The USCIS Director’s Office just released a Policy Memorandum, Adjustment of Status is a Matter of Discretion and Administrative Grace, and an Extraordinary Relief that Permits Applicants to Dispense with the Ordinary Consular Visa Process (PM-602-0199) (May 21, 2026). The memo gaslights the public with polar opposite interpretations of what it means:

• On the one hand, USCIS spokesman Zach Kahler asserts: “From now on, an alien who is in the U.S. temporarily and wants a Green Card must return to their home country to apply, except in extraordinary circumstances.”^[1]
• On the other hand, the Memorandum itself claims it is not altering the status quo but merely “reminds officers” of the agency’s “longstanding approach” to adjudicating cases.

Neither position is accurate.

1. What Is Adjustment of Status?

Before 1952, the procedure for a noncitizen to obtain lawful permanent resident status (i.e., a green card) involved applying for an immigrant visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. In 1952, Congress enacted section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), allowing for noncitizens who had legally entered the United States to adjust status within the United States.^[2] This was intended by Congress to alleviate the cost and hardship to applicants and their U.S. family members of the applicant having to leave the United States to apply abroad, which could take months or even years.^[3] This is consistent with a central purpose of the INA, which is to keep families together. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6, 811–12 (1977).

INA § 245(a), as amended, currently sets forth as requirements to adjustment of status that:

1. the applicant must have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States”;
2. they must be eligible to receive an immigrant visa, meaning that USCIS has already decided they fit within a category specified by Congress (for example, the spouse or minor child of a U.S. citizen);
3. an immigrant visa is immediately available, meaning that they are at the top of their category’s waiting list to immigrate as described by the State Department’s Visa Bulletin; and
4. they must not be “inadmissible,” meaning they have not violated certain immigration or criminal laws, do not have certain communicable diseases, etc.
5. They must merit a favorable finding of discretion.

Approval of an immigrant visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad is not a matter of discretion. The statutory language that gives USCIS discretion in adjustment cases is the use of the word “may” in the following sentence: “The status of an alien … may be adjusted … to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence….^[4] Wielding the power of discretion in adjustment cases should be done with care. Where a noncitizen meets the other requirements for adjustment of status, USCIS’ “discretionary determination can either permit them to remain united or tear them apart.” Matter of Blas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 626, 635 (BIA 1974) (Roberts, Chairman, dissenting).

2. The Memo Misrepresents Existing Law to the Extent That It Requires Extraordinary Circumstances for a Nonimmigrant To Adjust

The new USCIS memo uses an incoherent word salad to explain that adjustment of status is “extraordinary”:

Congress, in establishing the nonimmigrant admission and parole processes, made it clear that aliens are expected to depart the United States when the purpose of their admission or parole has been accomplished. Generally, when a nonimmigrant or parolee fails to depart as required and instead seeks adjustment of status, it contravenes these Congressional expectations, though USCIS acknowledges exceptions including nonimmigrant categories with dual intent and immigrant categories where only adjustment of status provides a pathway to permanent resident status. While aliens who were inspected and admitted or paroled may request adjustment of status, as a general matter the discretionary approval of such a request is extraordinary given Congress’s intent that aliens should depart once the purpose for which they sought parole or nonimmigrant admission from DHS has been accomplished….

Such aliens are generally expected to pursue an immigrant visa and admission from outside the United States if they wish to reside permanently in this country. While such aliens may be otherwise eligible for adjustment of status, their contravention of this expectation and attempt to avoid the ordinary consular immigrant visa process, usually accompanied by their violation of our immigration laws, are adverse factors that the aliens may need “to offset…by a showing of unusual or even outstanding equities.” Matter of Blas, 15 I &N Dec. at 641 (emphasis added).

The memo’s claim that applying for adjustment “contravenes … Congressional expectations” is bonkers. Applying for adjustment of status is not a violation of nonimmigrant status. Matter of Hosseinpour, 15 I. & N. Dec. 191 (1975). And Congress enacted INA § 245(a) specifically to provide to nonimmigrants in the United States an alternative to applying for an immigrant visa abroad. It is not unexpected that a person who satisfies Congress’s threshold eligibility criteria may apply for a benefit Congress made available. Calling an application for adjustment of status contrary to Congress’s expectation is like saying it is unexpected for a taxpayer to claim a deduction that Congress placed in the Internal Revenue Code.

