14 18:21,22	marketplace
97:23 100:9,15	92:4	42:12	19:11 20:13,14	95:5 105:6
let's 25:4 91:17	Lochner 30:11	major 19:9,9,18	21:19 22:18	markets 72:6
95:4	30:18 39:16	majority 28:15	23:20 25:20	94:18 104:18
level 43:12 52:19	66:24	67:11 87:4	26:13,15,25	104:18
96:12	Lochner-style	making 19:11	29:5,12 31:19	married 62:9
leverage 104:8	30:9	21:23 32:20	31:20,23,25	Marshall 77:11
106:4	locked-in 66:4	47:16 62:4	32:13,17,22,25	110:5
libertarian 91:2	long 38:22	69:15 72:24	33:3,4,12 37:4	Maryland 14:20
license 45:21	longer 67:4	74:2 84:2 100:7	37:5,6,11 38:17	15:14
46:3,4 47:3	look 35:17 40:17	100:23	39:12,15,19,24	Massachusetts
79:21,25 80:3	40:20 49:7,7	man 31:7 62:7	40:7,16,19,24	109:16
life 68:4 95:2	51:16 57:11	mandate 10:2,9	41:16,24 42:3	massive 22:5
104:16	61:1,11,12,16	10:10,14 21:3	42:10,25 43:5	29:7 105:15
limit 23:12 43:14	61:19,20 64:8	33:23 52:9 54:4	43:10,10,11,11	match 83:4
78:7,9 79:2	68:13 69:18	54:14 55:21	44:24,25 45:1,2	maternity 32:2
82:11	71:3 73:23 80:8	80:11,13 89:23	45:3 53:7 55:16	32:16 33:10
limitation 109:22	98:19 100:4	100:1	57:10,12,22	matter 1:12 6:12
limitations 40:3	102:13 105:23	mandated 88:1	58:16,24 60:25	53:1 56:3,10,12
77:14	106:16	mandates 20:25	62:8 64:11,17	66:1 76:3 81:15
limited 27:24	looked 7:11	mandating 24:4	64:25 65:2,4,5	87:4 111:5
30:13 39:7,8	45:13 80:4	mandatory 21:15	65:10,12,13,14	matters 23:3
43:1 60:14	looking 26:20	21:17	65:15 66:7	27:4 47:12
78:17 80:24	63:7,7	Manhattan	67:20,22,23	81:17 104:17
89:21	Lopez76:7,17	67:18	69:8,13,13,20	McCulloch
limiting 43:21	78:6,7 79:2	manner26:18	69:22,24 70:1,2	15:14 63:13,14
51:2,5,7,12	lose 70:22	110:7,24	70:4,5,5,13,14	109:20 110:5
54:17 74:6 76:2	lot 33:9 34:17	manufacturing	70:16,21,25	mean 8:15 13:23
76:5,10,12 77:3	55:7,12 58:13	95:18,21	72:12,13,23,23	14:2 16:8 27:6
77:8 78:15	61:7	106:19 107:19	75:14 78:14,17	27:13 29:19
94:19 106:25	lots 11:4 67:17	March 1:10	78:19,20,21	46:5 48:23 49:6
limits 16:19,20	79:12	marijuana 48:17	81:11,24 82:9	56:19 57:9,11
30:16,17	low52:19	61:20,24 62:10	83:6,23 84:4	60:12,18 61:1
line 107:8,17,18	lower 57:15,23	market 3:24,25	87:11 89:4,7,14	61:24 62:12
107:19	98:20	4:3,4,7,18,19	89:15,17 91:9	64:10 65:18
liquor 92:6	lowering 56:20	5:10,11,15,15	91:16,22,25	67:10,25 72:13
listed 46:19	lowers 75:19	5:20,20,23,24	92:1,1,2,6,7,8	78:6,25 94:5
literally 89:18	105:18	6:1,8,15,15,16	92:13,16,21	98:10
little 25:22 60:9	lunch 7:20	6:17 7:9,9,11	93:7,10,14,16	meaning 66:13
60:21 65:17		7:12,14 9:7,19	93:19,20,21,22	68:4
	I	I I		I

means 3:14,15	2:9 81:4	48:24 93:7,7,9	needing 58:5	71:17 85:24
4:15 17:21 18:7	midst 62:25	93:14	needs 13:2,3,4	numbers 37:18
18:12,14,18	miles 62:6	move 41:2 43:20	35:14	105:17
19:22 23:17,18	milk 35:20,21	moving 17:11	negative 86:22	nuts 75:5
24:22,23,24,25	93:21	mufflers 16:7	92:7	
25:2,4,11 26:22	million 3:20	multibillion 4:2	negatively 81:18	0
38:21 39:7	22:20 38:20		81:19 85:1,4,13	O 2:1 3:1
41:15 43:6	62:18,19,20,21	<u> </u>	91:6	objectives 24:18
89:18 90:10	68:13,17,18	N 2:1,1 3:1	never 13:6 32:16	50:16 89:25
101:23 109:15	71:18 72:1	name 97:20	36:22 67:10,11	obligate 20:18
109:15,19	76:21 103:11	narrow 76:7	67:12 71:9	21:16
meant 39:13	103:14,20	77:24	107:13 109:14	obligated 20:17
measured 57:3	108:24	narrower16:17	nevertheless	obligation 50:5
meat 93:24	mind 46:25	nation 73:14	45:15	110:21
mechanism 56:9	minimum 4:22	national 25:6	new28:5 37:3	obtain 13:20
mechanisms	5:17 8:19 11:10	26:4 28:24	52:17 64:22	obtaining 18:22
25:20	12:8 22:24 23:1	30:24 61:13	71:8 72:17 73:6	obviously 82:14
Medicaid 3:23	23:17 24:18	71:22,23	82:8 110:14,20	85:10 86:22
15:23 103:9	26:23 32:10	109:18	newborn 32:3	91:7 107:10
medical 4:6	39:1 102:6	nations 73:12	nexus 105:23	occur 8:21 29:12