The idea that adjustment of status is “extraordinary” originates with a Federal court of appeals decision:

Because this form of relief circumvents ordinary immigration procedures, it is extraordinary and will be granted only in meritorious cases, and the burden is on the immigrant to prove that his case is meritorious…. [The government] must … exercise discretion in adjustment of status proceedings.

Chen v. Foley, 385 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 838 (1968). See Kim v. Meese, 810 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987). The court simply meant that applying for an immigrant visa is the ordinary, nondiscretionary procedure to obtain a green card, while adjustment of status is out of the ordinary and discretionary. Chen v. Foley nowhere states that adjustment of status should only be approved for a nonimmigrant in “extraordinary circumstances.”^[5] Instead, the court merely affirmed the Board of Immigrations Appeals’ decision to deny adjustment as a matter of discretion because Chen had entered the United States with a B2 (visitor for pleasure) visa, stating that he intended to “sight-see in Honolulu, Hawaii, for three weeks,” concealing from the consular officer his true preconceived “intent to stay permanently.”

A general requirement that a nonimmigrant prove “extraordinary consequences” to qualify for adjustment would be contrary to longstanding administrative and judicial interpretations of INA § 245(a). Matter of Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494 (BIA 1970) is the foundational Board of Immigration Appeals decision governing the exercise of discretion for purposes of adjustment of status under INA § 245(a). The respondent in Arai was a Japanese citizen admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor who remained beyond his authorized period, applied unsuccessfully for H (temporary worker or trainee) status, was granted voluntary departure, remained beyond the date he was required to leave, and then was found deportable. Crucially, no finding was made that the respondent had been anything other than a bona fide visitor when he first entered. Also, he had good moral character, a labor certification had been issued, and his proposed employment was of potential benefit to the United States.

The Board in Arai clarified and superseded the overly demanding standards of earlier decisions, setting forth the following operative guidelines:

Where adverse factors are present in a given application, it may be necessary for the applicant to offset these by a showing of unusual or even outstanding equities. Generally, favorable factors such as family ties, hardship, length of residence in the United States, etc., will be considered as countervailing factors meriting favorable exercise of administrative discretion. In the absence of adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily be granted, still as a matter of discretion.

Id. at 496.

In sum, under Arai, the burden remains on the applicant to prove they merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The determination is made by weighing positing and negative factors. When negative factors are absent, adjustment will ordinarily be granted. When adverse factors are present, the applicant must affirmatively demonstrate that countervailing positive factors to justify a favorable result. The heavier the negative factors, the more “unusual or even outstanding” the positive equities must be.

Careful reading of the new USCIS memo does not even show a new requirement that adjustment applicants must prove “extraordinary circumstances” to merit a favorable discretionary finding. The memo merely observes that “as a general matter the discretionary approval of such a request is extraordinary.” That is best interpreted, as in Chen v. Foley, that applying for an immigrant visa is the ordinary, nondiscretionary procedure to obtain a green card, while adjustment of status is out of the ordinary and discretionary. After all, USCIS has no authority to announce a rule changing the eligibility requirements for adjustment though a mere memo. USCIS would need to publish a regulation after providing the notice to the public and allowing public comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301–03 (1979).

3. The Memo’s Misleading Claim That Entry as a Nonimmigrant Is a Negative Discretionary Factor

As mentioned above, the USCIS memo claims that under existing law admission as a nonimmigrant is a negative discretionary factor:

With limited exceptions, the statutory scheme suggests that Congress expects aliens paroled into the United States or admitted into the United States as nonimmigrants to depart rather than pursue adjustment of status. Such aliens are generally expected to pursue an immigrant visa and admission from outside the United States if they wish to reside permanently in this country. While such aliens may be otherwise eligible for adjustment of status, their contravention of this expectation and attempt to avoid the ordinary consular immigrant visa process, usually accompanied by their violation of our immigration laws,18 are adverse factors that the aliens may need “to offset…by a showing of unusual or even outstanding equities.” Matter of Blas, 15 I&N Dec. at 641 (emphasis added).