36:18 37:22	110:12	nature 12:13	NFIB 1:22 2:10	29:12
48:7,13 76:22	minute 53:20	74:12	81:5	occurring 18:21
104:21	minutes 108:17	near 56:17	noncommerce	odd 90:20
Medicare 3:23	misheard 100:2	necessarily	107:22	offer 11:15 32:9
15:23 103:10	misleading 99:14	22:10	noncommercial	office 55:14
Medicare/Me	missing 42:18	necessary 4:23	76:10	109:7
25:22	misunderstand	12:11 21:13	nondiscriminat	offset 59:17
meet 84:10 102:5	104:25	22:24 27:11,12	98:1 100:25	Ogden 79:7
member 9:12	mix 83:4	27:13,14,20	noninsured	oh 26:8 39:23
members 49:21	model 25:22 59:1	42:8 44:9,12	56:23	86:8 90:22
68:12 76:13	modern 35:13	59:9 63:24 64:7	nontax 45:22	91:17 97:24
membership	moment 11:19	need 5:23 6:4,6	non-group 10:5	okay 28:20 53:16
41:15	11:20 22:9,12	6:11,19,22,24	non-risk 66:10	63:19 76:4 83:6
mention 49:25	42:13	7:1,3 8:24	norm 20:23 28:4	86:15 100:1
mentioned 64:9	money 8:1 9:9	11:11 13:19	normal 73:25	101:10,12
merely 52:21	14:19 36:15	18:1,15 19:14	norms 20:16	104:12
95:19	53:5,13 58:9	22:2,12 32:5,14	Northern 26:2	old 58:5,10
merits 76:1	59:18 61:7 64:1	32:16 36:15	notwithstanding	once 39:11,11,24
met 52:22	71:23	37:10 42:11	87:10	41:19 42:24
method 5:6 8:13	monster 108:6	44:25 48:7,13	novel 25:19,25	43:6,7 59:10
17:3 21:4 25:21	moral 31:9	53:8,12 58:20	25:25	68:23 69:21
26:25 40:9	100:13	82:25 90:18	now-conceded	71:3 73:9,18
41:22 42:20	morning 3:4 55:8	94:24 96:5	41:23	77:22 78:25
43:2 44:20	Morrison 86:4,9	needed 105:15	number 19:13	89:3
MICHAEL 1:21	mortgage 48:23	110:6	46:19 47:17,17	ones 58:9,21

	1	1	1	1
68:14 76:7	part 6:25 10:2	21:25 22:1,8	20:17 21:1,5	12:16,17 14:21
90:17	23:15,16 32:7,8	34:19 40:18	22:20 23:4	22:4 29:6 51:23
one's 44:25	43:25 55:16	45:3 54:21	26:16,24 29:6	62:22,23 76:14
open 77:23	103:22,23	56:20 58:9 59:9	29:22,22 32:1	77:21 83:5
operated 73:9	106:9	59:12,13 62:24	32:15 33:1,9,13	85:23 88:15,17
operates 65:11	participant 33:4	65:7 66:5 67:13	33:22 34:3,13	88:18 104:7,8
operation 49:7	94:1	69:15 70:23	34:14,22,23	105:12,12,19
opinion 96:16	participants 9:7	71:16,17 74:15	35:5,8 36:13	percentage
opponents 49:23	9:19,20 45:4	84:2,13,14 88:6	37:4,5,8,11,14	83:13 99:3,6
opposed 30:17	91:9,22,25 92:7	90:16 99:22	37:18,24 38:20	perfectly 32:23
opposite 11:7	92:8 95:14 96:8	payer25:6	39:25 40:1,18	100:9,15 105:1
47:4 80:7	96:9 106:11,12	paying 3:14,16	40:21 43:22	period 12:17
optimal 69:8	participate 5:18	8:13 15:22 21:4	44:13 48:1,6,9	68:9
option 67:20	6:8 19:11 26:24	39:7 58:17	52:11 54:9	periods 106:18
106:2	32:17 33:11	62:23 66:2,2	55:22,24 56:15	permissible 82:3
options 59:5	39:25 92:16	74:22 83:9 84:8	56:18,19 57:11	permitted 67:4
oral 1:12 2:2,5,8	participates	84:11 88:2	57:16 58:5,13	pernicious 99:13
3:7 54:1 81:4	31:22 32:13	102:7,18,19	58:14 61:7,8	person 13:7,24
order 5:1 9:21	40:25 41:25	payment 17:3	62:5,18,22	31:6 34:10 57:1
12:23 20:1 35:9	42:3	18:8,12 26:25	63:10 64:6 66:8	61:19 62:16
49:15,18 54:6	participating	40:9 41:15,22	66:13 67:11,17	104:19
63:5 80:4,8	40:2 65:3	42:20 43:2	68:8,13,17 69:6	pesticides 94:25
81:10	participation	44:20 59:17	69:12,14,14	Petitioners 1:5
ordinary 55:13	12:7 13:16	66:4 70:4 102:8	71:8,18 73:10	1:18 2:4,13 3:8
55:14	17:14 31:18,23	payments 84:19	73:17,20,25	108:20
ought 25:9 30:9	particular 24:3	93:3 104:4	74:2,8 75:13	phone 6:10 35:10
47:25 109:25	40:17 42:10	pays 59:16 74:3	76:22 77:23	phones 15:20
outside 67:23	65:2 89:14	pediatric 32:3,6	78:8,9,18 79:10	16:4
87:12 96:11	particularly	32:16 33:10	80:1 83:21 84:9	physician 12:16
105:21	23:23 76:9	penalties 46:19	84:12,17,18,20	physician's
P	108:2	46:21 48:19	86:1,5,12 87:22	109:7
	pass 21:13 80:11	penalty 24:16	88:5 90:15 92:5	picked 71:19
P 3:1	80:13 91:11	45:15,17 46:7	92:11,15,21,22	picking 85:20
pack 102:12,14	passage 17:18	48:10,10,14	92:25 93:1,6	place 54:11
102:20	passed 54:12	50:15,22 52:4	96:10,19 97:17	74:19 75:2
package 38:25	74:25 79:25	52:11 99:22	98:5,12,14,19	79:10 83:4
39:2 Bookong 26:3	paternalistic	100:11 102:12	99:3,15,18,23	plans 56:17
Packers 26:3	83:22	penalty's 100:1	100:8,14,16,23	plants 95:21
page 2:2 75:23	PAUL 1:19 2:6	people 4:6 5:22	103:11,19,21	playing 83:4
pages 96:17 paid 12:21 35:8	54:1	6:17 7:21 8:24	105:2,21	please 3:10 54:4
46:16 52:5	pause 53:20,22	10:11,15 11:5	106:11,20	81:7 85:8 86:17
	pay 7:25 9:9,13	11:11,12 12:12	108:8 109:6	86:19 104:1
paradigm 110:3	10:16 12:19	13:11 15:2	people's 12:7	plenary 81:14
parallel 110:15	13:21 14:22	18:21 19:10,12	17:13	89:17,20,23
parent 99:5	19:25 20:11,14	19:24 20:2,10	percent 3:17	106:3,8 108:14
	I	I	I	I

	1	1	1	1
point 8:21 9:1	76:20,21	practical 49:7	102:20	40:18,20 51:1
12:9,12 14:15	108:10	practices 29:11	prevailing 64:17	53:7 55:17 58:5
17:19 19:9,14	possible 55:19	precisely 75:14	prevent 84:13	58:20 65:13
24:4,12,16 28:8	possibly 43:22	75:15,16 95:12	preventive 55:13	70:7,11 71:22
29:14 34:9,12	98:5,25	99:20 103:1	previous 31:14	71:23 74:17
36:6 42:7 45:21	potential 105:10	108:12,13	previously 15:11	83:10,10 84:1,2
47:4 49:14,18	power8:18 12:11	110:15	15:16,17	92:23 93:5
54:25 55:4,20	12:11 23:13,24	preclude 4:5,5	pre-existing 4:21	98:22,24 101:4
55:25,25 56:8	25:5,9,10,19	4:20,20	29:10	101:25 105:10
56:14 66:21	30:17 35:5,7,21	predecessor	price 19:25 20:1	105:24 106:15
67:14 68:7,23	35:22 39:13,17	96:4	26:6 35:15	106:23,24
71:1 77:22	39:18,21 40:4	predicate 46:1	64:14,17 72:22	108:23 109:3,8
78:12,13 82:23	41:3,20 43:1,15	52:20,22	74:3,8,10 75:19	problems 4:10
83:1 84:15,25	43:16 45:23	110:18	102:20	24:10 38:13
87:5,9 90:1	46:9,13,23 47:2	predicated 31:18	prices 43:5	57:7 64:19
103:1 109:4,10	47:12,14,18	predict 6:23	pricing 29:11	67:25
pointed 103:7	48:3,20,25 49:2	55:15 71:13	principle 18:24	proceeded 55:8
points 55:7 93:17	49:17,22,25	predictions 69:1	27:21 28:9,13	process 30:10
police 6:2,22 7:3	50:2,4,6,13	predominant	28:13,17 42:25	61:10 66:24
77:7 79:2 80:22	51:8 53:15 54:7	3:14,15 12:20	43:21 51:2,7,12	78:1 95:18
89:20	54:9 55:1 59:24	preexisting	54:17 74:6	producers 64:13
policed 28:23	60:13,14 63:14	97:15	76:11,12,15	produces 38:14
policies 32:1	63:18,20 66:17	premise 38:9	77:8.78:15	product 13:20
policing 30:24	69:5 73:1,2,5,6	70:6 80:19 81:9	83:21 94:19	15:1,3 22:10
policy 10:5 33:25	73:9,13,16,16	premium 10:4	principled 13:22	43:23,23 72:10
34:1,2 59:19	77:12,12 79:1,5	56:20 73:25	14:1	91:23 93:22
75:11 81:23	79:6,9,12 80:16	premiums 9:23	principles 45:6	94:6,9,17 97:9
91:4 106:5	80:22 81:14,20	19:15 57:15,19	51:5 76:2,5,17	97:10 105:8
107:14	81:22 82:1,2,2	73:21 75:19	77:3 78:4,5	107:6,7,10,12
pollution 88:16	82:8,10,14,17	98:20,23	91:2,3 106:25	107:15,15
pool 37:11 48:7	82:18,19,20	100:24 101:1	Printz 28:4	production 72:21
55:22 57:14	85:1,3,10,11	105:19	prior 101:21	82:11
90:18 97:17	86:1,14 87:13	prescribe 79:6	private 58:15,24	products 82:10
105:18 109:10	87:15 88:18	prescribed77:15	58:25 72:16	profile 57:19
population 11:17	89:17,21,21,23	prescribing 79:8	90:19,20,23	profit 11:16
12:15 22:4 99:7	101:11 106:6,6	presenting 92:11	93:9 100:18	profits 51:24
105:12	107:9,11	preserve 80:5	101:17 103:11	profound 87:10
pose 55:17	108:12,14	90:19,23	problem 3:12 4:8	programs 3:22
posing 33:8,8	110:13	President 47:8	4:9 7:11 10:22	103:22
position 5:14	powers 14:5	47:20,23,24	11:1,2 22:20	prohibiting 105:7
39:16 41:13	21:14 22:23	pressure 88:12	24:3 27:5 32:11	prohibits 105:13
44:19 54:19	27:23,24 28:14	presumably	32:22 33:20	prolonged 83:12
59:3 93:15	28:15 29:20	57:18 75:3	36:11,23 37:20	promote 81:10
101:15,19	30:14 53:6	presume 11:24	38:2,5,7,12,19	81:16 82:1,8,18