That claim is misleading.

A. The USCIS Policy Manual’s General Approach to Making Discretionary Determinations

An applicant for adjustment of status bears the burden of submitting evidence that proves they are eligible to receive the immigration benefit sought.

As mentioned above, since adjustment of status is “discretionary,” even if an applicant meets all the other requirements, USCIS may deny the application based upon a determination that discretion should not be favorably exercised.^[6]

The USCIS Policy Manual tells officers that to make a decision, they must weigh all relevant positive and negative factors including, but not limited to^[7]:

Issue	Positive Factors	Negative Factors
Eligibility Requirements	Meeting the eligibility requirements for adjustment of status.	Not meeting the eligibility requirements may still be considered as part of a discretionary analysis.
Family and Community Ties	Family ties to the United States and the closeness of the underlying relationships. Hardship to the applicant or close relatives if the adjustment application is denied. Length of lawful residence in the United States, status held and conduct during that residence, particularly if the applicant began his or her residency at a young age.	Absence of close family, community, and residence ties.
Immigration Status and History	Compliance with immigration laws and the conditions of any immigration status held. Approved humanitarian-based immigrant or nonimmigrant petition, waiver of inadmissibility, or other form of relief and the underlying humanitarian, hardship, or other factors that resulted in the approval.	Violations of immigration laws and the conditions of any immigration status held. Current or previous instances of fraud or false testimony in dealings with USCIS or any government agency. Unexecuted exclusion, deportation, or removal orders.
Business, Employment, and Skills	Property, investment, or business ties in the United States. Employment history, including type, length, and stability of the employment. Education, specialized skills, and training obtained from an educational institution in the United States relevant to current or prospective employment and earning potential in the United States.	History of unemployment or underemployment. Unauthorized employment in the United States. Employment or income from illegal activity or sources, including, but not limited to, income gained illegally from drug sales, illegal gambling, prostitution, or alien smuggling.
Community Standing and Moral Character	Respect for law and order, and good moral character (in the United States and abroad) demonstrated by a lack of a criminal record and evidence of good standing in the community. Honorable service in the U.S. armed forces or other evidence of value and service to the community. Compliance with tax laws. Current or past cooperation with law enforcement authorities. Demonstration of reformed or rehabilitated criminal conduct, where applicable. Community service beyond any imposed by the courts.	Moral depravity or criminal tendencies (in the United States and abroad) reflected by a single serious crime or an active or long criminal record, including the nature, seriousness, and recent occurrence of criminal violations. Lack of reformation of character or rehabilitation. Public safety or national security concerns. Failure to meet tax obligations. Failure to pay child support. Failure to comply with any applicable civil court orders.
Other	Absence of significant undesirable or negative factors and other indicators of good moral character in the United States and abroad.	Other indicators adversely reflecting the applicant’s character and undesirability as an LPR of this country.

B. Existing Law Does Not Consider Nonimmigrant Admission Alone as a Negative Discretionary Factor

Many applicants for adjustment of status have been admitted to the country as nonimmigrants. A nonimmigrant is a foreign national who is allowed to come to the United States temporarily and only for a particular limited purpose. Examples of nonimmigrant statuses include:

• B-1 visitor for business or B-2 visitor for pleasure
• F-1 student
• H-1B, L-1, O-1, or TN, worker
• K-1 fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen

For certain H, L, O, and K nonimmigrants, an intent to immigrate at the time of admission is explicitly authorized. For other classes of nonimmigrants, nonimmigrant entry without intent to immigrate is not a negative discretionary factor. Nor is entry with hope to eventually immigrate. But a preconceived plan to immigrate is a generally a negative discretionary factor, and misrepresenting one’s intent to a consular officer or at the port of entry is more serious.

i. Certain H, L, O, and K Nonimmigrants

The USCIS memo acknowledges that preconceived intent to immigrate is not a negative discretionary factor for “nonimmigrant categories with dual intent and immigrant categories where only adjustment of status provides a pathway to permanent resident status.”