possibility 67:14	106:3	pretty 43:8 61:17	38:19,24 39:3,5	82:19,19 106:6

	I	I	1	I
promotes 85:14	106:5	90:3,4,9,14	99:11	regulate 5:1
87:17	punishment	92:18 106:10	read 30:21 50:4	21:19 29:9
promoting 82:15	51:14	106:21	52:14,19 79:20	39:14,17,18
proper 12:11	punitive 51:14	questioning	96:16 97:1	40:6,15,16,21
27:11,15,16,20	purchase 5:6,11	27:25	real 58:5 67:24	41:22,23 43:5,8
28:4 42:9 44:10	21:3,17 32:2,7	questions 46:10	74:16,23	43:10 44:20
63:24 64:7 69:3	33:10,13 34:3	63:4 91:4	reality 35:20	54:6,8,13,24
79:19	40:22 43:22,23	104:16	56:24 57:2	54:25 55:19
property 89:23	54:16 56:16	quite 13:13,14	realizing 60:14	56:4,5,10,14
108:5	72:10 78:19	17:19 71:20	really 10:1,15,21	65:1 68:24
prophylactic	81:10 85:14		29:3 53:1 76:2	73:12 77:12
93:11	87:17 91:7 94:2	<u> </u>	78:6,10 92:14	79:6 82:2,18,20
propose 15:20	94:19 107:12	R 3:1	105:23 106:21	84:23 85:1,3,11
proposition	purchased 4:16	radioactive	107:6	89:5,19 91:24
49:19	17:20,23,25	52:20	reason 8:11 31:2	92:4,5 93:4,6
protect 80:17	purchases 16:24	Raich 44:15	31:2 32:10 37:7	95:18 96:10
protected 30:23	17:1 43:17	73:23 91:9 97:4	41:19,20 50:21	104:5,8 106:6
98:15	purchasing 18:22	rail 95:3	73:8 79:18	108:1
protection 48:12	purely 16:23	raise 25:5 35:19	87:25 104:5	regulated 5:5
provide 3:18,25	76:9 95:23	48:4,8,15,19	105:15 108:7	11:14 26:10
10:11 55:21	purpose 16:25	48:21 59:12,22	109:5,17	43:11 55:17
69:15 76:23	48:6,21,21	73:21 96:23	reasonably	81:18 87:12
88:2 107:11	65:18	raised 19:15	22:10 27:5,12	109:24
provided7:12	purposes 10:12	raises 49:1 51:3	27:13,16	regulates 21:4
12:24	17:2 57:4 69:7	raising 53:13	reasons 5:18	23:18,19 43:10
provider 104:4,7	102:24	92:10,13	14:7 52:13	43:11 94:18
providers 9:20	put 39:16 58:4	Ranch 51:13	79:12 83:22	95:2
provides 6:24	63:25 64:6	range 32:14	89:6	regulating 4:14
23:22	88:16 94:20	rate 37:23	REBUTTAL	8:13 14:9 17:12
providing 53:10	100:25 108:6	rates 9:21,22	2:11 108:19	17:15 19:21
104:21	p.m 111:4	11:13,16 35:6,8	received 10:18	22:7 26:11,14
provision 4:23		37:2,12 57:23	recognizes	26:14,17,21
8:20 11:10 12:8	<u>Q</u>	104:20	102:24	28:25 30:3,25
22:24 23:18	question 16:18	rating 4:22 11:3	redeemed 81:22	43:1 44:8 55:25
24:19 25:25	19:7,8 23:10	11:9,15 23:2	reduce 81:11	65:7 77:20 91:5
26:23 27:9 32:2	24:9 25:16,16	37:1 39:1 57:17	reducing 81:16	91:18,19,22
39:2 46:1,2	27:3 30:15 33:8	57:18 59:10	refer 49:5	93:25 95:14
52:19 110:12	33:18 42:7	rational 40:7	referred 96:6	108:8
provisions 22:25	43:13,14 46:10	rationale 16:16	reflect 9:22	regulation 5:12
23:1 52:21	46:14 47:6 49:4	16:17,23 35:3	reforms 4:18,24	6:16 7:9,10
100:25 110:6	49:10 56:5 57:8	71:1 106:5	8:19 11:3,9	12:6 15:6 19:4
proximately	63:7,13 66:15	rationales 77:24	22:17,19 38:25	26:22,24 28:6,7
104:19	66:24 69:3,3,10 78:8 11 22	rationalize 15:25 63:1	39:2	30:12 31:23
public 100:18	78:8,11,23		refuse 97:14	33:15,19 38:8
101:7,16,18	84:22 89:10	reaction 63:23	regardless 87:13	38:14 42:20
	l	l	I	I

44:11,11 54:15	58:10 88:1,4	100:18 102:7	105:18 109:10	save 14:18 61:7
60:25 61:25	108:4	responsible	risks 17:22 44:12	saved 8:1 99:11
64:11 69:8	requirement	102:7	57:1,14	saving 60:6
78:16 80:21	5:17 8:15 24:15	responsive 41:18	road 15:25 62:6	saw 58:5 109:15
81:16,20 82:8,9	42:6 44:21,23	rest 36:19 38:21	roadside 6:2	saying 20:5,7,10
85:2 91:10 92:8	51:25 52:7,10	53:3 84:2,11	ROBERTS 3:3	21:24 22:6
94:10,15 95:21	66:16 93:8	92:17,23 93:1	5:25 6:20 17:17	26:16 31:11
97:7,25 109:23	97:12 102:6	restrictions 95:6	18:4,9,14,17	39:16 52:23
regulations 4:5	109:4 110:17	95:7	30:11 31:24	58:22 69:17
96:18 98:1	requires 31:3	result 14:19	32:12 33:7 39:6	70:11 73:1 79:5
regulatory 43:25	32:9	19:15 20:15	39:10 40:11,14	96:3 97:8 98:19
67:24 82:3	requiring 10:15	35:22 84:17	41:17 42:4,14	100:8 101:6
reject 24:8	10:17 12:9 32:1	87:23,23	42:18,23 50:8	102:11,13
related 46:21	32:15 33:9	results 22:20	50:11,20 53:19	103:3 106:7
relation 12:1	37:20 38:16	return 78:22	53:23 64:23	says 17:5 29:20
31:8	94:2 95:16	returning 107:2	78:22 81:1 82:5	41:11 62:24
Relations 26:5	100:10	revenue 25:5	82:7,22 83:17	63:18 73:5 74:1
relationship	rescue 31:6	46:16 48:5,9,15	93:12 108:15	78:17 79:21
31:15	reserve 53:17	48:20,21 49:1	111:2	94:10 100:4
relative 83:15	reserved 29:21	50:17 51:3 52:2	Rock 26:7 35:16	102:5 109:20
relatively 57:13	30:23	59:12	role 90:19	scale 72:21
57:13 66:9,10	resist 80:19	revenue-raising	room 24:5 55:10	74:10
relevant 26:13	resort 3:24	48:5	55:18 57:2	Scalia 4:10,13
68:9 83:6,16	respect 30:7	rid 62:11	74:14 75:16	5:9,14 12:25
religious 5:18	32:18 35:14	riders 84:18	99:4 103:8	13:6,8,22 19:23
rely 25:20 69:1,2	43:5,6 44:7,15	right 7:19,23	rooms 75:3 99:16	20:5,6,9,18,24
remain 28:15	44:16,17,17	10:14,21 15:7	99:18	26:8,21 27:10
remaining	46:14 49:16	30:13 35:12	roughly 10:6	28:8,12,20
108:18	65:8 70:3 71:21	41:17,17,18	Royal 26:7 35:16	29:13,16,19
remedy 109:3	74:6 77:19	42:4,14 47:5	rule 19:22 31:10	35:10 36:13,17
repeating 42:19	78:14 84:16	49:8 52:17 53:5	31:10 41:14	36:21,24 37:19
replete 49:20	110:21	53:23 54:22	79:6,7,8	38:2,4,10,13
reply 17:18	respectfully	55:2 64:25	<u> </u>	41:4,7,14 46:3
represent 69:17	110:25	65:24 66:20,22		47:8,10,16,22
80:12	respond 92:18	68:7,25 69:13	S 2:1 3:1	52:23 53:8,12
represents 54:4	Respondents	70:18 73:22	sake 17:20,23,25	53:16 63:4 78:3
Republic 73:13	1:20,22 2:7,10	75:25 78:25	sale 8:21 12:10	87:5
require 4:21 6:9	10:7,8,20 12:21	82:21 85:15,16	12:12 24:16	scenarios 64:4
12:22 15:19	24:2 42:2 54:2	86:4 98:25	42:7 54:25 56:1	scheme 26:20
32:7 33:12	81:5	102:22 103:18	56:8,14 109:4	43:25 44:7,8,13
37:22,23 39:25	responding 6:10	rights 21:14	Sanchez48:18	44:14,19 52:25
66:18 86:1,12	response 6:23	risk 36:18 48:7,7	sanction 51:17	scienter 51:19
88:22 89:2	49:18 96:25	57:11,19 66:1,9	satisfies 14:11	51:25 52:6
91:20 108:5	responsibility	70:15 71:11	satisfying 18:15 18:18	Scientists 69:18
required 34:3,18	16:15 59:17	83:23 105:2,3,4	10.10	scope 32:21

39:14	sensible 25:1	short 68:5	small 10:2 83:15	21:10 23:6,8,12
second 21:18	105:8	shot 99:11	smaller 37:12,12	45:10,13 51:1,6
23:16 46:12	separate 45:25	show 12:3 42:12	social 20:16,23	54:18,23 55:2
51:18 77:9	46:2,10	42:16 109:6	58:3,17,25	59:15,25 60:3
79:20	serious 22:20	showed 23:3	90:15	66:12,19,23
second-guess	40:17	shows 14:4 71:22	society 12:18	67:9,16 68:2
75:22 107:13	seriously 71:13	71:22	solar-powered	77:10,19 78:2
section 79:15	79:4	sick 11:6,17	60:4	80:10,14,18
sector 90:19	serve 10:13 17:3	37:10 68:19	sold 97:5	94:5,8,21,23
secure 23:23	service 13:20	69:14,14 71:12	solemn 110:21	95:17 96:1,2
64:2	16:6 17:3 20:15	71:13 73:22,22	Solicitor 1:16	99:2,10,25
Securities 26:3	21:4 25:6 44:22	75:10 84:9	76:6 78:13	101:2,5,10,12
Security 58:3,18	52:2 57:3 74:4	89:12 98:9,11	79:21 80:6 81:8	101:14 102:4
59:1 90:15	74:13 100:15	98:14 100:8	82:16 83:8	102:15,18,23
see 8:22 16:8	services 1:4 3:5	side 8:16 15:24	solve 37:19 38:7	Sotomayor's
21:10,18,21	6:2,11 7:14,15	16:5 24:13 30:8	39:2 53:7 70:7	78:23
25:1 39:22 43:1	7:23 8:9 10:10	34:8 64:12	70:8,10,10	sought 57:21
58:20 61:12,16	10:16,17 18:23	sign 55:24	solving 33:19	sounds 62:13
63:9 73:10 78:2	19:13 21:25	signed 109:9	somebody 7:24	76:1
90:1,10 98:17	22:8 31:20 32:3	significant 9:15	8:2,4,7 10:18	soup 75:5
106:17 111:3	32:6,15,17	18:10 39:20	24:5 26:11	south 70:21
seek 13:20	33:10,10,24,25	40:5 43:12	32:25 35:23	sovereigns 28:6
seeking 5:3	40:9 54:20	56:13	37:21 38:16	sovereignty
109:7	56:17,25 72:7	simple 99:11	57:9 62:4,9	27:17
seeks 110:19	set 35:6 46:1	107:6	70:22 72:16	special 80:2