Persons applying for H-1B (specialty occupation worker) and L-1 (intracompany transferee) visas or seeking to enter in such status are not required to prove they are not immigrants under INA § 214(b). The same is true for their H-4 and L-2 dependents. Thus, a preconceived intent to immigrate is not a negative discretionary factor.

For O-1 (aliens of extraordinary ability) and their O-3 dependents, approval of a labor certification or the filing of an immigrant visa petition does not preclude granting O-1 or O-3 status.^[8] The alien may legitimately come to the United States for a temporary period as an O-1 or O-3 nonimmigrant and depart voluntarily at the end of his or her authorized stay and, at the same time, lawfully seek to become a permanent resident of the United States.^[9] So, preconceived intent to immigrate should not count as a negative discretionary factor.

K-1 fiancé(e)s and their K-3 children are admitted to the United States specifically for purposes of marrying a U.S. citizen within 90 days after admission^[10] and applying for adjustment of status.^[11] Since adjustment of status is specifically contemplated by the statutory scheme, preconceived intent to immigrate is not a negative discretionary factor.

ii. Entry with No Intent to Immigrate

Matter of Barrios, 10 I. & N. Dec. 172 (BIA 1963), stands for the principle that entry to the United States with genuine nonimmigrant intent but later changing one’s mind and applying for adjustment of status is not a negative discretionary factor. The Bolivian respondent in Barrios had previously been denied an immigrant visa, entered as a genuine visitor to see relatives and factories, and only after arrival, upon seeing an opportunity to work and study simultaneously, decided to apply for adjustment. The BIA granted adjustment, holding that the applicant did not formulate a specific intention to become a permanent resident until after arrival and that discretionary relief was warranted.^[12]

A nonimmigrant may be in the United States for years, for example, entering in F-1 (student) status for a course of study, then doing optional practical training, then changing to H-1B (specialty occupation) status for temporary work. Changing one’s mind by deciding to apply for adjustment after finding a long-term job or a U.S. citizen spouse is not penalized under the law.

Courts and the BIA look to the totality of evidence regarding the genuineness of the original intent: the circumstances of the visa application, the timeline of events after arrival, the nature of the relationship or opportunity that supposedly triggered the “change of mind,” and whether the applicant’s conduct before and after entry is consistent with the claimed sequence.

iii. Hope to Immigrate

“[P]reviously express[ing] a desire to enter the United States as an immigrant—and [even] still hav[ing] such desire—does not of itself preclude the issuance of a nonimmigrant visa nor preclude his being a bona fide nonimmigrant.” Matter of H-R-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 651 (Regional Comm’r 1958; approved by Ass’t Comm’r). See Matter of Hosseinpour, 15 I. & N. Dec. 191 (1975). The distinction is between a permissible hope and an impermissible fixed plan.

As such, entry as a nonimmigrant in genuine compliance with one’s nonimmigrant status—intending to depart as required—while privately hoping that circumstances might allow eventual immigration is not a negative discretionary factor. Matter of Barrios, 10 I. & N. Dec. 172 (BIA 1963), is such a case. He had previously been denied an immigrant visa but was later issued a nonimmigrant visa. The Board found that he had nonimmigrant intent when he was admitted, despite previously being denied an immigrant visa and presumably continuing to hope to immigrate. See also Brownell v. Stjepan Bozo Carija, 254 F.2d 78, 80 (DC Cir. 1957) (Applicants “shall not be denied adjustment of immigration status solely upon the theory that the intention, which these plaintiffs also held, to remain permanently in the United States if permitted to do so lawfully, made their entries of July 30, 1946, unlawful.”); Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 1960) (Admission to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant students was not illegal where applicants had secret desire to remain here, “if such an opportunity should offer itself.”).

iv. Preconceived Intent to Immigrate

Admission to the United States as a nonimmigrant with preconceived intent to immigrate is a negative discretionary factor (unless entering in H-1B temporary worker status (or dependent), L-1 intracompany transferee status (or dependent), or K-1 fiancée or K-2 status).

In Matter of Ibrahim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 55 (BIA 1981), the Board denied adjustment, holding that preconceived intent to immigrate was not outweighed by having a U.S. citizen sibling.