seen 21:11,13	77:16 88:4	simplest 96:14	74:21 75:10	speculation
76:7	101:7,16 103:8	simply 37:20	somebody's	57:24
self-created 38:4	103:9,9,10,12	51:2 53:2,3	72:10	spend 59:18
self-insurance	103:22	55:20,24 77:6	someone's 68:4	sphere 28:24,25
21:18	setting 52:20	78:14,17 81:15	somewhat 15:9	29:5 30:22,23
self-insure 14:18	108:9	89:13 93:8	son 99:4	sponsor 49:16
21:20 84:9	severe 31:9	103:19 110:18	soon 60:13	spread 59:11
self-insuring	share 55:23	single 10:5 25:6	sooner 13:2,9	stand 99:7
96:3	shared 59:17	71:6	15:3 84:13	standard 38:7
self-purchasing	102:7	sitting 57:1 70:20	sorry 18:10 82:6	stand-alone 46:1
5:9	shares 13:15	situation 6:17	85:7,19 86:8	stare 65:21
sell 37:21,23	sharing 75:1	9:15 16:9 17:10	94:7,22 97:10	start 63:13
55:5 102:13	Sherman 26:1	24:21 37:16	99:25 100:1	started 53:24
sellers 87:18	shift 8:2 34:21	45:23 49:24	sort 55:20 57:10	state 9:9 22:16
sells 37:23	45:3 75:10	50:19 71:21	97:25 106:17	29:5 44:6 56:22
Senate 49:18	shifted 88:5	110:4,15	sorts 68:8,25	76:15 80:2,4,16
Senator 49:16	shifting 9:7 70:24	situations 13:23	75:6 82:11	109:16
sense 25:7,24	75:8,12,13	14:1 15:21 17:2	83:14 89:6 95:6	States 1:1,13
56:5,9 70:15	87:25	17:9,10 45:16	95:21,22	15:15,22 23:3
102:3	Ship 15:23	72:9	Sotomayor 21:7	24:13 27:17
				l

28:6,16 29:16	strands 21:11	71:5	88:5	51:21,23 52:10
29:21,21 30:12	strange 90:14	substantially	survivor's 58:6	52:11 53:1,13
30:13,17,23	strawman 100:4	103:16,21	susceptible	53:15 58:7
36:25 38:24	street 99:23	substantive	62:18	59:11,20 60:3,4
52:18 61:2	strikes 14:18	30:10 56:13	Sutton 97:2	60:5,11,17,17
62:17 64:2,7	71:25	66:24	Sutton's 96:16	60:19,19,20,21
66:14,15,21,25	striking 25:18	substitutes 97:5	sweeping 62:17	60:22,24 61:3
67:2 71:25	strong 45:8	successful 48:8	85:22 86:13	79:13,13,14,14
76:14,15 80:11	structure 27:18	48:25	system 3:13,18	79:15,17,17,18
80:12,13,20,22	45:24,25	succinctly 43:21	3:23 7:12 14:5	79:21,22,25
80:23 85:22	100:12	suffer 68:17	15:22,25 36:9	88:3 101:7,11
95:7,11,11	structured 79:14	71:11	37:15 63:1	101:17,22,24
103:13 109:16	study 38:22	suffered 108:25	76:23 80:9 88:4	102:1,14
110:14	stupid 36:13	suffering 68:17	90:15 101:8,16	110:18
statist 91:3	subject 10:15	sufficient 11:16	101:18 103:2	taxation 102:24
statistic 83:7	13:24 33:22	suggest 24:3		taxed 51:10 53:5
statistical 84:23	52:11 79:2	25:23 30:8	T	taxes 46:5,20,21
86:2 88:20 93:5	109:23	60:12 92:5	T 2:1,1	60:15
statistically 85:3	subjects 5:11	93:22 96:10,15	take 11:4,11	taxing 45:23
85:12 95:20	submit 30:7	101:23	18:25 34:12,17	46:23 47:2,18
statistics 83:5	110:25	suggested 46:25	53:20 67:25	48:20,25 49:2
88:25	submitted 111:5	57:9 92:9	72:18 76:21	49:17,22 51:8
status 97:14 98:7	subset 100:20	suggesting 49:6	77:1,4 78:12	59:24 60:13,14
statute 14:11	subsidies 4:2	55:18	80:1 90:21	79:12 110:13
23:23 31:21	39:1 59:14	suggestion 109:9	93:20	taxpayer 102:5
32:9 45:17	subsidize 10:17	sun 78:21	takeover 59:2	102:10
54:12 57:25	32:24 33:2 35:5	supply 64:12	talk 72:8,11	taxpayers 71:15
65:11 70:6	35:9 57:22	91:8,19,23	talked 23:25	teetotalers 92:5
74:25 75:3	58:21 82:11	support 64:14	talking 8:3 24:21	telephone 35:6
110:23	100:21,24	supported 10:8	28:21 30:12	35:14
stay 36:8 92:5	subsidized 36:5	supports 26:7	56:3 65:10	tell 19:8 22:10
stays 30:22	100:19	35:15 71:2	69:22,23,25	31:12 41:4 63:3
step11:21 18:25	subsidizers 36:4	suppose 7:19	tangible 14:19	66:13 73:23
61:5 79:5	subsidizing 35:23	35:18 39:12	targeted 10:9 tax 25:5 29:8	80:10 92:20
stimulating	subsidy 10:11	49:3 65:9	41:3 45:11,16	telling 50:11
16:25	11:12 29:8 35:2	supposed 27:22	,	64:10 75:21
stipulate 12:2	59:8,11,13	27:23	45:17,21 46:6,7 46:9,11,20,23	tells 97:15
104:18	105:16	Supreme 1:1,13	47:1,3,7,9,14	104:13
Stockyards 26:3	substance 32:3,5	sure 6:5 7:2,5 9:8	47:17,18,22,22	temporal 109:22