Matter of Cavazos, 17 I. & N. Dec. 215 (BIA 1980), represents an exception. The case involved a citizen of Mexico who entered the U.S. with a border crossing card as a visitor and married his U.S. citizen girlfriend the same day. They gave birth to a child the following year. The Immigration Judge denied his application for adjustment of status on the basis that he had entered the United Stated with a preconceived intent to remain permanently. The Board reversed, holding that where the only adverse factor is preconceived intent to immigrate, it is outweighed by the positive factor of having a U.S. immediate relative, i.e., spouse, parent, or unmarried minor child.

The line between permissible hope and impermissible preconceived intent is a fact-intensive determination. In Barrios, the respondent had permissible hope because he “was not decided about changing status to become a resident” and “wanted first to find out here about the circumstances and the opportunities.” Id. at 175. By contrast, the respondent in Matter of Vega, 11 I. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1965), who had been denied a nonimmigrant visa on a first attempt, made misrepresentations on a second application, and had secured documents supporting an adjustment application both before and shortly after arrival, was found to have entered with an impermissible “preconceived intention to establish permanent residence” and was denied relief absent substantial equities. Id. at 338-339.

Evidence of preconceived intent may include filing an adjustment application shortly after entry; gathering documents for an adjustment application before or immediately after entry; unauthorized employment beginning shortly after entry; having been previously denied an immigrant visa and then obtaining a nonimmigrant visa; fand the overall record of conduct suggesting the nonimmigrant trip was pretextual. See, e.g., Chen v. Foley, 385 F.2d 929 (1967) (“the record of the respondent’s employment and his persistent efforts to adjust his immigration status raises a doubt as to the bona fides of respondent’s entry as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure.”)

v. Misrepresentation to the Consular Officer or at the Port of Entry

Misrepresentation of intent adds an additional layer of adverse weight beyond mere preconceived intent. When a nonimmigrant actively deceives the consular officer about the purpose of their trip, their ties abroad, their employment, or other material matters in order to obtain a nonimmigrant visa, that deception is treated as a serious and independent adverse factor in the discretionary analysis—even if the misrepresentation falls short of the level of misrepresentation or fraud required to trigger the statutory inadmissibility ground under INA § 212(a)(6)(C). Matter of Blas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 1974).

Matter of Blas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 1974, AG 1976) applied Matter of Arai’s rule for discretionary decisions to a situation where a person granted a nonimmigrant visa had a preconceived intent to immigrate to the United States. Blas involved a citizen of the Philippines who entered as a visitor in September 1970, overstayed his visa, divorced his foreign wife,^[13] entered into a bona fide marriage to a woman (who subsequently became a U.S. citizen) in 1973, and applied for adjustment as an immediate relative. The record showed that the respondent came to the United States with a preconceived plan: to leave his wife and four minor children in the Philippines, to divorce, to remarry a U.S. citizen or resident, and to remain indefinitely.

When he applied for his nonimmigrant visa, he stated his purpose was a “pleasure trip” of 35 days and made no disclosure of his true intention to remarry or of his adoptive parents residing in the United States. The Attorney General held that “these factual distortions … appear to have been intended to … mislead immigration officials concerning the true nature and purpose of respondent’s desire to enter the United States.” Id. at 643. While the distortions did not rise to the level of actual fraud, the Attorney General considered them to be a negative discretionary factor. In weighing that negative factor against the positive factor of his U.S. citizen wife, the Attorney General stated:

Here the misleading omissions which occurred, while not rising to the level of actual fraud, were in furtherance of a concerted plan calculated to produce the equity which respondent now asserts should support favorable exercise of administrative discretion—to wit, an American marriage. Such conscious construction of an equity must in the nature of things dilute the quality of that equity and abate its ability to counterbalance the adverse impact of actions committed to produce it. Although family ties will ordinarily result in favorable exercise of Section 245 administrative discretion, it is my opinion that they neither must nor should do so where it appears that the alien has engaged in a course of deception designed to produce those very ties.

In short, the Attorney General found that the respondent’s adjustment application should be denied as a matter of discretion where the negative factor (his deception of the consular officer) outweighed the most important positive factor (marriage to a U.S. citizen) because concealing his intent to marry and that he had U.S. citizen adoptive parents was part of his concerted plan to deceive the consular officer.