stop 31:8 77:25	32:6 33:12	22:15 25:3,13	47:25 48:3,4,5	tend 11:6
stopped7:22	substantial 5:8	65:24 97:24	48:18 49:5,10	Tenth 29:19
store 35:21	14:10 23:20	100:16 105:1	49:23,25 50:2,4	term 56:17
straightforward	24:22 29:1 30:2	surely 56:7 82:5	50:6,9,12,12	terms 35:2 39:14
59:7	30:4,25 36:18	82:7 105:22	50:13 51:11,14	46:9 63:11 89:5
strand 21:12,18	43:24 61:17,22	surreptitiously		94:13
L	•	•	•	•

terrible 85:22	35:3,3 36:9,11	87:4 89:20	travel 43:6	U
109:1	36:11,17,21	91:13,13 97:11	travels 88:17	ultimately 71:2
test 14:8,12	38:8,14 39:4,19	102:19 103:17	Treasury 100:19	72:13
90:25 91:3	42:1,14,19	thousand 9:24	treat 34:16 45:17	uncertain 15:9
106:13,13,21	43:13 45:8,20	14:22 74:1	treated 45:15	45:1
107:5	46:5,9,9,17,24	threatening	110:17	uncompensated
tests 106:18	47:5,13,23 48:2	108:2	treatment 32:4,5	9:18,21 14:22
text 73:11 81:13	49:12,24 50:18	three 21:11	32:6 33:12	14:24 74:17,20
107:24	51:9 52:12,13	22:13 51:15	37:22 88:2	75:2 81:12,17
Thank 53:19	52:16 55:6	76:6	tribes 5:19	83:10,11 84:17
81:1,6 108:15	56:12,12 57:6	throwing 99:18	tried 38:24 56:14	unconstitutional
108:21 111:2	59:4,5,22 60:2	99:23	67:7 70:8,10	101:23
thankfully 67:10	60:8,12,13,16	thrown 99:16	tries 70:24	undeniably 65:11
theoretically	60:24 61:7,8,11	time 12:16 15:17	tripled 37:3	undercut 44:14
35:19	63:22 64:3,5,9	22:11 36:9	true 6:1,5 8:6	understand
theory 32:12	64:10 65:24	44:21 53:18	34:6 35:19,24	11:24 18:4
54:16 59:25	66:15 67:5,17	69:5 93:2	48:16,17,18	29:13 31:25
69:11,12 93:4	67:24 68:11	106:15	56:23 78:20	36:12 42:21
They'd 98:8	70:18 71:2	times 24:1	92:3 94:5,8	101:6
thin 65:17	73:13,15 74:6	timing 24:14 42:7	104:16,22	understanding
thing 8:15 35:14	74:19 76:3 77:7	44:24 56:4,10	try 22:16 25:15	38:9
50:1 55:9,10	77:22 78:10	56:12 84:4	90:17	understands
60:16 62:2,25	79:3,4 80:11,13	today 21:12,24	trying .32:10	95:14 103:2
63:9 65:9 79:20	82:23 86:3 87:5	58:14 96:3	34:21 36:7	108:8
90:21 109:25	89:17 90:25	told 14:20 46:18	64:13 70:7,9	understood 47:7
things 12:5 40:22	91:3,11 93:13	tomorrow72:15	75:21 76:21	47:25 73:16
41:23 47:11	93:20,21 95:4	103:3 111:3	82:13 90:19	109:14
52:3 55:15	96:1,7 99:2,6	tool 27:4,6,7	Tuesday 1:10	undoubtedly
57:20,20 62:3	101:23 102:15	torts 31:4	turn 45:10 77:1,4	96:15
69:7 73:4 75:6	102:15,23	totally 89:10	82:16 86:17	unexpected 22:5
79:11 82:11	104:16 106:2,8	tradition 31:5	turned85:21	unexpectedly
85:1,3,4 91:5	106:20 107:8	traditional 25:21	99:5	34:15
96:19 103:19	107:16 109:2	trait 13:15	turns 69:6 72:14	unfathomably
106:20	109:11,17	transaction	88:15	109:13
think 6:14,14,15	110:3	23:20 56:4,6	two 12:5 14:7	unhappy 106:18
7:7,13,18 8:10	thinks 24:23	transfer 108:5	23:22 27:15	unhealthy 33:2,4
8:15 10:19,20	110:15	transferred9:18	44:5 45:7 46:10	37:18 105:12
10:21 12:2,6	third 21:21 22:6	9:19	47:11,16,17	uniform 15:22
16:16 17:8	51:19	transfers 35:18	55:7 57:7 64:4	51:10 52:25
18:19 21:23	thought 6:25	89:23 108:11	65:19 75:7 76:16 78:4 5	uninsured 73:20
23:22 24:8,11	14:14,25 15:13	translates 9:23	76:16 78:4,5	73:24 83:13
24:25 25:17	15:18 19:9 20:9	transplant 6:7	79:11 83:3	84:21 93:4
27:2 29:3 30:1 31:17 32:9,19	20:10 50:12,14 50:21 54:13	13:3,4	93:17 96:17 97:16 104:18	104:8,9,19
32:23,23 33:7	60:20,21,24	transportation 18:1 72:7	type 25:22	unique 12:2,13
54.43,45 55.1	00.20,21,24	10.1 /2./	·ypc 23.22	14:25 104:14
L				

104:15	v 1:6 3:5 61:2	vested 77:12	wants 58:25	27:15 40:23
uniquely 70:24	79:7 110:14	view 17:6 29:4	82:16,17 90:23	44:1,3 45:18
104:19	valid 59:23 60:25	39:5 52:16	Washington 1:9	82:9 98:21,23
United 1:1,13	78:16 80:20	85:15,16	1:17,19,21 7:20	100:5
15:15,22 24:13	valuable 35:1	viewed 52:10	wasn't 28:8 47:9	wheat 61:21 62:7
52:18 61:2	value 100:15	viewing 38:23	47:25 52:1	62:8 64:11,14
62:17 64:2,7	vast 28:15 67:11	views 45:5	60:25 79:13	64:17 91:15,16
71:25 76:15	Verrilli 1:16 2:3	violate 28:3	waste 52:20	91:19,21 93:22
85:22 103:13	2:12 3:6,7,9	violated 27:17	way 4:16 8:3 12:2	93:24 97:4,5,6
110:14	4:12 5:2,13	violates 27:20	12:20 14:11	Wickard 44:15
universal 17:22	6:13 7:7,15,17	79:19	19:18 22:17	64:11 65:1,1
unlawful 80:2	8:5,10 9:2,5,11	violation 103:18	25:3,14,25 26:1	73:23 91:9,14
unpasteurized	9:14 10:19,25	violence 86:5,21	26:12,24 28:22	91:18
94:24	12:5 13:5,13	87:12	30:21 31:16	widowed 58:10
unprecedented	14:7,14 15:4	virtually 5:19	35:7 36:8 38:24	windfall 75:18
11:20 26:1,2,4	16:2,10,14,22	12:17 22:3	40:7 47:5 48:24	wipe 95:8
26:5 54:5 79:4	17:8 18:3,6,11	31:22 37:5	52:14,17 54:21	wishes 10:13
unpredictable	18:16,19 19:2,4	44:23 55:4 68:3	56:25 58:3,4,22	withdrawing
13:17	19:19,23 20:4,8	68:5 78:21	59:13 67:23	67:20
unrealistic	20:12,20 21:2,8	visit 12:16 62:22	68:5 70:10,18	woman 87:9
109:10	22:16 23:7,11	visits 55:10,14	72:19 73:15	women86:21
unusual 35:4	23:14 24:11	55:19	78:17 84:13	87:12
unwillingness	25:15 26:19	vis-à-vis 96:8	89:24 91:10,20	wonder72:17,24
74:7	28:3,11,18,22	voluntarily 108:9	93:11 95:4	words 81:25
upfront 66:4	29:15,18,25	voluntary 83:24	97:25 99:21	83:15 92:3
upheld 26:2,4,6	30:19 31:17	voted 49:18	100:5,7,9	107:20,21
30:5 35:16	32:8,18 33:14		104:21 110:24	work 3:23 58:3,3
45:22 48:18	34:5,23 35:12	W	ways 24:9 39:19	97:16 98:5,11
50:6 110:24	36:1,3,6,16,20	Wait 27:10	43:12 83:3	98:11 106:21
uphold 110:11	36:23 38:1,6,11	walked7:20	wealth 108:11	106:22 109:5,5
up-end 80:8	38:18 39:8 40:8	walking 31:7	web 67:24	109:14,15,18
urge 79:20	40:13 41:1,13	want 15:1 29:23	welfare 70:23	worked 68:13
110:11	42:1,5,16,22	37:25 56:16	74:21 80:17	109:16
use 21:25 25:5	43:9,19 44:1,3	58:18 60:12	went 37:3	works 4:16 10:24
25:10 27:7 32:3	44:5 45:12,20	61:5 62:25	we'll 53:20 71:12	11:1 36:9 48:23
32:5,6 33:12	46:8,22 47:10	65:14 71:25	111:3	71:6,6
39:17,18 68:6,8	47:20,24 48:16	72:13 85:24	we're 5:3 16:23	world 14:17
68:15 75:17	49:12 50:10,14	90:16 91:16	18:24 20:4 22:7	35:13 103:12
91:15	50:23 51:4,8	94:3,12,14,17	40:17,19,21	103:14 104:18
useful 46:9	52:12 53:6,10	96:20 100:16	41:13 43:15	worried 40:12
uses 4:22	53:14,17	101:5 102:13	59:18 67:8	worse 23:3
utmost 77:14	108:17,19,21	103:19 105:8	69:22,23 76:21	worth 60:14
utterly 109:10	versus 15:14	105:24	101:16 102:18	wouldn't 16:1
	106:19,19,22	wanted 15:25	105:23	55:17 56:15
V	107:15	56:18	we've 20:16	60:1 62:10

[L
63:24 70:9	1040 46:17	54 2:7		
98:25	108 2:13	57 62:22		
Wrightwood 26:7	11-398 1:5 3:4		_	
35:16	12:02 111:4	6	_	
written 76:17	15 105:19	60 49:18 88:18		
wrong 10:3 19:9	15th 46:17 50:18		-	
97:2	180,000 37:4	7	-	
Wyoming 71:9	1930s 107:4	7 14:21		
		70 105:11		
X	2	8	-	
x 1:2,8	20 104:7 105:19	80 3:17	-	
Y	2012 1:10	80,000 37:4		
	2016 10:6	81 2:10		
year 10:10 12:16	22 62:23	83 12:16		
29:8 40:18	220 54:23		_	
67:13 68:9,14 74:1	23rd 49:14	9	_	
74:1	26 80:12	9 79:15		
years 54:23	27 1:10	90 88:15		
yesterday 46:18 52:13	3	911 6:11		
York 28:5 52:18	$\frac{c}{32:4}$	95 76:14 83:5		
71:8 110:14,21	30 105:13	96 12:16		
young 7:21 10:8	30s 58:5			
34:6,7 36:7,14	30-year-old		•	
56:23 57:13	105:11			
100:23 104:19	30-year-olds			
105:2	105:24			
	39 49:19			
\$				
\$10 102:19	4			
\$100,000 62:24	4 79:16 108:17			
\$250 29:8	40 3:20 22:20			
\$5 102:12,14	38:20 62:6,18			
\$5,800 10:6	62:20,21 68:13			
\$695 99:22	68:17 71:18			
\$854 10:10	76:21 85:23			
1	103:10,14,20			
<u>1</u> 22:4	108:24			
10 51:23 62:18	43a 57:24 75:23			
64:15 68:18	45 62:6 73:5			
72:1	5			
10:00 1:14 3:2	5 105:12			
100 77:21 88:17	50 29:6 85:23			
104:8	5000A(a) 110:17			
100,000 64:22	5000A(b) 110:19			
		<u> </u>		