4. What Should an Adjustment Applicant Do in Light of the USCIS Memo?

a. Hiring experienced counsel is more important than ever.

b. In every case, before filing, applicants and their counsel need to analyze the positive and negative factors listed above, to evaluate what are the odds of denial of adjustment by USCIS as a matter of discretion. In particular, consider the applicant’s intent at the time of admission. Then, if a decision is made to move forward with the application, evidence needs to be gathered to mitigate, explain, or rebut the negative factors and prove the positive factors. And a legal argument needs to be made that the application should be granted as a matter of discretion.

c. To the extent that a USCIS officer may rely on the new USCIS memo to require “extraordinary circumstances” for adjustment of status or to count mere admission as a negative discretionary factor, dispute that interpretation of the memo.

d. If the application is denied by USCIS based on the memo, consider challenging the denial, such as by a motion to reopen or reconsider, filing a new application before USCIS or before the Immigration Court (where this Memorandum is not binding), and/or litigation in Federal court.^[14]

e. Don’t be gaslit by the USCIS memo. One the one hand, USCIS spokesman Zach Kahler’s assertion is false that “From now on, an alien who is in the U.S. temporarily and wants a Green Card must return to their home country to apply, except in extraordinary circumstances.”^[15] On the other hand, the memo falsely claims that it is not altering the status quo but merely “reminds officers” of the agency’s “longstanding approach” to adjudicating cases. Neither position is accurate.

Footnotes:

1. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Trump Administration to Require Most Immigrants Seeking Green Cards to Leave the U.S., CBS News (May 22, 2026). ↑
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 245, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). ↑
3. House Report No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 63 (1952), described the statute as “specifically devised to obviate the need for departure and reentry in the cases of aliens temporarily in the United States.” Matter of S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 548 (BIA, 1961). See Jain v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 612 F.2d 683, 686-687 (2nd Cir. 1979). A 1960 amendment to this section was also motived by Congress’ attempt to reduce the administrative burden on consular offices, which were being flooded with applications from individuals who had to depart the United States solely to apply for immigrant visas. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005). ↑
4. INA § 245(a) (emphasis added). ↑
5. Where Congress intends to require extraordinary circumstances, the statute is explicit. For example, an application for asylum not filed within one year after the date of arrival in the United States may be considered only in “extraordinary circumstances.” INA § 208(a)(2)(D). And multiple Forms I-129F, Petitions for Alien Fiancé(e)s, may not be approved for the same petitioner within two years “except in extraordinary circumstances.” INA 214(d)(2)(B). Similarly, if Department of Homeland Security regulations intend to require extraordinary circumstances, the regulations are explicit. For example, An extension of nonimmigrant stay may not be approved if the applicant has failed to maintain their status, except that late filing may be excused if due to “extraordinary circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c)(4). ↑
6. See Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1981). ↑
7. 7 USCIS-PM A.10(B)(2) (internal citations omitted). See USCIS Policy Alert, Impact of INA § 212(f) on USCIS Adjudication of Discretionary Benefits (PA-2025-26) (Nov. 27, 2025). See also Gary Chodorow, Following National Guard Shooting, Immigration Restrictions Imposed on Nationals from 19 “Countries of Concern” (Dec. 3, 2025) (describing Trump administration Policy Alert that, for nationals from a country of concern applying for discretionary immigration benefits, USCIS will consider as a “significant negative factor” the country’s insufficient vetting and screening information shared with the United States). ↑
8. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(13). ↑
9. Id. ↑
10. INA § 101(a)(15)(K). ↑
11. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6). ↑
12. See also Matter of Blas, 15 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 1974) (citing Barrios for the principle that “Where the intention to remain here permanently was formulated after nonimmigrant entry,” it is not a negative factor). ↑
13. He and his wife had various differences. 15 I. & N. Dec. at 632. ↑
14. There is no administrative appeal of a denial by USCIS of a Form I-485, Application to Adjust Status. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). ↑
15. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Trump Administration to Require Most Immigrants Seeking Green Cards to Leave the U.S., CBS News (May 22, 2026). ↑